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Despite the advantages of the public cloud governments are still reluctant to deploy sensitive data and 
critical systems into the public cloud. The advantages of scalability and cost are attractive for 
governments and the current trend is for governments to consider placing more of their data and 
systems in the public cloud towards a more comprehensive government cloud solution. However, 
there are major concerns related to the public cloud that are especially significant to governments 
which are cause of reluctance in terms of public cloud adoption. Such concerns include security and 
privacy, governance, compliance, and performance. If these concerns are answered, governments will 
perceive less risk and be more confident to deploy to the public cloud. Besides the obvious technical 
solutions, which include improving security, another solution is an effective cloud service provider 
(CSP) - government relationship. 
Towards the development of such a solution the study contributes a novel approach to researching the 
CSP-government relationship in order to reveal, in depth and comprehensively, the relevant 
relationship and associated cloud issues, often neglected in previous research. Specifically, the 
developed research design was achieved through a mixed methods approach using a questionnaire and 
semi-structured interviews with senior IT professionals in various government ministries and 
departments in Saudi Arabia.  
The findings not only offer a comprehensive and in-depth understanding of the relationship, but also 
reveal specific relationship and cloud issues as problems towards the development of a solution to 
increase government confidence in the public cloud. Specifically, it was found that government were 
more concerned about areas of the cloud that are more relevant to government and there was often an 
associate lack of trust or perception of risk for these areas. Moreover, it was found that in relation to 
more specific areas of the cloud there was increasing concern in terms of trust and risk, the ability to 
negotiate and collaborate, and the perception of reputation.  
Based on these findings, which also revealed the various interplays between relationship factors as a 
novel contribution, the study offers recommendations to CSPs on how they may improve their 
relationship with the government. This is to be achieved through resolving relationship issues and 
associated cloud concerns within the relationship context towards improving government confidence 
in the public cloud. The findings also have implications for other parties which include governments 
considering the public cloud and those engaged in academic research in the area of government 
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1.1 Research Motivations 
Often governments when using cloud solutions will use private clouds whereby the cloud 
infrastructure is physically located within their borders or within their embassies in other 
countries. In terms of security this offers benefits because they can implement their own 
firewalls and the IT departments have direct control over the data. This security is 
particularly important because governments use sensitive data and critical systems, as well as 
non-sensitive data, in the cloud for e-government and backup and disaster recovery purposes.  
The control, or governance, over data and systems is important for governments who must be 
compliant with laws and regulations that require a certain level of control. Where 
governments do use public clouds, the benefits of which include cost, scalability and 
portability, there are security and governance issues and often only non-sensitive data and 
non-critical systems are put in the public cloud. However, it is important that governments 
use public clouds as part of an overall cloud solution to take advantage of the benefits of the 
public cloud. Due to such advantages, the future direction of government in the cloud will 
involve the use of the public cloud.  
Not only does the public cloud have advantages in terms of cost and scalability, but in the 
case where a country wants to ensure that there is digital continuity where their physical 
infrastructure, which supports their private cloud, is compromised, then they need to look at a 
public cloud solution whereby data and systems are stored in multiple virtual locations 
around the world as part of the overall solution. This will ensure that a government can 
continue to function in the public cloud and provide services to its citizens even in the event 
that their territory is compromised. An example of this is Estonia, a country that is concerned 
about a threat to its territory from Russia as well as cyber warfare and is working with 
Microsoft to provide such a ‘virtual data embassy’ solution where all its e-government 
systems will be virtualised in the public cloud.  
It is accepted that governments have cloud-specific concerns which include security and 
privacy, governance and compliance as well as customised service and performance 
offerings, all of which impede willingness to use the public cloud. Governments are reluctant 
to place sensitive data and critical systems in the cloud because they do not have confidence 
in these cloud-related areas as well as receiving specialised and customised services that they 
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need. In relation to the latter point, due to the nature of the public cloud service offerings are 
often standard which are not suitable for governments.  
In addition to the aforementioned cloud concerns, there are relationship issues that also 
impede willingness to adopt the pubic cloud, the most notable of which include trust in the 
cloud service provider (CSP), associated perceptions of risk, the ability to negotiate 
requirements, the ability to collaborate and the perceived reputation of the cloud services. 
Therefore, consideration of a relationship within which reluctance or otherwise to adopt the 
public cloud may occur, would require consideration of both cloud and relationship factors 
towards understanding such reluctance. 
However, particular consideration of both these types of factors in combination is either rare 
or weak in the literature. Studies often consider either cloud-related factors (Bhatt, 2012, Aziz 
et al., 2013, Ahmad and Janczewski, 2011, Lecklider 2014, Trigueros-Preciado et al., 2013) 
or relationship-related factors (Wang and Wu 2014) in isolation or there is little attention paid 
to the links between the two or the fact that they exist together (Filali and Yagoubi, 2015, 
Hana 2013, Alshomrani and Qamar 2013, Almorsy 2011, Fan et al. 2014, Ding et al. 2014). 
Studies merely mention factors without considering a connection between them. This study 
builds on this and investigates the links in detail to provide a better understanding of this 
dynamic.  
The motivation behind this study is to reveal concerns in the government-CSP relationship by 
considering both relationship and cloud factors in combination. It would be not enough to 
say, for example, that governments are concerned about compliance, rather it is necessary to 
reveal the relationship reasons why they are concerned about compliance, for example 
because they do not trust the CSP in relation to compliance, or they feel they are unable to 
negotiate compliance requirements.  
In support of a relationship approach to the problem of reluctance to adopt the public cloud, 
the European Union Agency for Network and Information Security (ENISA) say there are 
two possible solutions to these concerns; firstly, the development of technology that would 
serve to alleviate these  concerns such as improved security, and secondly, an improved 
relationship between government and the CSP where governments can negotiate and 
collaborate for the cloud service that they require and trust can be achieved (ENISA, 2015). 
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In pursuit of these ideas, the study offers a research design that investigates the relationship 
from both the cloud and relationship factor perspectives, revealing the links between them in 
order to offer a more comprehensive and more detailed understanding of the relationship and 
the specific areas of concern that may cause reluctance to adopt the public cloud. The 
research is carried out with government organisations in Saudi Arabia as a case study, this 
includes the Ministry of Finance, Saudi Customs, Saudi Immigration and the National 
Information Centre.  
1.2 Research Problem 
The reluctance of governments to use the public cloud is related to the perception of risk and 
the level of trust that they have in the CSP, and the negotiation and collaboration that takes 
place between the two parties. Therefore, there is a need to examine the relationship in order 
to find out factors related to that relationship and cloud requirements that may be impeding 
government confidence to use the cloud. Other studies that have addressed this relationship 
have been limited in that they only examine the cloud related factors such a governance or 
security and privacy, or they only examine relationship factors and the links between the two 
are often weak. Therefore, there is a need to overcome this limitation by considering 
relationship and cloud factors and the links between them in the context of the cloud provider 
– customer relationship. 
Overall, it is important to remember that governments have specific and unique needs from 
the public cloud and that it is in the relationship where confidence or otherwise is attained for 
the cloud related factors. This study expands on other studies where cloud concerns or 
relationship concerns are addressed in isolation. Not only does this study reveal the 
relationship concerns of government but also how those relationship concerns are related to 
aspects of the cloud, such as governance or security and privacy, and how this has an impact 
on the confidence to adopt the public cloud.  
Government reluctance to adopt the public cloud is something that affects governments 
globally. There is variation in the extent of progress towards public cloud adoption. Such 
variation ranges from the example of Estonia where real intention and progress for 
government in the public cloud exists, evidenced by a joint project with Microsoft which is 
currently assessing the feasibility of moving government to the cloud, to countries of the 
European Union, including the United Kingdom where there is consideration of the public 
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cloud on a limited and controlled basis, to finally, developing countries such as those in the 
Gulf region, including Saudi Arabia, where there is significant reluctance as well as 
understanding of the benefits of the public cloud for government. In fact, consideration of the 
public cloud in the Gulf region is something that is taking place, however, there are concerns 
about the development of technology especially in terms of security and privacy. In Saudi 
Arabia in particular, the reasons that have been put forward about government reluctance 
include business, financial and technical reasons and economic reasons but no mention of the 
relationship with CSPs. There is a real need for consideration of adoption of the public cloud 
in the region, this includes economic benefits and specifically to support the emergence of 
smart cities, however, the interest until now has only come from the private sector because 
there is a real concern about data being stored outside the country. Despite this, the 
government of Saudi Arabia has been introducing regulation for the public cloud in the 
country, therefore, there is an interest in the public cloud and an associated need for 
government to achieve what they need from the CSP. Despite the fact that there is variation 
in terms of the level of progress in different countries, there is still overall reluctance that 
needs to be addressed through the CSP – government relationship.  
 
1.3 Research Questions 
1. What are the relationship and cloud factors relevant to the government – CSP 
relationship? 
 
2. Do relationship related factors and cloud factors affect each other which could affect 
government confidence in the public cloud? 
 
The first research question relates to the idea that there are a number of relationship and cloud 
factors that are relevant to government that need to be identified first before the relationship 
can be investigated. The second research question is about the interplay between relationship 
and cloud factors that could affect confidence in the public cloud.  
 
In order to answer the research questions the following aims and objectives are established 
for the study: 
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1.4 Aims and Objectives 
Based on answering the research questions, the study establishes the following aims and 
objectives. The aims are what the study intends to investigate, and the objectives how these 
aims will be achieved. 
1.4.1 Aims 
• To reveal issues about relationship and associated cloud factors in the government – 
Cloud Service Provider (CSP) relationship. 
• To determine specific areas of concern within the government - CSP relationship that 
includes relationship and associated cloud related factors that may have an effect on 
government reluctance to adopt the public cloud. 
1.4.2   Objectives 
• To research the specific relationship and cloud factors in the government - CSP 
relationship. 
• To reveal the links between the relationship factors and cloud factors in the 
government - CSP relationship. 
• To develop and apply a research design that combines these relationship and cloud 
factors to better understand government reluctance to adopt the public cloud. 
• To provide recommendations on how the government-CSP relationship can be 
improved towards decreasing government reluctance to adopt the public cloud.   
1.5 Scope of Research 
The research is being conducted with the government of Saudi Arabia because it is a country 
that is currently using the public cloud on a limited basis and does not use it for sensitive data 
and critical systems. The government have expressed concern and reluctance for using the 
public cloud in this way, however, it has been shown in the literature that eventually to take 
advantage of the public cloud fully, the government will have to migrate more of its services 
to the public cloud as part of government trends globally in this area. 
Primarily, the study reveals the relationship and cloud issues towards understanding the 
reluctance of governments to utilise the public cloud for sensitive data and critical systems 
which is the next inevitable step in cloud computing for governments. The scope of the 
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research includes the relationship between the Saudi government and the CSP which includes 
the relationship where terms are negotiated and agreed and collaboration during the working 
relationship between the two parties. Relationship factors also include trust, the perception of 
risk and reputation. All of the relationship factors used in the study have been identified as 
the relevant factors in the relationship between government and CSP from the literature.  
Moreover, the scope of the research includes cloud factors which again have been identified 
from the literature. In the identification of cloud factors there was careful consideration of 
cloud factors that would be relevant to government, and although these include concerns that 
all types of organisation would have, cloud factors that are particularly important to 
government, such as governance over data and compliance with laws and regulations, are 
also included. Specifically, the cloud factors included governance, compliance, security and 
privacy and performance and offering. Any concerns that the government would have about 
the cloud can be found within these four areas. However, these cloud factors are broad and 
clearly incorporate numerous aspects within each. Therefore, as part of the development of 
the research design of the study, areas (sub cloud factors) within each cloud factor are 
identified, again, as being relevant to government. To provide an example, within the 
governance cloud factor a sub cloud factor was ‘control and knowledge of CSP employees’ 
which for a government is particularly important as there may be spies or saboteurs from 
other countries employed by the CSP. The sub cloud factors also included factors that would 
be of concern to both government and other types of organisation such as private enterprise, 
and examples include auditing and measuring the CSPs performance and clarity of roles and 
responsibilities.    
This study contributes to understanding the possible reasons why government does not have 
the confidence to use the public cloud, but it does not investigate the direct link between 
cloud and relationship factors on the one hand and lack of confidence on the other. Therefore, 
the scope includes revealing issues within the government - CSP relationship that may have 
an effect on confidence, however, the actual link between relationship and cloud factors and 
confidence is a subject for future study. 
1.6 Research Design 
The study is about investigating the relationship factors and associated cloud factors that can 
have an effect on government’s confidence to adopt the public cloud. Thus, the research 
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design of the study considers relationship factors that are relevant to this relationship and 
include trust, risk, collaboration, negotiation and reputation. The study aims to investigate the 
areas of the cloud itself where the relationship factors would have an impact, these areas are 
the relevant areas that governments would be concerned about when considering the public 
cloud and include governance, compliance, security and privacy and performance and 
offering which are also considered in the research design.  
The research design is intended to show how relationship factors are linked to cloud factors, 
for example where a government does not trust (relationship factor) the governance structures 
(cloud factor) offered by a cloud provider, is an area of concern. Moreover, the study offers 
greater insight by considering the specific issues within each cloud factor, namely; the sub 
cloud factors, for example, where governance is the cloud factor; control over data would be 
a cloud sub factor.  
All factors, whether relationship, cloud or cloud sub factors are considered in the study as 
critical success factors for government confidence in the public cloud. These factors form the 
basis of the development of the methods which include a questionnaire and a semi-structured 
interview. 
1.7  Research Methods 
Based on a research design which considers both relationship and cloud factors together, a 
mixed methods approach was used, including a quantitative questionnaire and a qualitative 
semi-structured interview. This approach was adopted because both relationship-specific and 
cloud-specific CSFs are already known in the literature, but the study wanted to find out 
specific issues within the relationship which factors were significant in terms of affecting 
government confidence in the public cloud. The questionnaire served this purpose through 
identifying which cloud-specific CSFs, such as governance, are there issues of trust, risk 
perception, negotiation and the services offered. However, the study does not assume to know 
everything about the relationship that could affect government confidence in the public cloud, 
and therefore, a semi-structured interview was adopted to reveal concerns that governments 
have in relation to the relationship-specific factors and the cloud-specific factors. The 
participants in the study included government personnel from the Ministry of Finance, Saudi 
Customs, Saudi Immigration and the National Information Centre, who are involved in the 




There are numerous studies that have addressed the concerns associated with adopting the 
cloud (Bhatt, 2012; Diez and Silva, 2013; Aziz et al., 2013; Almorsy, 2011; Ahmad and 
Janczewski, 2011; DiModica, 2014; Alshomrani and Qamar, 2013; Zwattendorfer et al., 
2013; Tripathi and Parihar, 2011; Haag et al., 2014; Nycz and Polkowski, 2015; Brenda and 
Markov, 2013). These studies either consider cloud concerns such as security in isolation or 
where they do consider relationship factors a simple link is made, for example, customers do 
not trust the CSP for security. These studies are limited in that they simply state there is, for 
example, a perception of risk for governance or a lack of trust in security technology. There is 
a lack of a more detailed understanding of these issues, which clearly include a relationship 
factor such as risk and trust and a cloud factor such as security or governance, within the 
relationship context. It is within the relationship between the cloud customer, in this case the 
government, and the CSP, where confidence in the public cloud can be achieved. 
In order to understand the issues, that may cause reluctance for the public cloud, that may 
occur in the relationship context it is important to consider the cloud concerns and the 
relationship concerns that feature in that context. However, these concerns do not take place 
in isolation, and although there are studies that do consider them together, the link is weak, or 
the study is too broad, or no detail is considered. Importantly, studies do not consider all 
relevant relationship and cloud factors within a relationship context, whereby the relationship 
is considered a major solution to alleviate reluctance about the public cloud.  Therefore, if 
there is a need to understand the relationship in more detail, all the relevant relationship and 
cloud factors need to be considered together, something that has not been done until now. 
This study applies these ideas through the development of a research design which is applied 
in the form of a questionnaire. This is another contribution of the study that can be applied in 
different government-CSP relationship contexts.  
Through the application of the research design the study offers a detailed insight and 
understanding of the issues that cause government reluctance, or even confidence, to adopt 
the public cloud for sensitive data. 
In light of the fact that the abovementioned contribution of the study is to reveal the issues 
within the relationship and offer a greater insight into that relationship, this leads to another 
contribution of the study which is offer recommendations as solutions to the identified 
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problems. Specifically, recommendations are offered to the CSPs on what they can do to 
increase government confidence in the public cloud. 
Below is a summarisation of these contributions: 
1. A new approach to consider the relationship between the government and CSP that 
considers all relevant relationship and cloud factors together. 
 
2. The development of a research design that is developed to reveal relationship and 
cloud factors in the relationship context and the various connections between them. 
3. The development of a research instrument that can be applied to different 
government-CSP relationships. 
 
4. A deeper insight and understanding of the issues in the government-CSP relationship 
and the associated reluctance to adopt the public cloud. 
 
5. Recommendations on how to improve the government-CSP relationship and increase 
government confidence in the public cloud. 
1.9 Success Criteria 
The following are the success criteria for the study: 
• Identification of relationship and cloud related issues in the government-CSP. 
• Identification of the associations between relationship and cloud factors. 
• Successful application of developed research design. 
• Identification of potential issues that may affect cloud adoption. 
• Development of recommendations based on analysis. 
1.10 Thesis Outline 
Chapter 2 – presents a review of the literature related to the cloud in general, e-government, 
associated issues related to governance, security, sensitive data and legality and regulation. 
The review also presents models of adoption for the cloud and the associated issues of trust 
and risk perception. 
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Chapter 3 – This chapter explains the research design of the study. Specifically, there is an 
explanation of how the research considers and combines relationship and cloud related 
factors towards a deeper understanding of the reasons for government reluctance for adopting 
the public cloud. 
Chapter 4 – This chapter presents the methodology for the study. Specifically, the 
methodological approach and the adopted methods are explained and justified. 
Chapter 5 – Presents the results and analysis of the questionnaires. 
Chapter 6 – Presents the results and analysis of the interviews. 
Chapter 7 – Discussion of the findings of the study and the implications the findings have in 
relation to other studies. 
Chapter 8 – This chapter concludes the study, shows the contributions and implications of 
























•  Review literature about relationship factors 
•  Review literature about cloud factors 
• Review literature about government and the cloud and associated concerns 
• Review existing literature about trust in the cloud 














A review of the literature was conducted to identify and perform an analysis of the literature 
that is relevant to the government – CSP relationship in the context of public cloud adoption. 
Moreover, the review of the literature will reveal the gaps in the research which will support 
the rationale for the study. Moreover, the present study is established on an approach to 
researching the government – CSP relationship which is partly developed based on the work 
of other authors in addition to models for cloud adoption. The sources that are used in this 
literature review include books, journal articles, models, government publications and news 
media. Government websites of the government of Saudi Arabia were also used in order to 
research the latest developments and possible issues related to government adoption of the 
cloud. 
2.1.1 Search Method 
The researcher was interested in literature that was related to cloud computing, the associated 
issues of cloud computing, reasons for reluctance for cloud adoption, issues in the 
relationship between cloud provider and cloud customer, government in the cloud and the 
future of government in the public cloud. The search included use of the university database 
to identify academic journal articles, conference papers and news and magazine articles.  
2.2 Key Concepts 
Here the key concepts on which the study is based are presented. These concepts relate to 
issues that directly affect governments’ adoption of the public cloud for sensitive data as part 
of an overall government cloud solution. 
2.2.1 Security and Privacy 
Despite the numerous benefits of governments using the cloud which includes cost savings 
there still needs to be consideration of the challenges of adopting cloud technology (Bhatt, 
2012, Diez and Silva, 2013, Aziz et al., 2013). The main concerns of governments using the 
cloud are related to security and privacy, especially that related to sensitive data. The general 
idea is that sensitive data is for the private cloud and non-sensitive data in the public cloud 
(Bhatt, 2012, Khan et al. 2011, Lecklider, 2014, Diez and Silva, 2013). 
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In addition to the security concerns associated with loss of governance the characteristics of 
the cloud present other security concerns. These issues relate to shared resources, multiple 
tenancies, third party hosting and multiple access points. Multiple points of vulnerability 
increase the risk of the system being compromised. In relation to the above-mentioned issues, 
there is a need for improved cooperation between cloud vendors and governments to create 
unified global rules for safer government clouds (Liang, 2012).  
2.2.2 Governance 
The nature of the public cloud means there is a loss of governance by the owner of the data 
unlike with private clouds. Moreover, the security itself is a service provided by the cloud 
provider and is not in the hands of the government, this is especially a problem because there 
is a shift in the responsibility of governance and control. 
There is also the issue that there are multiple parties involved in the situation, there is the 
cloud provider, the cloud service provider, there are many different employees in each of 
these organisations and there are multiple tenants who share the cloud. These factors, each 
pose risk in terms of governance and security and privacy of government data. Each party has 
their own security requirements which may conflict (Almorsy, 2011). 
Governments require a certain level of control over their data and systems. This control, or 
governance, may be in the form of direct control over data or may be simply being informed 
of the location of data. 
2.2.3 Compliance 
With a public cloud solution for e-government, the servers which are used will be located 
outside of the sovereign territory of a country which gives rise to legal concerns about citizen 
data being located in another jurisdiction and the laws of the jurisdiction which may allow 
another country to subpoena the data for investigatory purposes (Ahmad and Janczewski, 
2011). In order to resolve these problems governments would have to make changes to 
domestic laws, but only if the benefits of using the public cloud outweighed the risks 
(ENISA, 2011). In 2015, the European Union Agency for Network and Information Security 




Legal issues are also relevant to the cloud provider, where it may not be possible for the 
cloud provider to comply with the law and auditing requirements of a government customer 
because of the laws of their own jurisdiction or they may not have the ability to do so because 
the nature of the public cloud and its benefits means that cloud service providers can only 
offer generic SLAs to its customers (Ahmad and Janczewski 2011).  
2.2.4 Service Provision 
Due to the nature of the public cloud it is often the case that service offerings are standard, 
DiModica (2014) says that standardised offering is a problem and it does not allow those who 
wish to pay for a differentiated service which is often the result of an inflexible negotiation. 
The solution to this problem has been the idea of some form of dynamism in the SLA. 
Kanwal (2015) puts forward the idea of the need to have active agreements that are updated 
periodically and Filali and Yagoubi (2015) put forward the idea of a dynamic SLA. This is 
especially the case with governments who not only require a tailored solution in the public 
cloud, but they also need a dynamic SLA. A dynamic SLA will serve two purposes, firstly, it 
will be flexible enough to adapt to the changing requirements that governments will have, 
and secondly, it will also allow governments to monitor the SLA against performance 
requirements and adjust accordingly. 
2.2.5 The future of government in the public cloud 
A pioneering project to place e-government into the public cloud has been initiated by the 
government of Estonia, who with the help of Microsoft has embarked on a project to test the 
viability of placing sensitive data and critical systems into the public cloud. Estonia is under 
threat from Russia both territorially and through cyber-attacks and part of its strategy has 
been to create private clouds in physical Embassies in friendly countries around the world, 
while there are security advantages to this solution, these private clouds can still be 
vulnerable to cyber and physical attack. A development of their strategy has been using 
‘Virtual Data Embassies’ in the public cloud. Specifically, the project involved placing the 
President’s website and the government gazette into public clouds around the world as a test 
towards the ultimate solution of virtualizing all government services in the public cloud so 
that the government can continue to provide e-services to its citizens even in the event that its 
physical territory and IT/IS infrastructure is compromised.  
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Such an endeavor would require overcoming the limitations of the public cloud through a 
special relationship with the cloud provider, especially in the area of governance where 
governments would need more control in order to comply with laws related to the security 
and privacy of sensitive government data. Although in the Estonia project the country is 
working directly alongside the public cloud provider, Microsoft (Microsoft Azure cloud 
solution), the project highlights the security and privacy issues in the public cloud and how 
this relates to the relationship between the government as a customer and the public cloud 
provider and the Service Level Agreement (SLA) towards the possibility of other 
governments considering using the public cloud for sensitive data and critical systems on a 
permanent basis. 
2.2.6 Relationship Factors 
During any negotiation for the acquisition of information technology, there is a level of 
perception of risk and the purchaser much have a certain level of trust in the provider. 
Moreover, there needs to be an effective relationship between the two parties where the buyer 
is able to effectively specify their requirements and the provider is able to understand these 
requirements. These factors, together with the services that are offered and the reputation of 
the supplier service to affect both trust and perception of risk. These ideas are particularly 
relevant to the issue of collaboration between the two parties. In this study theories and ideas 
about risk, trust and collaboration are considered. It is important to consider these factors in a 
study that seeks to establish the reasons related to the relationship that are causing a lack of 
confidence in the public cloud. Theories considered include Protection Motivation Theory, 
which says that organisations will protect themselves when they perceive a risk and will 
avoid negative consequences if they have the ability to carry out preventative measures and 
Risk Compensation theory says that more risk will be taken if there is an increased level of 
security (Huntgeburth, 2015).    
2.3 Government in the Cloud – Challenges and Benefits 
Governments want to improve the performance of the public sector through the use of cloud 
technology (Bhatt, 2012) and they are under pressure from decreasing IT budgets and 
increasing demands for their services and that a solution to this problem is cloud computing 
(Diez and Silva, 2013). 
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There are a number of commonly accepted benefits of using the cloud which includes cost 
reduction, according to the United States government where the government moves to the 
cloud millions of dollars are saved; these cost savings are from the fact that there is no need 
to invest in building and maintaining infrastructure (Department of Defense, 2012). The idea 
of cost saving is echoed by Khan et al. (2011) who bring attention to the economic benefits 
which include the fact that only the resources that are used are paid for and that traditional IT 
administration costs are almost completely removed, the financial benefits which includes 
saving on capital costs which are replaced by operational costs and finally, timeliness, 
whereby resources can be obtained in a matter of hours which is sharp contrast to the time 
takes to install in-house computing resources. Similarly, Chandra and Bhadoria (2012) say 
that the benefits of the cloud include lower costs, the shift of capital expenditure to operating 
expenditure, agility, dynamic scalability and simplified maintenance.  
Speed and flexibility is another common benefit where the cloud offers flexible solutions 
which include that services can be scaled up or scaled down and increased security is another 
commonly accepted benefit of the cloud. The best of the cloud service providers offer state of 
the art of security where data is often hosted in physically secure data centres (Department of 
Defense, 2012). In reference to benefits, Bo (2013) approaches the issue of e-government in 
the cloud from the angle of data storage and says that a cloud solution solves the problems 
that governments have with storing large amounts of data.  
Khan et al. (2011) say that the benefits of the cloud include on-demand self-sufficient 
services, location independent resources, ubiquitous network access and rapid elasticity. 
Additional benefits include that cloud computing allows leapfrogging opportunities for lesser 
developed countries to develop (Khan et al. 2011).   
Diez and Silva (2013) say although public organisations face similar challenges to private 
organisations, the fact that public organisations offer different types of service such as social 
interaction and open data it means that cloud computing is a more attractive option. However, 
the uptake of the cloud has been less for public organisations due to the challenges which 
include a lack of established standards and the fact that there are not enough cloud providers 
who meet government requirements; this makes the provision of cloud services to public 
organisations less attractive for cloud providers because of these legal and regulatory 
requirements (Diez and Silva, 2013). Hana (2013) says that the benefits of the cloud for 
governments are encountered by a number of difficulties which include security, privacy, 
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performance and reliability, in addition to concerns about the law and national and 
international regulatory framework. 
Aziz et al. (2013) focus on the challenges of adopting cloud technology for E-government 
and say that although it has many benefits, one of them is cost savings, they bring attention to 
the fact the due to the technology itself, there are also risks and importantly that the success 
of the implementation of this technology depends on how well the government deals with the 
challenges. Therefore, governments need to be careful about E-government adoption because 
if not it could result in damage to the reputation of public administration, decrease in 
customer satisfaction and financial loss (Aziz et al., 2013). 
Aziz et al. (2013) further say that the potential of cloud computing for E-government is 
something that still needs to be explored as it is a continuous process; they encourage further 
research into the advantages and disadvantages in order to weigh up the benefits of cloud 
technology for government. Alshomrani and Qamar (2013) also address the challenges and 
benefits of the adoption of cloud computing by E-governments and Bhatt (2012) also 
considers the advantages, limitations, problems and solutions of cloud computing for E-
government and the emerging future trends. Diez and Silva (2013) looks at the impacts and 
benefits of cloud computing for the public sector and an interesting question that is raised by 
these authors is why have few public organisations adopted cloud computing as it has been 
successful and widely accepted by other types of organisation?   
Thus, despite the benefits, there are a number of challenges when deploying the cloud for the 
government sector. Zwattendorfer et al. (2013) say that these challenges include security and 
privacy concerns with sensitive data in the cloud, compliance, interoperability and portability, 
identity and access management and auditing. Tripathi and Parihar (2011) present technical, 
economic and social challenges. Under the technical challenges Tripathi and Parihar (2011) 
talk about legacy systems, some of which can be written into the new cloud computing 
environment, but for some that could be too expensive and thus a key factor is the 
interoperability between existing software and hardware platforms. The economic challenge 
is mainly related to return on investment and weighing up the costs against the benefits. 




Haag et al. (2014) says that in addition to the challenges of cloud adoption by the government 
which includes security, transparency and accountability there is also the impact on IT 
governance. Governance is a specific issue that is especially a concern for governments 
where opting for the public cloud mean that governments lose control over their data. Nycz 
and Polkowski (2015) acknowledge that the governance issue in cloud computing is the lack 
of physical control of the data. In reference to this lack of governance in the public cloud, 
Diez and Silva (2013) say that the lack of control of cloud services and not knowing how 
cloud systems are managed by the cloud providers is a cause for concern, they say that 
although the government is the owner of the data, the cloud provider is the custodian and 
thus, the cloud provider has to meet the data owner’s security requirements. Nycz and 
Polkowski (2015) echoes these concerns and say that the main problem with cloud computing 
is the lack of physical control of the data. An important point related to governance was 
raised by Abbadi and Alawneh (2012) who said that users should have the ability to control 
their data in the public cloud. 
Brenda and Markov (2013) say that the loss of governance over the IT infrastructure is a 
major risk of cloud computing. Particularly, this loss of governance can lead to problems 
related to regulatory compliance. Another problem that is associated with the issue of 
governance is that the risks associated with the cloud are often dealt with in agreements, this 
is in contrast to internal IT governance (Yigitbasioglu, 2015) therefore, the problem lies in 
the fact that risks are not managed through governance mechanisms. 
The main difference between normal IT systems and cloud computing in terms of security is 
governance, in that the organisation loses control over assets and information, this means that 
the collaboration between the cloud provider and the customer is essential in order to reduce 
the threats associated with loss of governance by the customer (Rebollo et al., 2012). 
Moreover, because of the continuously changing nature of cloud computing there is a need 
for an assurance framework in order to secure the cloud model and a clear governance 
strategy to be developed in order for enterprises to benefit from cloud computing (Rebollo et 
al., 2012). According to Craig et al. (2009) the public sector will face challenges in relation to 
governance when they adopt cloud computing, governance here is referred to as that related 
to compliance with legal and policy constraints and internal and external auditing 
requirements. The problem of governance is made worse by geographical dispersion, 
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problems include enforcement difficulties, increased monitoring costs and ensuring rights 
when data are stored overseas (Craig et al. 2009). 
The governance risks in the cloud are similar to those faced with any outsourcing of IT. One 
of the ways that governance, risk can be mitigated is through effective contractual 
arrangements which can be assured through an effective SLA. The issue of governance for 
government in the cloud has a great influence on decisions for risk management, this is 
mainly due to large concentrations of data and resources that are in the cloud (Elena, 2013) 
which include the outsourcing of key organisational processes. The link between IT 
governance and risks has been identified by Yigitbasioglu (2015) who says that IT 
governance needs to be developed in order to mitigate risks and mitigating risks will in turn 
improve IT governance.   
In reference to Saudi Arabia the loss of governance has been cited as one of the significant 
reasons for the Saudi public sector opting for a private cloud solution, because governance 
requirements of the government cannot be met by the public cloud (Mreea and Munasinghe, 
2016). 
Because sensitive data is process outside of an organisation there is a bypass of the logical, 
physical and personnel controls that IT staff exert over in-house programs (Elena, 2012). 
However, customers of the cloud are responsible for their own data, but they do not know 
where their data is hosted and how the cloud environment where the data is hosted is used by 
other customers (Elena, 2012).  
2.3.2 Security Issues 
Although the advantages of e-government using the cloud are clear, there are serious security 
and privacy issues, which ENISA (European Network and Information Security Agency) say 
are ‘show-stoppers’ for the adoption of the cloud (Luna et al, 2011). Security is one of the 
most significant issues when it comes to the adoption of the cloud by e-government and has 
been the main reason for the reluctance for adoption by government. The reason for such 
concerns is obvious; e-government data contains highly sensitive data about citizens. Clouds 
are susceptible to hacking, not only for data that is stored but also for data that is transmitted 
(Bhatt, 2012). 
According to Spiga et al. (2014) threats to security is the main barrier for full adoption of 
cloud computing, despite the benefits of the cloud, this is especially the case for public 
 20 
 
administrations because security is more critical, therefore, there needs to be consideration of 
security and privacy laws in the development of the delivery model. Ahmed and Hossain 
(2014) say that unless security is consistent and robust there will be little credibility in the 
advantages that cloud computing has to offer.  
Security is essential in the government sector and has to be provided in several layers, these 
include the network, applications and the data security (Zwattendorfer et al., 2013). Similarly, 
Hashizume et al. (2013) say that cloud computing is a new computing model and there is 
uncertainty about security at different levels, which include the host, the network, data and 
applications, for the latter there is a concern of how application security is moved to the 
cloud. 
Security concerns are related to risk areas which include dependency on a ‘public’ internet, 
data storage, multi-tenancy, lack of control (governance) and therefore, traditional security 
measures which include authentication, authorisation and identity are now not enough for the 
cloud (Hashizume et al. 2013). Moreover, there is a need to objectively and quantitatively 
measure security of services offered by a cloud service provider (Luna et al, 2011). Although 
security controls in cloud computing are no different to security controls in any IT 
environment, because of the operational models that are employed and the technology that is 
used, cloud computing presents different risks (Hashizume et al. 2013).   
Anitha (2013) say that due to the fact that there are a number of different technologies used in 
the cloud which includes transaction management, virtualization, resource allocation, 
databases, cloud networks and operating systems, Anitha (2013) summaries the security 
issues that are faced by cloud computing as follows: 
1. Data access control: this refers to the illegal accessing of data because of a lack of 
secured data access control, this is especially a problem for sensitive data stored in the 
cloud. 
2. Data integrity: problems related to data integrity can arise from human error when 
data is inputted or hardware malfunctions, this is relevant to the cloud because there 
are many people accessing and managing the data. 
3. Data theft: because the cloud uses external servers they are more exposed to theft 
4. Data loss: considered a serious problem in cloud computing, this could especially be a 
problem if the vendor closes due to financial issues. 
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5. Data location: the cloud consumer is not always aware of the location of their data 
and the cloud provider does not always reveal where the data are kept. 
 
Aamir et al. (2014) say that despite the benefits of the cloud, the largest threat is breaches of 
security which include, among others, account or service hijacking, data manipulation and 
data management security. Security is an issue that can be considered from a number of 
different angles in the cloud, according to Alam et al. (2013) it can include consideration of 
user access, regulatory compliance, data location, data segregation, investigative support, 
recovery and long term viability. Y (2013) brings attention to a number of security issues that 
exist in the cloud which include consideration of privacy, security, compensation for loss of 
data and liability. 
Bamiah et al. (2012) also say that despite the benefits of cloud computing there is a dark side 
in relation to security and privacy, and this has been the reason why certain industries such as 
banking and health care have been reluctant to trust the cloud especially in relation to 
sensitive data. Specifically, the problem is that sensitive data is placed in the cloud with no 
knowledge of location and there is a lack of transparency about the mechanisms that the 
cloud service provider uses for securing data and applications (Bamiah et al., 2012). Liang 
(2012) says that there is a need for better and more comprehensive cooperation between 
technology vendors and world governments to create unified global rules for a safer 
government cloud. 
A characteristic of the cloud that is a concern for security is multi-tenancy because it 
virtualises the boundaries between hosted services of the different tenants and therefore, there 
is a need to strengthen the boundaries with security controls (Almorsy, 2011). The cloud 
providers themselves have problems related to the cloud platform because it is very complex 
and there are numerous security considerations (Almorsy 2011). Specifically, these issues 
include the complex architecture of the cloud platform, it characteristics, the long security 
stack and the different security needs of stakeholders all of which mean that security has to be 
continually managed (Almorsy 2011). Moreover, the cloud providers are not aware of the 
contents of the cloud or the security requirements for the services. 
2.3.3 Sensitive and Non-Sensitive Data 
E-government data is sensitive data and needs to have a corresponding security mechanism 
(Bo, 2013). Cloud services are evolving with an increase in the use of cloud technology, 
 22 
 
which means that increasingly sensitive data is geographically dispersed in remote servers 
and locations with the possibility of being exposed to malicious behaviour (Ahmed and 
Hossain, 2014). Alshomrani and Qamar (2013) say that when third parties store sensitive 
data, then there are likely to be trust issues for government.  
Security and privacy considerations do have implications for managing private and sensitive 
data, therefore, for governments one of the main decisions that have to be made is whether or 
not to host sensitive and private data in the cloud (Yamin, 2013). Specifically, sensitive 
government data could include security, defence and personnel data (Yamin, 2013). 
Due to the aforementioned security concerns, a major issue about the adoption of the public 
cloud is what type of data, whether sensitive or non-sensitive, can be stored in the cloud. 
Bhatt (2012) says that sensitive data should be kept in corporate (private) clouds and non-
sensitive data can reside in public clouds and Khan et al. (2011) say that a private cloud 
should be established which is operated by government for critical and sensitive government 
information. Similarly, during analysis of the benefits of cloud computing for e-government 
in general, and the benefits that it can have to help developing countries to leapfrog, Khan et 
al., (2011) suggest that critical and sensitive government information be stored in a 
government private cloud and for general services where government has less control over 
their provision, the public cloud solution is recommended. This idea has been echoed by 
Bhatt (2012) who says that sensitive data should be kept in corporate data centres and other 
data can be kept in the public cloud. Moreover, Lecklider (2014) says that for government 
agencies in the US, such as the Department of Defense, that there are some data that is too 
sensitive and will never be put in a commercial cloud. This issue is also a concern for Diez 
and Silva (2013) who say that there needs to be careful consideration about what services can 
be migrated to the cloud, and there are certain services that cannot be migrated. Diez and 
Silva (2013) notes that personally identifiable information is at risk, especially in the public 
cloud, a suggestion is to anonymise the data before moving to the cloud.  
Diez and Silva (2013) say that sensitive data should be processed, stored and communicated 
using the same protective measures that are used for internal systems in addition to the 
specific measures that are required for cloud services, this includes authentication, 
authorization and compartmentalization which is to limit access on a need to know basis. 
Importantly, governments should consider authentication and identity management as crucial 
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because sensitive data is stored in cloud servers in addition to the client’s servers (Ahmed and 
Hossain, 2014).   
Ahmed and Hossain (2014) say that there are sensitive states or scenarios that are a concern 
in cloud computing and they include the transmission of personal sensitive data to the server 
in the cloud and the storage of client’s personal data in servers that are remote and not in 
control of the clients. 
2.3.4 Legal and Regulatory Compliance 
Governments are bound by laws that govern the protection of data, especially sensitive data 
related to its citizens. Problems arise in cloud computing because the servers can be located 
in different geographical jurisdictions which have their own data protection laws. This leads 
to issues with the governance of the data, an example of which is where governments could 
subpoena the data of other governments.  
Hana (2013) says that an important concern for government in the cloud is achieving 
compliance with national and international regulatory and legal frameworks. Diez and Silva 
(2013) says that compliance requirements in public organisations are more difficult to 
achieve in the cloud environment for reasons that include access to log files and auditing 
information. 
Bhatt (2012) brings attention to the fact that the benefits of cloud computing can be 
undermined if political and geographic borders become fractured. Diez and Silva (2013) says 
that legal issues related to data protection are the most important in the area of cloud 
computing and therefore, before planning any technical details for implementation it is 
important to consider the legal requirements, this is especially the case in the EU where 
public organisations are not allowed to send data out of the EU, due to the EU Data 
Protection Directive (Hashemi, 2013) and the US where the Patriot Act allows the 
government to seize data for investigation purposes. 
Compliance is an issue that has to be considered in the SLA agreement between the client and 
the service provider. It is important for the client to be aware of the potential legal 
implications of transferring data from one country to another, considerations include the 
requirement of meeting specific standards, for example, where personal data is transferred 
outside of the EC then it should comply with the EC Directive on Data Protection where the 
adequacy of third country to protect data should be assessed (Australian Government, 2011).  
 24 
 
It has been claimed by Hon et al. (2012) that the role of service providers regarding the 
compliance obligations of their clients is not well defined or understood by the service 
providers. There is the that during consideration and negation of terms, which are often 
standard, there was little consideration by the cloud provider of the legal and regulatory 
obligations of the user and that the user had compliance responsibilities to regulators, this is 
especially the case in Europe (Hon et al., 2012).  Importantly, in the study by Hon et al. 
(2012) large global service providers have not conducted a legal and regulatory review of 
their services and terms of service. Despite the fact that some providers have shown that they 
often refuse to negotiate security and privacy terms, if clients refuse to sign the agreement, 
then the provider would then agree to make some changes (Hon et al., 2012). 
Users of the cloud are not particularly concerned with the issue of colocation of data within a 
third-party data centre, but rather they are concerned with the geographical location of their 
data centres, therefore, it is recommended that providers have to reveal to the clients the 
location of the data (Hon et al., 2012). Haag et al. (2014) say that within public organisations 
there is uncertainty when it comes to jurisdiction and compliance at a global level because the 
nature of cloud services being cross-border and distributed which instill in governments an 
attitude of wait and see.  
Technically, it is difficult to verify that data is processed where it is claimed by the provider 
and often providers can be misleading (Hon et al., 2012). However, although there may be 
uncertainty about data being outside of Europe, providers often provide assurance that data 
will not be located in the United States due to the Patriot Act. Diez and Silva (2013) brings 
attention to the fact that the Federal Information Security Act (2002) in the United States 
requires that sensitive data must remain within the country, and this is something that cloud 
service providers have to comply with in order to be certified for government services in the 
US.  
In consideration of the above issues, governance, compliance and security and privacy, and 
the need for companies to have a certain level of knowledge and control over systems and 
data, these considerations are in addition to the effectiveness, efficiency and cost 




2.4 Disaster Recovery Continuity in the Cloud 
Disaster recovery and business continuity are naturally a critical consideration for clients of 
the cloud in service agreements. Threats to business continuity can include interruption to 
communication networks, software or hardware failure, power failure and finally, disaster 
which result in a loss of access to the service (Australian Government, 2011). Craig et al. 
(2009) say that business continuity is a challenge in the cloud and this can be addressed by 
effective remedies which include strong contracts and effective SLAs which stipulate disaster 
recovery and business continuity plans. Nycz and Polkowski (2015) say a concern of cloud 
computing is to ensure continuity of access to data even in the event of server failure. In 
2011, the Cloud Security Alliance provided security guidance for critical areas of focus in 
cloud computing and one of those critical areas was disaster recovery, where an important 
aspect of cloud storage is how it can be used for disaster recovery. The challenges in this area 
include mobility, information transfer both to and from the cloud and availability (CSA 
2011).  
Hashemi (2013) says that the use of cloud computing is important to replicate copies of both 
data and systems in multiple locations. The Scottish government, in their 2014 strategy for a 
digital future using data hosting and a data centre, address the need to have greater continuity 
and disaster recovery capabilities for new and existing systems which will require additional 
hardware and software and the strategy says that cloud computing should be the first 
consideration for this continuity and disaster recovery strategy (Scotland, 2014).  
Decman and Vintar (2013) looked at the literature related to digital preservation and 
investigated a framework for digital preservation in the public sector and then linked this with 
cloud computing. The idea behind their suggestion was the long term digital preservation of 
data for the public sector, the solution was a centralized repository using cloud computing, 
specifically, a community cloud. The findings of their study included the mapping of six 
factors of digital preservation to three levels of digital preservation shows that using 
appropriate steps supported by suitable strategies and policies enables the public 
administration sector to take advantage of modern information technology and solve the 
demanding and critical problem of digital preservation (Decman and Vintar, 2013).  
The use of the cloud for disaster recovery is something that is also considered by smaller 
local government, although it is important to note that while there are advantages of using the 
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cloud for local government because it is easier and more cost effective, they are not jumping 
into the technology straight away and are being cautious due to security concerns (Barkin, 
2013). 
2.4.1 Estonia / Microsoft Project 
Cloud technology and the way it is used by governments are continuously developing and the 
latest development is the use of the cloud for virtual data embassy. The Estonia / Microsoft 
project was started in September 2014 and continued into 2015. The government of Estonia 
has embarked on a project to open its borders to e-residents who can sign up for digital 
identification cards which will allow them to access national electronic services and 
databases (Anthes, 2015). This is part of an overall move of government services into e-
government by the government of Estonia which requires the transfer of many databases and 
services to the cloud, specifically the public cloud. However, there are associated security 
risks, in 2007 there were a number of denial of service attacks that Estonia blamed on Russia 
which lead to national concerns about data integrity and data protection (Anthes, 2015). This 
attack together with the perception of a threat of more attacks, especially in the form of a 
physical incursion, prompted to decision to move e-government services to the cloud.   
Often governments when using cloud solutions for e-government will use private clouds 
whereby the cloud infrastructure is physically located within their borders or within their 
embassies in other countries. In terms of security this offers benefits because they can 
implement their own firewalls and the IT departments have direct control over the data. This 
security is particularly important because governments need sensitive data and mission 
critical systems, as well as non-sensitive data, to be in the cloud, especially for back up and 
disaster recovery purposes. Where governments do use public clouds, the benefits of which 
include cost, there are security issues and often only non-sensitive data and non-critical 
systems are put in the cloud. 
However, in the case where a country wants to ensure that there is digital continuity where 
their physical infrastructure, which supports their private cloud, is compromised then they 
need to look at a public cloud solution whereby data and systems are stored in multiple 
virtual locations around the world. This will ensure that a government can continue to 
function in the cloud and provide e-government services to its citizens even in the event that 
their physical infrastructure and sovereign territory is compromised. This can be achieved on 
an indefinite basis using virtual embassies. Although the use of embassies as data centres, or 
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‘physical data embassies’ is not new, there is a newer idea of virtual data embassies in the 
cloud as opposed to physical data embassies, whereby data and applications are hosted in the 
public cloud (See figure 2.1). 
 
Figure 2-1: Estonia's Advanced Digital Continuity (Elements of the Data Embassy Initiative) 
 
 
Source: Ministry of Economic Affairs and Communications and Microsoft (2015)   
This is a very new idea and Estonia is a country that is looking at this solution. Estonia is 
worried about a threat to its territory from Russia as well as cyber warfare and is working 
with Microsoft to provide such a ‘virtual data embassy’ solution where all of its e-
government systems will be virtualized. However, because of the security concerns of using a 
public cloud solution, Estonia is only trusting Microsoft with non-sensitive data to begin 
with, in this case the President’s home page and the government Gazette, before 
incrementally introducing more sensitive data over time as trust and security are established. 
The goal is for the Estonian government to achieve complete virtualisation of its e-
government systems (Ministry of Economic Affairs and Communications and Microsoft, 
2015). 
Currently the government of Estonia uses a Physical Data Embassy Solution whereby they 
have their own physical servers in Estonian embassies around the world and use data centres 
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in friendly countries. This solution is essentially a private cloud that is geographically 
distributed. One of the key features of this approach is that the government is in full control 
of the servers and data security. However, the intention of the Estonian government is to use 
geographically distributed public clouds, a virtual data embassy solution (Ministry of 
Economic Affairs and Communications and Microsoft, 2015).  
It is important to note that the intention of the Estonia government is not to use the cloud for 
normal back up and disaster recovery, they see it as a more permanent solution. The main 
reason for this is that Estonia is in fear of a physical incursion by the Russians into Estonian 
territory or a cyber-attack on its IT infrastructure, even its private servers located in Estonian 
embassies of friendly countries. In this case, there would be a need for a solution where all 
systems and data are functioning in the cloud so that the government can continue to provide 
online services on an indefinite basis, because in this situation they will not know when they 
can return to using normal infrastructure.  
Although a government using the public cloud is not something unknown, it is still a 
relatively new idea and only non-sensitive data and non-critical systems are, if anything, 
considered due to security concerns about the public cloud, and even then, it is for normal 
back up and disaster recovery purposes (Ministry of Economic Affairs and Communications 
and Microsoft, 2015). 
Until now the Estonian government has only been testing the idea of a Virtual Data Embassy 
Solution (VDES) using PCC with non-sensitive data as a Beta test with Microsoft using 
Azure, this is because of the security concerns associated with the public cloud. The ultimate 
intention is the deployment of more sensitive data and critical systems.  
Advanced continuity is the new area or next step for governments using the cloud to provide 
their services. Cloud technology and the way it is used by governments are developing all the 
time and the latest development is the use of the cloud for a virtual data embassy solution. 
The Estonia / Microsoft project was started in September 2014 and continued into 2015. This 
brings new security considerations using this approach.  
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2.5 Models of Adopting Cloud Computing in the E-Government 
Context 
Research investigating the use of cloud computing for e-government has been carried out 
since 2009. There are two significant approaches within the literature to this subject. Some 
researchers focus on the benefits and challenges of cloud computing for e-government 
(ATSE, 2010; Bhardwaj, Jain, & Jain, 2010; Chandrasekaran & Kapoor, 2011; Craig, et al., 
2009; Das, Patnaik, & Misro, 2011; Kurdi, Taleb-Bendiab; Liang, 2012; Mukherjee & Sahoo, 
2012; NASR, et al., 2012; Paquette, Jaeger, & Wilson, 2010; Randles, & Taylor, 2011; 
Rastogi, 2010; Sharma & Thapliyal, 2011; Tripathi & Parihar, 2011) and other researchers 
provide models for migrating e-government services to the cloud (Ahmad & Hasibuan, 2012; 
Chandra & Bhadoria, 2012; Chanchary & Islam, 2011;  Das, et al., 2011; Khan, Zhang, 
Khan, & Chen, 2011;  Kurdi, et al., 2011; Liang, 2012; Mukherjee & Sahoo, 2012; NASR, et 
al., 2012;  Rastogi, 2010; Prasad, Chaurasia, Singh, & Gour, 2010). 
2.5.1 Challenges and Benefits of Cloud Adoption 
Mohammed and Ibrahim (2015) review and classify the models for the adoption of cloud 
computing by e-government. The main criticism by Mohammed and Ibrahim (2015) was that 
most of the literature related to cloud computing and e-government is concerned with the 
benefits and challenges and that there are few studies that are concerned with models or 
frameworks for adopting cloud computing for e-government.  
Rastogi (2010) identified the current problems with e-government architecture and then 
proposed a model to implement cloud computing into e-government. The model consists of 
continuous improvement from traditional computing to cloud computing, comprising of four 
steps which include learning, organisational assessment, cloud prototype, cloud assessment 
and cloud rollout strategy. While the proposed model offered considers both the 
organisational issues and the cloud issues, there is very little mention or consideration of 
relationship factors towards achieving the desired cloud goals of government. There are two 
phases of the model where negotiation with the CSP (cloud service provider) would be taking 
place and they include the cloud assessment stage where there is no mention of relationship 
factors with the CSP and the cloud roll out strategy where only communication with internal 
and external stakeholders is mentioned.  
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Liang (2012) looked at the benefits of cloud computing in terms of how it could answer some 
of the limitations of e-government and proposed an architecture, deployment and service 
model selection strategies. For the architecture, there are five layers the infrastructure layer 
which comprises the physical resources and kernel software, the application platform layer, 
the application layer, the management layer and the client layer. As for the deployment 
model, Liang (2012) made a comparison, related to cost and security, between the four cloud 
models, namely; private cloud, community cloud, public cloud and hybrid cloud by 
identifying the target departments for each of the models, additionally, the characteristics of 
the service layers (IaaS, SaaS and PaaS) and the associated target businesses were identified. 
While Liang (2012) does bring attention to the important considerations for government in 
selecting the type of cloud and the service model approach to support e-government services, 
there is no mention of any of the relationship aspects with the CSP where all requirements 
would be achieved. The cloud related critical success factors for success in the cloud are 
given much attention and they include security and privacy, reliability and sustainability and 
adherence to legal requirements by the vendor but there is no mention of how these are 
achieved through the relationship. 
Das et al., (2011) talk about the adoption of cloud computing for e-government in terms of 
reducing costs and increasing scalability and security, in addition to accelerated 
implementation. 
2.5.2 Practical Frameworks 
Kurdi et al., (2011) developed a framework with guidelines and tools to support the readiness 
of e-government information systems in relation to moving to the cloud. The framework 
provides a method of assessment for readiness for moving to the cloud and is comprised of 
four dimensions; technological, organisational, people and environmental. The technological 
aspect includes the ICT infrastructure; the organisational aspect considers organisational size, 
structure, culture, vision and strategy, leadership, support, legislation and data sharing, the 
people and stakeholder’s aspect includes business, government and citizens and finally, the 
environment and society block which includes the country profile and demographics, the 
political, the socio-cultural and the economic considerations. The output from all of these 
aspects helps governments to understand the important issues related to implementation of e-
government systems as well how to assess readiness for migration to the cloud. While this 
appears to be a comprehensive approach to cloud adoption because it considers the technical, 
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the organizational, people and environmental, all relevant parties within these areas do not 
include the CSP, there is particular attention paid to stakeholders in their study but these are 
citizens, government and business and do not include those who provide the cloud service as 
a solution for e-government. 
Mukherjee and Sahoo (2012) proposed a framework that can be used by all and comprises of 
three layers, the knowledge base layer which contains the rules and facts about a specific 
problem from which the system gains expertise, the inference engine layer that scans facts 
and rules in order to provide answers to users’ queries, and finally, the user interface layer 
which comprises of the channels through which the user communicates with the system. 
Ahmad and Hasibaun (2012) propose an architecture comprising of six layers, namely; 
infrastructure, virtualisation, management, user, access, service and layers. The architecture 
allows better sharing of information and resources and promotes standardisation in 
government resources; however, the writers recommended the hybrid cloud model for this 
deployment.  
Chanchary and Islam (2011), in relation to e-government in Saudi Arabia, present a model 
where systems and critical data are outsourced to the public cloud while at the same time 
maintaining control centrally. 
Singh (2012) proposed a model for transferring e-governance from traditional computing to 
the cloud using a step by step approach for migration of e-government to the cloud and is 
comprised of six steps; learning, requirement specifications, cloud prototype development, 
data and application migration, cloud rollout, and finally, cloud advancement and is a 
continuous improvement process. Again, although attention is brought to the issues that 
government face, there is no mention of the relationship with the CSP and how these issues 
can be resolved.  
Song, Shin and Kim (2013) propose a framework to deploy e-government in the cloud which 
includes three phases, namely; policy, technology and service introduction system. 
Specifically, it aims to develop the introduction system by considering both technology and 
policy. Although there are recommendations to tackle government-specific concerns 
associated with use of the cloud including guidelines on achieving governance, such 
recommendations are for the internal parties of the government such as departments and 
ministries, and there is no mention of external parties.  
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Wang and Hua (2011) proposed a model that considers the user group, the organizer 
(comprising of the internet service provider and the cloud provider), and the participator 
(including the application and content supplier, solution supplier, hardware and software, 
terminal provider and advertisement agent).  
Trivedi (2013) presents a model for adoption of cloud computing by government, the 
framework assists governments to understand the capabilities they need to acquire in order to 
be able to adopt cloud computing. The TOE framework identifies the technological, 
organizational and environmental factors in adoption of the cloud. 
Mohammed and Ibrahim (2015) classify models into four main types which are layered 
based, step based, component based and conceptual / theoretical models. Layered based 
models are either built using the cloud computing architecture service model or by using the 
traditional e-government architecture and introducing cloud computing in some way. The 
main focus of these models is how e-government can take advantage of the benefits of cloud 
computing, however, these models do not pay attention to the challenges (Mohammed and 
Ibrahim, 2015). Step based models are focused on integrating the current e-government 
system with cloud computing or simply migrating e-government to the cloud. These models 
are only concerned with the process of migrating existing systems to the cloud by using a 
model based on the prototype model of the software engineering. Component-based models 
are static models which integrate the components of e-government with cloud computing in 
order to show the benefits of cloud computing. Conceptual or theoretical models look for the 
factors that influence the adoption of cloud computing by e-government.  
Mohammed and Ibrahim (2015) provide a statistical analysis of all the different types of 
model found in the literature and found that most proposed type of model was the component 
based models at 42 %, followed by layered based models at 29 %. The least proposed model 
type was the conceptual / theoretical based models at only 12 %. 
2.6 The Government and the Cloud in Saudi Arabia 
Cloud services is something that is not widely adopted in Saudi Arabia and there are a 
number of reasons cited for this. Mreea and Munasinghe (2016) towards understanding why 
public organisations in Saudi Arabia are reluctant to adopt the public cloud look at the 
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business, financial and technical attributes of public organisation in order to provide a 
balanced view of the situation.  
The acceptance of the cloud in Saudi Arabia has been addressed by Alharbi (2012) using the 
Technology Acceptance Model. The study focused on the users’ perspectives but was 
restricted to the TAM model because it also included personal factors such as gender, age and 
job domain, overall the study found that there was a high level of acceptance by users. 
There has been one study, Sharma et al. (2016) that has looked at cloud adoption by public 
organisations in Oman, however, it focuses on employees of these organisations using the 
Technology Acceptance Model (TAM). The study goes further to say that there is a need for 
further research for Gulf countries, which includes Saudi Arabia, to test the human-related 
factors which includes job opportunity and system-related factors which includes perceived 
usefulness, perceived ease of use and trust.   
Yamin (2013) says that an important part of government reform is to make government more 
accessible to business, however, this is not possible unless there is government initiative in 
countries such as Saudi Arabia. Moreover, there are many private business organisations in 
Saudi Arabia who would benefit greatly from the government being in the cloud. It has been 
found that number of large organisations in Saudi Arabia such as the biggest mobile phone 
operator and the utility companies are fully aware of the benefits, this has included the energy 
sector of the government where there has been a reasonable awareness of the benefits of the 
cloud (Yamin, 2013). In Yamin’s (2013) study there were reasons given for the Saudi 
Arabian government’s reluctance to adopt the cloud which included concerns about security 
and privacy.   
A more recent report in 2016 (Saudi Tech Report, 2016) showed that there has been a very 
slow uptake of the cloud in Saudi Arabia, and one of the reasons has been the downturn in oil 
prices which has affected government spending. However, it has been suggested that 
adoption of the cloud by the Saudi Arabian government would help to drive economic 
development (Saudi Tech Report, 2016). 
There are number of economic initiatives in Saudi Arabia which require using cloud 
solutions. This includes the construction of smart cities which very much dependent on IT-
based systems especially cloud computing (Saudi Tech Report, 2016). 
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However, there is a negative side to the deployment to the cloud for the Saudi government 
and that is the cyber security generally in the Middle East. Saudi Arabia is in a particularly 
vulnerable position in terms of cyber-attacks (Saudi Tech Report, 2016). However, most of 
the interest and the growth of the adoption of the cloud is clearly taking place in the private 
sector in Saudi Arabia. 
Despite there being interest for use of the public cloud for higher education institutions in the 
country, there is still recognition that it means that data will be stored outside of the country 
which could entail data privacy and legal risks (Tashkandi and Al Jabri, 2015).  
There is evidence that the government itself is not an influencing factor for adoption of the 
cloud in Saudi Arabia. According to Tashkandi and Al Jabri (2015) institutes of higher 
education both private and public say that the government do not play any influencing role in 
the adoption of the cloud. However, according to Alkhater et al. (2014) the environmental 
context has a significant influence on cloud adoption in Saudi Arabia, and it is government 
regulation that defines this context. 
Saudi Arabia is a developing country, and according to Sharma et al. (2016) in reference to 
the motivators of cloud adoption in developing countries, governments face hurdles which 
include a lack of in-house expertise, trust issues with the technology, the lack of a regulatory 
authority and the overall lack of will. 
It would be important in a study that addresses the relationship reasons and reasons 
associated with cloud factors that are affecting cloud adoption by the government of Saudi 
Arabia, to comment on the Saudi government cloud computing initiative. The initiative 
recommends that cloud computing should be self-provisioned (Ministry of Communications 
and Information Technology, 2017) which suggests a private cloud solution. In fact, the 
initiative mentions the current status which only includes Government Secure Network (as 
IaaS) and Government Service Bus and National contact Centre (as PaaS) and e-
correspondence (as SaaS).    
Recently in 2016 the Saudi Arabian government have put forward proposals for regulating 
the cloud in the country. Specifically, this regulation was proposed by the Communications 
and Information Technology Commission (CITC). The CITC by law is authorized to regulate 
the information and communication technology in the country and in 2016 review existing 
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regulations for cloud computing. The CITC say that there is a need for regulation because 
there has been an increasing demand for the cloud from both the private and public sectors. 
The Saudi regulations include a provision that says the following: ‘CSPs may not provide, or 
allow another party to provide, to any third party (including, but not limited to, any 
individuals, legal entities, domestic or foreign government or public authorities) User 
Content or User Data belonging to a Cloud User, or process or use them’ (Communications 
and Information Technology Commission, 2016 s.3.4.2, p.32). Therefore, there is evidence of 
strict stipulations for government use of the cloud in Saudi Arabia. Furthermore, there is 
evidence in the regulations that reflect the concerns that government have about loss of 
governance in the cloud, specifically, the regulations stipulate the following: CSPs shall 
grant Cloud Users the right and the technical possibility to access, verify or delete their User 
Data (Communications and Information Technology Commission, 2016 s 3.4.3, p.33).  
In reference to contractual obligations a number of sections in the regulations clearly stipulate 
the duties of the CSP which include proof of the CSP’s authorisation to use other CSP’s for 
data centres and infrastructures (s 3.6.2). This point has reference to the issue of third parties 
in the cloud which is a well-known concern for all governments. The regulations also 
stipulate what CSPs are required to include in the contract which include rules for handling 
user content which also includes processing, destruction and restoration of data, and the SLA. 
2.7 Risk and Trust 
Towards understanding the relationship reasons for reluctance of government to adopt the 
public cloud, which include issues of trust and risk in the cloud and the CSP it is necessary to 
understand relevant theories of risk and trust in relationships. 
2.7.1 Theories of Risk and Trust 
Protection Motivation Theory (PMT) is a common theory that is related to risk perception 
and risk tolerance. The theory says that people will protect themselves when they perceive a 
risk; they try to avoid negative consequences and feel that they have the ability to carry out 
preventative measures. Basically, the theory suggests that there is a relationship between risk 
perception and injury and that an organisation will take action if they are motivated and have 
the means (Campbell Institute, 2014), however, if they do not have the means, i.e. 
governance, then there will be higher risk perception. 
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Goo and Huang (2008) bring attention to the trust-commitment theory that is relevant to an 
IT outsourcing relationship. The theory basically suggests that trust and commitment are both 
central to the success of this type of relationship, and there cannot be one without the other. 
The theory considers the benefits of a relationship, the cost of breaking a relationship, shared 
values, cooperation and uncertainty in the relationship (Goo and Huang, 2008). 
Another theory that may provide an explanation about why governments are reluctant to 
place sensitive data in the public cloud is risk Compensation / Risk Homeostasis Theory. This 
theory basically states that a person will take more risk when there is greater security; risk 
taking behavior is directly related to the safety measures that are in place (Campbell Institute, 
2014).  
Service procurement, especially at the public level and especially in public cloud 
procurement where, for example, citizen data is concerned involves complex risks because 
the procurement process itself is complex. In the literature about collaboration and 
partnership it can be found that there is a link between relationship risk and trust.  
Firdous (2011) says that there no single agreement on the definition of trust, however, there 
are key factors that are common and they include that trust is important when the 
environment is uncertain, decisions are made based on trust, trust is based on prior 
knowledge and experience, trust is subjective, trust changes over time, trust is dependent on 
the context and finally, trust is multi-faceted. Alruwaili and Gulliver (2014) adopt the idea of 
reliability trust and they say that trust is subjective and is based on the idea that an individual 
will perform an action that will affect the welfare of another.  
2.7.2 Trust and Relationship 
In reference to collaboration fluency there has been increasing research about collaboration 
and partnership in public sector procurement and has been addressed from different 
viewpoints including efficiency, effectiveness, performance and success. Unfortunately, 
however, Grudinschi et al. (2014) say that there have been few studies that focus on 
procurement in the public sector. 
Collaboration efficiency refers to the cost of collaboration which is not directly related to the 
aims and objectives of the present study. Collaboration effectiveness is about evaluating the 
ways that objectives are achieved from a managerial perspective (Grudinschi et al. 2014). 
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Finally, there is concept of collaboration success which is related to satisfaction or dyadic 
sales (Grudinschi et al. 2014). 
Collaboration is essential to achieve high quality services and even though collaboration 
practices and relationships have been evolving, the achievement of fluent collaboration 
between the partners is still difficult (Grudinschi et al. 2014). Collaboration fluency is a 
newly defined concept and is considered to be similar to collaboration effectiveness, and it 
takes into account managerial indicators such as identifying common goals and challenges. 
The common goal of the cloud service provider and the government as a customer would 
include security, planning to achieve the goal, implementing the plan and then analyzing and 
developing the activity (Grudinschi et al. 2014). Partnerships, in the case of the present study 
the partnership between the buyer and supplier, are related to the management of 
collaboration (Grudinschi et al. 2014).  
An effective system for ensuring collaboration requires clarity of roles and responsibilities, 
mechanisms to measure each other’s activities especially in terms of roles and 
responsibilities, and communication in order to enhance the coordination, however, these can 
be difficult when the communication is relational and not routinised (Thomson et al. 2009).  
Norms is based on the idea of reciprocity, that in collaboration each party has a reciprocal 
obligation to each other and they expect that their contribution will be reciprocated by the 
partner (Thomson et al. 2009). In the case of the present study, because the government will 
pay the provider there will be the expectation that the cloud provider will reciprocate by 
providing the services with the level of security that their government require. Clearly this 
idea is based on trust which is important in collaboration; unfortunately, this trust takes time 
and has to be built on a number of different interactions in order to build reputations 
(Thomson et al. 2009).  
2.8 Trust and Risk Perception in the Cloud 
As with trust and risk theories generally, trust and risk perception in the cloud are relevant to 
understand the reluctance of government to adopt the public cloud. 
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2.8.1 Trust in the Cloud 
Trust in the cloud service provider and the services that they offer and the risks that are 
perceived are major factors that influence the adoption of the public cloud. In this section, the 
relevant literature towards understanding trust and risk perception in the cloud is presented. 
Fan et al. (2014) in reference to existing literature on trust theory, say that trust is considered 
a measure of uncertainty, the measure of which is represented by entropy. Trust and distrust 
become significant when consumers are making decisions in an uncertain environment that 
involves risk and vulnerability. Therefore, Fan et al. (2014) say that cloud service 
trustworthiness is a function of cloud uncertainty, and it is used in consideration of whether to 
use the cloud, and the greater the uncertainty of a cloud service system, the lower the 
trustworthiness (Fan et al., 2014). 
Ahmed and Hossain (2014) say that establishing trust is key to establishing a successful cloud 
computing environment. Moreover, trust in the cloud is something that depends on a number 
of factors which include automation management, processes and policies as well as human 
factors and trust is recognised as a soft factor affected by security which is an influencing 
factor for adoption of the cloud (Ahmed and Hossain, 2014).  
Huang and Nicol (2013) raise an important issue in relation to trust in the cloud, they 
question what exactly the meaning of trust in the cloud is. They question that if the attributes 
of a cloud service provider are used by the customer as a way to measure trust; on what basis, 
should they believe the cloud provider and who is the authority who can assess and validate 
cloud attributes? Here there is clear link between trust and reputation as relationship factors 
in the cloud that are required to achieve the desired cloud factors.  Huang and Nicol (2013) 
look at the existing mechanisms for establishing trust and also look at their limitations, as 
solution they offer a mechanism for establishing trust.  
McKnight and Chervany (2001) say that there are 16 characteristics of trust organised within 
five groups which include competence, predictability, benevolence, integrity and other, the 
latter ‘other’ includes being open, being safe and having a shared understanding. 
Abbadi and Alawneh (2012) say that critical infrastructure services and organisations will not 
place their critical applications in the public cloud without being assured of trustworthiness of 
the different elements of the cloud without having to understand all of the details about 
infrastructure. Similarly, Gholami and Arani (2015) acknowledge that there is concern about 
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place sensitive data in the cloud and say that trust is the solution to enhance security and is an 
important way to improve reliability.  
Filali and Yagoubi (2015) bring attention to the fact that the benefits of the cloud which 
include sharing services in a dynamic environment, storing data remotely the ability to scale 
up, can be seen as weaknesses in reference to assuring trust and therefore, instill a lack of 
confidence.  
Ryan and Falvey (2012) say that the perception of trust in cloud computing which is based on 
centralized servers is often formed by people based on the use of their own computers which 
are localized in nature. The idea is that this view of trust is based more on perception than 
fact and Ryan and Falvey (2012) recommended that users of the cloud change their view of 
trust like has happened with other contexts such as travel and banking.  
Wu et al., (2013) say that trust is good way of achieving security and also allows access 
control, reliability and policies. Similarly, Bhatt (2012) says that cloud customers need to be 
able to trust that cloud services are safe, and that the issue of security is essential for the 
building of trust. 
Alshomrani and Qamar (2013 p.17) say that trust is an ‘act of firm belief in truth, reliability, 
faith, confidence, or strength of someone or something. It is a belief in the capabilities and 
skills of others that you think you can reasonably rely on them to care for your valuable 
assets’.      
Ahmed and Hossain (2014) say that trust is an issue that gives rise to security concerns 
because it is directly related to the credibility of the cloud service provider. Similarly, there 
are a number of different ways that enable trust in an unknown entity which includes direct 
interaction, reputation, trust recommendation, trust negotiation and propagation, Abbadi and 
Alawneh (2012) say that a trustworthy environment is established through cloud providers 
continuously enforcing the cloud requirements of the customer, do not interfere with the 
customer’s application data and hand over control of the data from the cloud provider to the 
user (Abbadi and Alawneh (2012).  
Burda and Teutberg (2014) say that trust is something that can be increased through the 
satisfaction of the user but also by the provider’s reputation. It is important to further 
understand the issue of reputation as a determinant of trust in a cloud provider. Reputation 
has been identified as being particularly important in research about cloud provider selection 
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(Burda and Teutberg, 2014). It is important to note that some companies see the cost of being 
perceived as untrustworthy as very high, especially for those companies who have achieved a 
reputation for being trustworthy, and therefore, trustworthiness is considered an asset (Burda 
and Teutberg, 2014). Based on a definition of provider reputation provided by Doney and 
Cannon (1997), Burda and Teutberg (2014) say that reputation is based on the extent to 
which a cloud customer believes that a cloud provider is honest and is genuinely concerned 
about their customers. Huang and Nicol (2013) also say that trust in the cloud is based the 
perception of reputation. The issue of reputation is addressed by Parwar et al. (2012) who say 
that reputation-based trust is a good way of evaluating service providers based on available 
evidence. 
In considering trust in a cloud service provider there is also the issue of familiarity, this is 
considered a prerequisite of trust and it is about the understanding that a customer has of an 
organisation based on interactions and experience that they have had (Burda and Teutberg 
,2014). More specifically, in relation to cloud service providers, familiarity can relate to how 
well the customer understands the cloud service provider’s infrastructure and procedures 
(Burda and Teutberg (2014). 
Brender and Markov (2013) bring attention to the fact that although there are numerous 
benefits to the cloud, there are still security risks whom the authors identify as information 
security, regulatory compliance, location of data, provider lock in, support in investigations 
and disaster recovery. Brender and Markov (2013) found that there was a high degree of risk 
awareness. Risk can be found in any context and a traditional formula for risk is that risk = 
probability x impact and involves comparison where one activity is considered riskier than 
another (Ryan and Falvey, 2012) and risk management decision processes are strongly 
affected by concerns about security, data availability, confidentiality, integrity and loss of 
governance (Elena, 2012). 
Elena (2012) say there is lack of understanding of risk perception in cloud computing and 
examines risk perception using psychometric testing in a questionnaire. The results of their 
study showed the military organisation was more concerned about documents in the cloud. 
One of the contributing factors to risk perception of using the cloud is that cloud providers 
often offer clients standard terms which are offered on a ‘click through’ basis to accept terms 
and do not give opportunity to the client to negotiate (Hon et al., 2012). Reasons that cloud 
providers have this ‘click through’ approach to contractual terms, which is reflective of a 
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standardised offering approach, is because they wish to eliminate the cost of negotiation, 
legal liabilities and other associated risks, moreover, they do not have in-house legal 
resources to deal with requests for changes to terms as they arise from the client (Hon et al., 
2012). However, this approach by service providers can be a risk for potential users because 
often users will click through the terms in order so that they can start using the technology 
without considering the effect of those terms, it has in fact been shown that it is common for 
employees to accept standard terms in this way and then try to renegotiate the terms later to 
achieve more acceptable terms (Hon et al., 2012). Just because a service is low cost or free of 
charge this does not indicate that it is low risk or free of risk (Hon et al., 2012). There may 
exist regulatory or legal risks, especially with data that is sensitive (Hon et al., 2012). 
According to Hon et al. (2012) even if contracts are negotiated legal professionals of the 
clients are often not involved in the negotiation.    
2.8.2 Trust models 
Burda and Teutberg (2014) present a model that considers user’s perception of risk and trust 
in addition to the antecedents of trust, they found that trust can mitigate uncertainty and 
actually reduce risk perception, and in reference to the present study, Burda and Teutberg 
(2014) say that risk perception is one of the main inhibitors of cloud adoption.  
Burda and Teutberg’s (2014) research model clearly illustrates the interaction between 
satisfaction, reputation and familiarity, perceived ease of use, perceived usefulness, trust, risk 
and the intention to use. They present a number of hypotheses in their study which include 
that perceived usefulness will positively affect the intention to use the cloud, a perceived ease 
of use will also positively affect the intention to use the cloud, perceived risk will have a 
negative effect on the intention to use the cloud, trust positively affects intention to use the 
cloud, trust will negatively affect perceived risk to use the cloud, trust will positively affect 
perceived usefulness and perceived ease of use will positively affect trust. Moreover, 
reputation is another aspect of trust in relation to the confidence to adopt cloud services, 
Burda and Teutberg (2014) say that reputation positively affects trust and that familiarity 
with a cloud service provider positively affects trust and the perceived ease of use.  
Filali and Yagoubi (2015) present a general trust model which is based on the QoS (Quality 
of Service) and the Certain Trust Model and contributes towards the selection of a cloud 
provider. Specifically, selection is based on sources which include user feedback, direct trust, 
user preference and Qos parameters and the model considers two trust attributes which 
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include trust value and performance value, performance value allows trust to be evaluated, 
and finally, the model uses consumer preferences (Filali and Yagoubi, 2015). Similarly, 
Manuel (2015) approaches the issue of trust in the cloud from the perspective of service 
quality, specifically, Manuel (2015) present a trust model for the cloud that is based on past 
credentials and present capability of a cloud service provider. They say that trust is calculated 
based on four parameters which include availability, reliability, turnaround and data integrity. 
In response to the fact that assurances about the cloud are insufficient and that clients do not 
have confidence in cloud providers, Chong et al., (2014) offer a multi-faceted trust 
management system architecture designed to allow cloud customers to identify trustworthy 
providers. Similarly, Noor and Sheng (2013) propose a framework for trust management 
based on credibility based on credible trust feedback which also takes in consideration of 
malicious feedback from attackers. 
According to Huntgeburth (2015) agency problems are common in cloud service 
relationships (the agency problem here being where the actions of the cloud provider as an 
agent affect the welfare of the government as the principle) and that this is made worse by the 
fact that quality of cloud service providers is something that is difficult to evaluate because 
the behavior of the provider and the technical details are hidden from the user. 
Therefore, the relationship between the user and the service provider and the ongoing 
assessment by the user and the decision whether or not to continue with the provider, is 
affected by uncertainty of the cloud provider where quality is difficult to assess (Huntgeburth, 
2015).   
2.9 Cloud Service Level Agreement SLA (Negotiation) 
In order to achieve the identified benefits of the cloud it is important for governments to 
establish guidelines that address the associated concerns through the use of effective SLAs 
(Khan et al. 2011). In a cloud solution situation, the traditional controls that are available with 
normal systems can be managed through the SLA.   
The SLA should include a number of different areas related to security that are listed in the 
SLA which include user access, regulatory compliance, data location, data segregation, 
investigative support, recovery and long-term viability (Alam et al., 2013). However, 
although this paper is concerned with security in the SLA agreement, the legal agreement 
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between the cloud service provider and the customer, and there is a detailed consideration of 
cloud related factors, as with the common criticisms of models and approaches to cloud 
adoption, there is no mention of the SLA relationship factors required to achieve the cloud 
factors. 
Bochicchio et al. (2011) say that cloud contract management plays an important role in the 
formation of cloud services contracts and should include a combination of legal, financial 
operational and technical aspects. Bochicchio et al. (2011) say that for government contracts 
they are far more complex and contain specific requests. Cloud contract management should 
include consideration of negotiation and collaboration as relationship factors towards 
achieving the required cloud factors. Bochicchio et al. (2011) do provide the practical ways in 
which to manage the relationship which includes strategic communication management, 
business communication management and operational communication management where 
there is mention of the importance of the need for communication between peers in the 
customer and provider organisations, however, the level of detail for relationship factors ends 
there.  
Baset (2012) acknowledge the variation in cloud SLAs and says that SLAs leave detection of 
violation of the SLA to the customer. In order to make comparisons between the different 
SLAs that are available, Baset (2012) break down SLAs into their component parts. SLAs 
can be divided into the service guarantee which relates to a service guarantee time period and 
includes availability, response time, disaster recovery and fault resolution, the service 
granularity refers to the scale of the resource on which the service is specified, for example, 
on a per service or per transaction basis. Although this study does much to highlight the 
problems that are associated with cloud SLAs there are no practical solutions offered. 
Zheng et al. (2014) say that if cloud providers and cloud consumers have different 
preferences it means that a SLA cannot be achieved unless there is negotiation. A solution 
that is offered by Zheng et al. (2014) is that there should be a mix of concession and tradeoff 
strategies which they found that as a negotiation approach achieved higher utility than the 
concession approach and less failures than the tradeoff approach. This study does much to 
address how compromise and trade-off can overcome the differing intentions of the two 
parties, however, there is no mention of how relationship factors such as negotiation have an 
effect on confidence and the only relationship factor that is mentioned is negotiation. 
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What is relevant to the present study are some of the findings from Baset’s (2012) study. 
Firstly, the study found that cloud providers do not provide guarantees for compute instances 
and performance and secondly, the burden of detecting a violation of the SLA is left to the 
customer and that in some cases the service provider requires that the customer has to inform 
the provider of the violation within a specified timeframe. What the study found was missing 
from the SLAs were sufficient assurances of disaster recovery, privacy, auditability and 
security (Baset, 2012).    
Burden (2014) say that contracts for the cloud have been extremely restrictive, however, 
although it has been the case that a few large providers have dominated the market which has 
led to inflexible SLAs, however, the market is changing and there are more companies 
entering the market which will be able to offer more flexible SLAs (Di Modica and 
Tomarchio, 2014). 
Burden (2014) does address the trends that are found in cloud computing SLAs and 
interestingly does address the issue of risk in the relationship, however, this is the risk 
perception that the CSP has in that relationship on whether to offer more customisable 
services. What is also important Burden (2014) is that there is recognition that an increase in 
negotiation has led to a recent shift towards more customisable offerings. Burden informs the 
present study about what may be important in a relationship that is perceived to be successful 
for the government as a customer. For example, Burden (2015) recognises the importance of 
customer knowledge.   
2.9.1 SLA Inclusions 
The Australian government offer advice about the legal implications of using the cloud, they 
bring attention to the fact that providers of the public cloud include clauses that they can 
change the terms of the agreement at their own discretion and advise government to either 
delete such rights or to oblige the provider to provide sufficient notice.  
In reference to service levels, it is important that level of service meets the service expected 
by the client, this is especially important if the service is critical and the service levels should 
measure something that is critical to the client, be easy to measure and there should be an 
incentive for the provider to meet the service requirements (Australian government, 2011).  
Key aspects of service include response times to interruption of services, flexibility of service 
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in terms of scalability of service and finally, business continuity and disaster recovery 
(Australian Government, 2011).  
Moreover, it is important agreements are included in the SLA that ensure disaster recovery 
requirements are met so that the client does not lose service or suffer from serious service 
disruptions, this may be achieved through a geographically separate disaster recovery site 
transition to which can take place seamlessly, continuity in the case of a power failure, make 
business continuity a strict requirement, that business continuity plans are submitted to and 
approved by the client, limitations on the provider for suspension of services and finally, 
regular maintenance (Australian Government, 2011).  
Other important aspects of the SLA include terms for ending the arrangement, dispute 
resolution, the disengagement and transition of services and the changes to terms and 
conditions by the provider (Australian Government, 2011).  
Similarly, the Cloud Standards Customer Council (2013) say that the agreement should 
include service provision, payment, temporary suspension in service, terms of termination, 
indemnification against loss or damage, limitation of liability and security and privacy.  
The customer themselves also have obligations that will be found in a cloud service 
agreement. Referred to as Acceptable Use Policies (AUPs) they include terms of use for both 
the customer and the provider, an example includes that the customer will not put any 
malware in the cloud (Cloud Standards Customer Council, 2013). 
Hon et al. (2012) examine cloud contracts that are negotiated, specifically, they look at the 
area of where users make requirements to change standard terms and the extent to which the 
providers agree to such changes. The findings of their study show that the most negotiation 
takes place in the areas of liability, Service Level Agreement, security and data protection, 
termination rights, amendments to service and intellectual property rights. Where clients 
should more seriously scrutinize the terms of an agreement is where there is consideration of 
full migration to the cloud or where ‘real’ or personal data is considered (Hon et al., 2012). 
Rajavel and Thangarathinam (2014) address the issue of negotiation conflict which they say 
arises from misperception, aggressive behavior and uncertainty in terms of preferences and 
goals.   
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2.9.2 Dynamic / Flexible SLA 
Cloud customer requirements are continuously changing and it is important that cloud 
services respond, in light of this requirement Prieta et al. (2015) present a real-time 
agreement and fulfilment of SLAs in cloud computing, the idea is that resources are 
readjusted to meet change in demand. 
Kanwal (2014) say that Active – Passive trust models are considered active if they allow the 
flexibility to dynamically update the agreement according to changing requirements of cloud 
customers. These agreements need to be updated periodically because the customers’ 
requirements regarding security and quality of service change over time.  These models are 
considered passive if they’re not flexible enough to be updated and manipulated according to 
the changing requirements of cloud customers. 
However, the idea that terms are standardized is supported by Hon et al., (2012) who say that 
it may be difficult for clients to negotiate terms with large providers who may refuse requests 
for change because they have more bargaining power, in this case terms may be on a ‘take it 
or leave it’ basis. Although there has been the idea that large service providers are inflexible 
in this sense, there has been move towards by large providers to be more flexible in order to 
secure contract (Hon et al., 2012).  
Negotiation is something that engaged in more by larger organisations, especially those that 
are regulated and there is demand or insistence that clients’ requirements are included (Hon et 
al., 2012). Although it may be the case that government organisations have the purchasing 
power and therefore, it seems that they can get what they want, the internal procedures make 
it difficult to formulate and agree terms (Hon et al., 2012). Larger organisations such as 
governments demand that the contracts are on their terms and they try to negotiate more. 
Going against the argument that cloud contracts are too standardized, Hon et al. (2012) found 
that there have been a number of different types of approaches to cloud contracts than the 
standard cloud models, this has been evidenced by participants in the cloud developing a 
diverse range of cloud services with different contractual terms. Importantly, contracts have 
been found to consider standards and certifications that promote legal certainty and 
compliance (Hon et al., 2012). 
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Although it is the purpose of a cloud provider to offer computing services to clients while 
making a profit, there are circumstances where the service providers have to differentiate 
their SLAs because of the type of client (Macias and Guitart 2014). 
Rajavel and Thangarathinam (2014) say that there are two types of SLA, those which are 
classified as static which means they are predefined by the cloud service provider and those 
classified as negotiated or customized. The former type is often offered by large cloud 
providers such as Microsoft Azure and Amazon and they are often established as soon as the 
client has confirmed the consumer service request and made the online payment. Where this 
template is not appropriate, especially for those consumers that have special QOS requests, 
Rajavel and Thangarathinam (2014) offer an automated negotiation framework which 
considers that for the provider there needs to profit maximization while at the same time 
offering a differentiated SLA according to client types as well as agreement of customised 
service provisioning. 
2.9.3 SLAs and Trust    
Alhamad et al., (2010) present a SLA-based trust model for cloud computing and also bring 
attention to the fact that for critical systems and sensitive data there is a need to select cloud 
providers based on the requirement for a high level of trustworthiness. The trust model that is 
presented by Alhamad et al., (2010) is designed to help evaluate cloud services which will 
help users select the most reliable service. This model was achieved by combining a SLA 
framework for cloud computing with trust management. Manuel (2015) in proposing a model 
for trust says that an SLA is based on quality of service requirements and capabilities of the 
provider. 
There are clearly two elements within the SLA-based trust model that is offered by Alhamad 
et al., (2010), firstly, they talk about the most related services which means services that meet 
the functional requirements, and secondly, trusted resources.  
Alruwaili and Gulliver (2014) say that in addition to confidentiality, integrity and availability 
concerns, there are also issues of trust especially where the cloud hosts sensitive data. 
Moreover, Alruwaili and Gulliver (2014) say that the cloud service providers themselves 
have difficulty in maintaining confidentiality, integrity and availability for their customers.  
Alruwaili and Gulliver (2014) highlight the concerns when transferring applications to the 
cloud, these are three security and privacy concerns and are as follows: cloud service 
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providers may not possess the required intrusion detection and prevention policies to meet the 
requirements of the customer, the cloud service provider may not have the necessary 
intrusion detection and prevention controls which mean that confidentiality and integrity 
could become compromised whereby customer can lose their data, finally, the cloud service 
provider may not possess the needed intrusion detection and prevention systems which may 
lead to a loss of service and a loss of information availability for the customer.  
Alruwaili and Gulliver (2014) highlight the trust concerns that customers have when they 
enter into an agreement with a cloud service provider, and one of the issues that they mention 
is that customers have insufficient information about their service providers. As a result, it is 
often the case that customers have to accept a certain level of risk, however, it is important to 
note that where there is insufficient information about security and privacy services, risks can 
be mitigated, to a certain extent, by a detailed SLA and a detailed meeting. Alruwaili and 
Gulliver (2014) say that trust and reputation systems should be combined with SLAs in order 
to create confidence in the customer. 
An important note that is made by Alruwaili and Gulliver (2014) relevant to the present study 
is that although there have been solutions to address SLA requirements in cloud computing, 
there is a need to leverage the trust relationship between cloud provider and cloud customer. 
Furthermore, one of the requirements that governments would have is that they are allowed to 
continuously monitor and evaluate the cloud service that they are being provided. Alruwaili 
and Gulliver (2014) say it is important that there is continual evaluation of intrusion detection 
and prevention, this brings attention to the idea of continuous evaluation as part of the cloud 
provider – customer relationship. 
Fan and Perros (2014) offer a solution to the issue of trust in the cloud which involves Trust 
Service Providers which are independent third-party trust agents that are trusted by cloud 
providers, cloud service providers and cloud customers, these agents are distributed 
throughout the cloud and that gather raw data about trust related to the extent to which a 
cloud service providers adhere to the SLA.  
A similar idea has been put forward by Pan et al. (2015) which is based on the idea of trust 
relationships in a social network, which these authors say is something that is not taken into 
consideration in existing methods of selection of cloud services.     
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Habib et al. (2012) bring attention to the idea that although most cloud providers offer the 
same service, the descriptions that are found in SLAs, where technical and functional 
assurances are specified, are not consistent between the various cloud providers, this means 
that potential customers are unsure of how to identify a trustworthy cloud provider based on 
the SLA.  Habib et al. (2012) propose a multi-faceted Trust Management (TM) system 
architecture which helps to identify trustworthy cloud providers based on different attributes 
which include security, performance and compliance. 
Habib et al. (2012) say that there are a multitude of attributes that have to be considered in 
selecting trustworthy cloud providers. They say that a TM should combine these attributes 
which are based on user feedback and reviews known as soft trust and certificates or audits 
known as hard trust.   
Marudhadevi et al. (2014) say that during the SLA negotiation customers will have 
inadequate assurances in order to determine if the services are trustworthy. These authors 
propose a trust mining model that is used to identify trustworthy service providers during the 
SLA negotiation. The model is based on objective and subjective ratings, the former from the 
cloud service provider when their service is used and the latter from the customer when they 
used the service. Moreover, the model is based on third parties which include a SLA manager 
who negotiates the SLA between provider and customer and the negotiation is complete 
when the customer agrees on the trust rate of the provider, and a trust manager who 
determines trust based on previous and current experience of a cloud providers’ customers 
and then passes that information onto the SLA manager (Marudhadevi et al., 2014). Aamir et 
al. (2014) identify a number of challenges to security in the cloud and they include weak 
Service Level Agreements (SLAs). 
2.10 Summary 
The review of the literature here has provided both an overview of the issues relevant to the 
present study and overview of similar work that has been carried out in this area. Review of 
work that has already been done in the area of cloud adoption has showed the research gap of 
this study. The review has shown that although there is consideration of trust and risk issues 




From the literature in the above it can be seen that much attention is given to issues that relate 
to the suitability of the cloud and the benefits and risks of the cloud. There has been very 
little literature written about the relationship between the customer and the CSP in relation to 
specific areas of the cloud, especially government and the public cloud. 
Some studies focus on the human-related factors in cloud adoption as opposed to technology-
related factors, such as those that use the TAM, however, there is lack of studies in the 
literature about the actual relationship and relationship factors between the customer and the 
cloud service provider. Where risk and trust are addressed they are simply established against 
cloud factors, for example, there is a perceived risk of losing control over data but this is not 
explored in detail. Moreover, although it has to be acknowledged that negotiation and 
collaboration between customer and provider are addressed in the literature, the literature 
does not associate these relationship factors with specific aspects of the cloud, and 
negotiation and collaboration generally between government and the CSP receives even less 
attention.  
Even though relationship factors may apparently be addressed, such as trust or the perception 
of risk, they are often associated with technology and its ability rather than the CSPs ability 
or willingness to ensure required service. Trust and risk are often considered in relation to 
trust or a perception of risk for the technology to provide a safe and secure service, rarely is 
trust and risk viewed as a relationship factor between the customer and the CSP where the 
CSP can be trusted to provide the required security, or the required security can be negotiated 
or collaborated for within the relationship. Therefore, as a solution to the problem of 
reluctance by government to adopt the public cloud, this study considers the relationship 
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Research into information systems (IS) is not purely technical nor is it purely social and is in 
fact a combination of the two, referred to as a sociotechnical approach (Sarker et al. 2013). 
This sociotechnical approach tries to understand the interaction between the technical aspects 
which include technology and the business processes supported by this technology 
(Huntgeburth, 2015), in the case of the present study this would be the technology that is used 
not only to offer the cloud services to government but also offer the ability to govern data and 
processes, be compliant and be secure as a service. The social aspects are the values and the 
needs of the people in an organisation (Huntgeburth, 2015); again, in the case of the present 
study the people are the government that are the purchasers of the cloud and the requirements 
and concerns that they have. These requirements are achieved in the relationship between 
government and CSP. 
According to Huntgeburth (2015) in more recent years IS research has focused more and 
more on changes that are a result of cloud computing, however, there has been no framework 
for considering the behavioural changes as a result of the emergence of the cloud.   
Primarily, the study is concerned with the relationship factors that affect government 
adoption of the public cloud and the associated areas of the cloud where these relationship 
issues occur. Therefore, it is important to understand the aspects of a user – provider 
relationship that have a bearing on the willingness to adopt the cloud. There are certain 
theories that can be used to understand this relationship and the associated cloud concerns.  
One of the main contributions in this area is the Cloud Service Relationship Theory by 
Huntgeburth (2015) which explains how uncertainties occur in the user – cloud provider 
relationship and how they can be mitigated. This theory is based on a number of different 
theories which explain why different aspects of the relationship may be responsible for 
reluctance to adopt the cloud. In this chapter, the relevant theory related to the relationship 
and associated cloud factors in the government – CSP relationship in the context of cloud 
adoption is presented. These theoretical foundations are used to inform the development of 
the research design of the study.  
The research design is developed to help understand how relationship factors link to cloud 
factors, for example where a government does not trust the governance structures offered by 
a cloud provider, and therefore, provides insight into the areas of concerns. Moreover, the 
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study offers greater insight by considering the specific issues within each cloud factor. This is 
achieved through the consideration of cloud sub factors, for example, where governance is 
the cloud factor; control over data would be a cloud sub factor. All factors whether 
relationship, cloud or cloud sub factors are considered in the study as critical success factors 
for government confidence in the public cloud. These factors form the basis of the 
development of the methods which include a questionnaire and a semi-structured interview. 
3.2 Research design 
The research design answers the research questions and achieves the aims and objectives. The 
research questions, the first aim and first objective are concerned with the relationship factors 
that may have an impact on governments’ confidence to place sensitive data and critical 
systems in the public cloud. These factors have been identified from the literature and 
existing models, frameworks and standards for the cloud. Specifically, the relationship factors 
are trust, risk, collaboration, negotiation and reputation (Figure 3.1) and are all relevant to the 
relationship between government and a cloud service provider. 
The research questions are related to the cloud factors that are relevant to government when 
considering the public cloud and the study wants to investigate how these cloud factors are 
affected by relationship factors, for example, a government may perceive a risk in relation to 
governance or they feel they are not able to negotiate compliance needs, this is the 
relationship between relationship factors and cloud factors (Figure 3.1). 
Moreover, because the study is about the relationship for the public cloud, greater insight into 
the specific areas or factors of the cloud is required. An example of this can be seen in the last 
box in Figure 3.1 where the specific areas within the cloud factor of governance include 








Figure 3-1: Research structure - Relationship and cloud factors 
 
3.3 Relationship Critical Success Factors (RCSFs) 
Aspects of the relationship that have been shown in the literature to have a direct impact on 
confidence to adopt the cloud. Specifically, they include trust, risk, collaboration, negotiation 
and reputation. Although there is often a relationship between these factors, for example a 
good reputation is required for trust; it is justified to approach them separately because each 
one receives a significant amount of attention in the literature and have been shown to be 
relevant when considering the reasons that governments are reluctant to migrate to the public 
cloud. 
These relationship factors, as well as the cloud factors that follow, are considered as critical 
success factors, for example for there to be a successful relationship and associated 
confidence to use the public cloud there needs to be increased trust, decreased perception of 
risk, an effective negotiation and collaborative relationship as well as a perceived positive 
reputation. 
3.3.1 Trust (CSF) 
According to Mayer et al (1995 p.726) trust is ‘willingness to be vulnerable to another party’ 
and trust is founded in three characteristics which are ability, integrity and benevolence, 






























vulnerability based on the belief that using the cloud will meet their expectations based on the 
confidence of the cloud provider as well as the cloud integrity and benevolence. 
Behavioural attributes of trust include competence, dynamism, expertise, predictability, 
benevolence, responsiveness, integrity, honesty, credibility, reliability, dependability, 
carefulness and understanding (McKnight and Chervany, 2001). Additionally, trust is based 
on expectancy by the customer that the provider would behave in a particular way and belief 
by the customer that the service provider has integrity, goodwill and competence (Nicol, 
2013).  
According to Firdhous et al. (2011) trust only plays a role when the environment is perceived 
to be risky and uncertain, is the basis on which decisions are made, is based on prior 
knowledge and experience, is a subjective notion based on opinions, can change with time 
and experience and is dependent on the context. 
The latter point about trust being dependent on the context is relevant to the present study 
where the context is the cloud and the associated cloud factors. In relation to this, the research 
design of the study is based on the idea that relationship factors such as trust should be 
considered with cloud factors, this link between the two different types of critical success 
factor is explained in more detail at the end of this section (Section 3.3.1.2). 
3.3.1.1 Trust and IT  
Blomqvist et al. (2008) examines the role of trust in contracts in companies that are 
technology intensive and puts forward propositions about the role of trust and contracting in 
these types of companies. Trust is about what the other party will do in a situation that is 
often not included in the contract; in fact, formal contracts only play a limited role and have 
to be augmented by informal norms and agreements (Blomqvist et al., 2008). Much like the 
situation in the present study, when companies are engaged in this type of partnership they 
have to share valuable information and this information cannot always be covered by the 
contract, therefore, it requires trust. Moreover, similar to ideas put forward by Grudinschi et 
al. (2014) if the partners are able to trust each other then it will lead to better communication 
and collaboration, and also enhances the transfer of information. A key consideration here is 
to what extent are governments allowed to trust cloud service providers given the laws and 
regulations that they must abide by?  
 56 
 
Another point raised by Blomqvist et al. (2008) is that trust is a more important governance 
mechanism for companies dealing with technology than other companies. Moreover, that 
instead of being something that takes time to develop trust may be something that can 
develop quickly if there is an intense interaction of managers negotiating within collaboration 
and may enable a collaborative relationship (Blomqvist (2002). In fact, as pointed out by 
Blomqvist (2005) with technology intensive partnerships fast-based trust was essential for 
partnership formation. Therefore, trust and collaboration are linked, but here it has been 
shown that trust is something that cannot necessarily be controlled by a contract. In reference 
to the present study, these ideas can inform the interviews through the development of 
questions related to trust. 
3.3.1.2 Link between Trust and Cloud Critical Success Factors (CCSFs) 
Towards achieving the aims and objectives of this study where both relationship and cloud 
factors are considered together towards understanding government reluctance to adopt the 
public cloud, and towards the development of research methods to achieve it is necessary to 
show the link between trust as a relationship factor and cloud factors. Where trust is 
considered it has to be considered with cloud factors which are impacted by trust and vice 
versa. Habib et al. (2011) says that trust has been shown to be linked with cloud factors such 
as security, performance and compliance and trust has been associated with reputation factors 
where trust is based on feedback and reviews.  
In reference to the cloud specifically, Noor et al. (2016) says that poor trust management is 
one of the main reasons for lack of adoption of the cloud and associates the trust 
characteristics of the cloud with security and privacy of sensitive data through authentication 
and authorization. Moreover, the responsibility for this security as a cloud factor should be 
included in the Service Level Agreement (SLA) which both parties negotiate.  
Further links between trust and cloud related factors have been made by Khan and Malluhi 
(2010) who say that trust in the cloud from the perspective of the user is related to the 
security and privacy of data. Moreover, in reference to governance, Khan and Malluhi (2010) 
say that control ownership prevention and a lack of control and transparency decrease trust 
and that providing more jurisdiction and allowing for remote access control facilities and 
transparency will increase trust.  
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Fan and Peros (2014) say that a trust issue is that multiple clouds can be used by cloud 
service providers run on distributed computing resources. They say that for a multi-cloud 
solution a trust relationship is required among customers, cloud service providers and cloud 
providers. Fan and Peros (2014) also say that trust can be considered objective 
trustworthiness when based on quality of service (QOS) and subjective trustworthiness where 
users’ perception of belief in a cloud service provider is based on their preferences and 
requirements. 
3.3.1.3 Link between Trust and Sub Cloud factors    
In addition to the established relationships between trust as a relationship CSF and the cloud 
CSF there is also evidence of links between trust and sub critical success factors of the cloud. 
To provide an illustration, trust as a relationship factor has been shown in the literature (Nycz 
and Polkowski, 2015, Ahmed and Hossain, 2014, Alshomrani and Qamar, 2013) to be related 
to governance, compliance, security and privacy and performance and offering as cloud 
critical success factors, however, each of these has sub critical success factors that also have a 
relationship with trust, examples include continuous auditing and assessment and dynamic / 
flexible agreements. 
Kanwal (2014) says that in agreement-based trust models it is a functional requirement that 
there is dynamic update and monitoring of agreements in order to maintain trust, this can be 
in the form of contract parameters monitoring. Cloud CSFs and their associated sub cloud 
CSFs are relevant here. In order to achieve governance as a cloud CSF and therefore, trust, 
the sub cloud factors of a dynamic service level agreement (SLA) and auditing and measuring 
of the CSP need to be achieved. This is also the case for other cloud CSFs, for example, 
compliance requires continuous auditing and assessment, and performance and offering also 








Figure 3-2: Relationship between Trust and Cloud Sub Factors 
 
 
Where trust is associated with the cloud it has been shown to be an ongoing trust that is 
achieved through continuous measurement of performance and dynamic agreements which 
can change with changing requirements and that these types of trust are to be found in all 
areas of the cloud, namely; governance, compliance, security and privacy and performance 
and offering and their associated sub cloud factors such as a dynamic agreement and 
continuous monitoring of performance. Therefore, trust is a relationship CSF that has an 
association with the cloud CSFs and the sub cloud CSFs. The idea of these links is found in 
the literature and it is important to include this link in the research of this study in order to not 
only understand the role of trust in the relationship, but also to find out which aspects of the 




3.3.2 Risk (CSF) 
The perception of risk is something that the literature (Abbadi and Alawneh, 2012, Gholami 
and Arani, 2015, Burda and Teutberg, 2014, Ahmed and Hossain, 2014, Brender and 
Markov, 2013) has shown to be the main reason that governments do not have the confidence 
to adopt the public cloud. A reduction in risk perception is considered to be a relationship 
CSF towards achieving confidence in the public cloud. 
Service procurement, especially at the public level and especially in public cloud 
procurement where, for example, citizen data is concerned, involves complex risks because 
the procurement process itself is complex. The present study is motivated by the fact that 
governments do not have the confidence to place sensitive data in the public cloud because 
they perceive risks. Therefore, it is important to consider the issue of this risk perception 
within a public procurement relationship. Consideration of how the links between the 
perception of risk as a relationship factor and cloud factors such as security and privacy is 
important towards understanding reluctance by government to adopt the public cloud. 
In this section the perception of risk is associated with all of the cloud critical success factors, 
in other words governments perceive a risk in relation to governance, compliance, security 
and privacy and performance and offering. As part of the development of the research 
methods the links between risk or the perception of risk as a relationship factor and cloud 
factors and sub cloud factors is presented here. 
3.3.2.1 General Theories and Ideas about Risk 
There have been a number of different studies that have looked at risk management and the 
perception of risk related to collaboration management (Grudinschi et al., 2014, Thomson et 
al., 2009, Huntgeburth, 2015, Hon et al., 2012). The effect of trust on relationship risks in 
partnerships, how communication affects risk management and the effect of organizational 
structure on the perception of relationship risks are all examples of how different factors can 
have an effect on risk management and risk perception (Grudinschi et al. 2014). 
Unfortunately, according to Grudinschi et al. (2014 p.83) ‘risk perception and relationship 
risk management are rarely highlighted in discussions of public procurement and 
collaboration’.    
According to Protection Motivation Theory (PMT), a common theory that is related to risk 
perception and risk tolerance, people will protect themselves when they perceive a risk; they 
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try to avoid negative consequences and feel that they have the ability to carry out 
preventative measures. When this theory is applied to this study, where there is an increase in 
risk perception the use of protective action increases, which is not adopting the public cloud 
for sensitive data and critical systems.  
Basically, the PMT theory suggests that there is a relationship between risk perception and 
injury and that an organisation will take action if they are motivated and have the means 
(Campbell Institute, 2014). The means to prevent injury in the case of a government adopting 
the public cloud would be achievement of an acceptable level of governance or security and 
privacy, however, if they do not have these means then there will be increased risk 
perception. Therefore, there is a link between risk as a relationship factor and governance or 
security as cloud factors where the latter influences the former.  
Another theory to consider in relation to the issue of risk perception that can provide an 
explanation about why governments are reluctant to place sensitive in the public cloud is Risk 
Compensation / Risk Homeostasis Theory. This theory basically states that a person will take 
more risk when there is greater security; risk taking behavior is directly related to the safety 
measures that are in place (Campbell Institute, 2014). If this theory is applied to the present 
study then it would suggest that a reason why governments are not taking the risk to place 
sensitive data in the public cloud is because there may be the perception that there are not 
enough measures in place in the areas of governance, compliance, security and privacy to 
secure sensitive data and critical systems. Again, there is a link between risk and cloud 
factors.  
3.3.2.2 Link between Risk and Cloud and sub Cloud CSFs 
An example of where risk perception has a link with a cloud CSF is that governments need a 
certain level of governance or control over the data not only for security purposes but also 
because it is required by legislation and regulation, without this there is an increased 
perception of risk. 
In reference to the risk compensation theory, discussed in the above, there is a clear 
relationship between what the cloud provider is willing to offer such as governance, 
compliance and security and privacy and how secure they are as cloud critical success 
factors, and the government’s perception of risk with these factors. Therefore, there is 
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justification for considering both relationship and cloud factors together towards 
understanding the reasons why governments do not have confidence in the public cloud.    
Brender and Markov (2013) have identified that the most important risks are related to 
information security, confidentiality of data and privacy. For government, this link between 
risk and security is especially a problem in the cloud where privileged user access associated 
with the processing of sensitive data bypasses the personnel controls that an IT department 
would normally have and therefore, there is the concern about malicious insiders of the cloud 
service provider, this is a sub cloud factor of governance and security and privacy. As a CSF, 
a way to reduce the risk perception here is to have sufficient information and assurances on 
who is hired and there must be the use of the least privileged principle whereby processes, 
individuals or entities have the minimum access to carry out tasks.  
In consideration of the issue of risk, where there is a lower level of risk perception there will 
be more confidence to use the public cloud. Therefore, a lower perception of risk is 
considered a critical success factor in the relationship towards increasing confidence in the 
public cloud. 
Moreover, this section has shown that risk cannot be considered in isolation, there is a 
relevant link between risk as a relationship CSF and cloud CSFs such as security and privacy 
and compliance, and sub Cloud CSFs such as knowledge and control over CSP employees. 
Therefore, the questioning in the research will consider the relationship between risk and 
factors of the cloud that are determined by risk perception.  
3.3.3 Collaboration (CSF) 
Collaboration between the government and the CSP has been shown to be necessary for 
governments to deploy to the public cloud. Specifically, collaboration is required for 
achieving CSFs such as governance and compliance. The government – CSP relationship is 
not something that takes place in one instant but rather takes place on an ongoing basis as 
requirements change, and therefore, the ability to collaborate with the cloud service provider 
is an essential relationship CSF. 
3.3.3.1 General Theories and Ideas about Collaboration 
Research into collaboration and partnership in public service sector procurement has received 
much interest and has been studied from different perspectives including efficiency, 
effectiveness, performance and success; however, according to Grudinschi et al. (2014) there 
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have been few studies that specifically focus on procurement in public sector procurement 
itself. 
Collaboration is one of the important areas in order to provide high quality services and 
although collaboration practices and relationships have evolved in this area, there is still 
difficulty in gaining fluent collaboration between partners (Grudinschi et al. 2014). More 
specifically, collaboration fluency is a newly defined concept, similar to collaboration 
effectiveness, and takes into account managerial indicators which include identifying 
common goals and challenges (Grudinschi et al. 2014).  
Collaboration efficiency refers to the cost of collaboration and collaboration effectiveness is 
about evaluating the ways that objectives are achieved from a managerial perspective 
(Grudinschi et al. 2014). Collaboration is a much broader concept and involves economic, 
operational and managerial indicators. Finally, there is concept of collaboration success 
which is related to satisfaction or dyadic sales (Grudinschi et al. 2014). 
According to Thomson et al. (2009) there are five areas of collaboration that have emerged 
from the literature, these are governance, administration, organisational autonomy, mutuality 
and norms. 
Governance is the decisions about the rules that will govern behavior and the relationship 
should be made jointly by both parties for there to be successful collaboration (Thomson et 
al. 2009). Specifically, this involves establishing a set of rules about who is authorised to 
make certain decisions, which actions are allowed and which are not and what information 
has to be provided. 
Administration is the administrative structure that is required to move from governance to 
action, here the focus is on implementation and management as opposed to governance where 
the focus is on institutional supply (Thomson et al. 2009). However, this implementation in 
collaboration is not easy to achieve because of the autonomous or semi-autonomous nature of 
the relationship whereby traditional mechanisms for coordination, such as hierarchy, do not 
work (Thomson et al. 2009). 
Partners have a dual identity, on the one hand they have their own identity and organisational 
authority, and on the other they have a collaborative identity. Therefore, there is a conflict 
between self-interests in wanting to achieve their own missions and maintaining an identity 
that is distinct from the collaboration and the collaborative interests which include achieving 
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collaborative goals (Thomson et al. 2009). Problems arise from the fact that there is no 
formal authority hierarchy between the partners. 
Based on the idea of interdependence, mutuality means that each partner in the collaboration 
should enjoy mutual benefits according to their different interests or shared interests 
(Thomson et al. 2009). Mutuality occurs where one party has resources such as skills or 
expertise that the other party could benefit from. 
Mutuality is also based on the idea of reciprocity, that in collaboration each party has a 
reciprocal obligation to each other and they expect that their contribution will be reciprocated 
by the partner (Thomson et al. 2009). 
3.3.3.2 Link between Collaboration and Cloud Critical Success Factors (CCSFs) 
In reference to the governance mentioned in the above, governance is clearly related to the 
governance that is referred to in the literature about government and cloud provider 
relationships where government require a certain level of governance over data and systems 
in order to comply with their own laws and regulations. Having the authority to make certain 
decisions, establishing who is allowed to do what and rules about sharing information are 
found in cloud provider and customer relationships, especially under the area of governance. 
Moreover, the process of governance is ongoing, there should be continuous negotiation to 
establish an equilibrium where although conflict may still occur marginally, there is still 
agreement on the rules for a collaborative environment achieved by managers understanding 
the agreed shared responsibility (Thomson et al. (2009). Therefore, there is clear association 
between collaboration as a relationship CSF and governance as a cloud CSF, moreover, this 
association applies to other cloud and sub cloud factors. 
This link is further evidenced by an important idea raised by Alruwaili and Gulliver (2014) 
that was collaboration in detection. This idea is related to governments and the control of the 
data and includes the extent or ability of control of the data or specifically the extent of 
involvement and control over the detection of intrusion.  
Collaboration refers to the ongoing relationship that the government has with the cloud 
provider when the government deploy sensitive data and critical systems to the cloud. 
Governments need to be confident that there is collaboration between the two parties in order 
to achieve the cloud related critical success factors of governance, compliance, security and 
privacy and performance and offering. As an example, a link between collaboration and 
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governance is where the government need control over data in order for there to be 
collaboration in detection of malicious behavior.  
As collaboration is an overall relationship requirement it can be easily linked to the cloud 
CSFs and the literature has shown this. According to Marudhadevi et al. (2014) collaboration 
is important for the continuous checking that service provisions in the SLA are met which is a 
sub cloud factor for all four of the cloud critical success factors (governance, compliance, 
security and privacy and performance and offering). For example, a cloud sub factor of 
compliance is ‘continuous auditing and assessment’ and a cloud sub factor of security and 
privacy is ‘Continuous monitoring of policy adherence and performance’ both of which 
require collaboration as a relationship CSF.  
Allocation of responsibilities is another important aspect of the service level agreement.  It is 
important to ensure that all of the employees of the cloud service provider understands their 
duties and responsibilities in order to ensure that there is no conflict between them. 
Moreover, allocation of duties is important to achieve governance because the government 
wants to ensure governance is adhered to through the allocation of duties and responsibilities. 
An effective system for ensuring collaboration, a relationship factor, requires clarity of roles 
and responsibilities, a sub cloud factor, as a mechanism to measure each other’s activities 
especially in terms of roles and responsibilities, and communication in order to enhance the 
coordination, however, these can be difficult when the communication is relational and not 
routinised (Thomson et al. 2009). These factors reflect the sub cloud CSFs, for example, 
where the cloud factor is governance the associated sub cloud factor is clarity of roles and 
responsibilities, is also required to achieve the other cloud factors such as compliance and 
security and privacy.  
Collaboration has been shown to be a universal relationship CSF and has been shown to be 
required in order to achieve all of the cloud CSFs. Collaboration is required for an effective 
ongoing relationship and if it is not achieved then there can be many occurrences that would 
lead to a decrease in the confidence of government to use the public cloud.   
3.3.4 Negotiation (CSF) 
The ability to negotiate is important for governments to achieve what they require from the 
relationship with the cloud service provider. This is a relationship CSF that is required to 
achieve all of the cloud and sub cloud factors. Without effective negotiation government will 
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not be able to, for example, achieve their governance and compliance requirements and 
therefore, will not be confident to use the public cloud.  
The most important aspects of negotiation that are considered in this study are the ability to 
specify requirements and to have those requirements understood by the CSP. If a government 
feels that they do not have the ability to specify their cloud requirements or that their 
requirements are not understood then they will be concerned that their requirements are not 
met leading to a decrease in confidence.       
As an aspect of cloud negotiation, being able to articulate or specify requirements properly is 
important for both the cloud customer and the cloud service provider and is something that 
will form the central element of the contract (Johansson and Lahtinen, 2012). Being able to 
articulate and specify requirements is especially important in the case of government and the 
public cloud because requirements specification should be clear, particularly because 
governments require a customised non-standard service from the provider. Furthermore, 
specified requirements are useful for analysing the procurement situation and auditing against 
agreed requirements. Alruwaili and Gulliver (2014) and Johansson and Lahtinen (2012) say 
that the articulation of requirements is important in the specification of contractual 
obligations in areas related to technical specifications for security and sensitive data. 
3.3.4.1 Link between Negotiation and Cloud CSFs 
Negotiation is a relationship critical success factor that is required in order to achieve all of 
the cloud critical success factors. Negotiation is where terms and conditions for the cloud are 
requested and agreed upon. Without effective negotiation, by both the government and the 
CSP, cloud factors as CSFs will not be achieved. Specifically, where the government has an 
inability to specify their requirements, or the CSP has an inability to understand those 
requirements, there is a failure in negotiation and an associated failure to achieve cloud 
requirements. 
3.3.5 Reputation (CSF) 
The reputation of the cloud service provider will play an important role in whether the 
government trusts the cloud service provider, perceives a risk and ultimately have confidence 
in the public cloud. Reputation or the perception of reputation has been chosen as a critical 
success factor because reputation is directly related to confidence to adopt the cloud (Burda 
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and Teutberg, 2014). Pilevari et al. (2013) say in reference to user satisfaction that there 
should be positive perception of reputation which is positively linked to trust. 
3.3.5.1 General Theories and Ideas About Reputation 
A justification for considering the information and knowledge that the government as a cloud 
customer has about the cloud service provider can be found in bounded rationality theory. 
This theory assumes that the rationality of the customer is bounded by the information and 
knowledge that they have to make decisions (Huntgeburth, 2015). Moreover, another 
important issue that highlights the importance of reputation in the government – CSP 
relationship is that although the user depends very much on the cloud provider, they have 
very little information about them (Huntgeburth, 2015). This issue is raised in consideration 
of the Principal Agent Theory whereby one of the problems of making an ‘adverse selection’ 
is the fact it is difficult to verify quality in relation to the CSP and their service, therefore, it 
would be reasonable to expect the government to rely on reputation in this case.    
Although trust can be enhanced by the satisfaction of the user, trust can also be enhanced by 
the provider’s reputation and the extent to which the client believes that the provider is 
genuinely concerned about clients (Burda and Teutberg, 2014). Trust can be enabled in an 
unknown entity through direct interaction, reputation and recommendation (Abbadi and 
Alawneh (2012). Huntgeburth (2015) talks about principal agent theory and social influence 
which also consider unknown entities and their reputation. Moreover, trust concerns can arise 
from the fact that customers have insufficient information about their cloud service provider 
(Alruwaili and Gulliver, 2014). Ryan and Falvey (2012) say that trust is based more on 
perception than fact. 
It is important to consider the fact that the service relationship between the government as a 
user and the CSP takes place in a specific social context. One of the criticisms of the 
Principal Agent Theory is that it does not consider that the principal – agent relationship 
takes place in a social context. A response to this issue has been the Social Influence Theory 
which considers the context or the environment of the exchange relationship (Huntgeburth, 
2015). In reference to reputation, according to Wiseman et al. (2012) a higher density in the 
social network of principal agent relationship, the more likely the principal will defer to the 
social network for assessing the cloud provider or monitoring their behavior. In the present 
study, this social network would include other users and networks of users that come together 
to help each other evaluate and even certify CSPs. Thus, it is important to question the 
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government about reputation, where information is received from other parties in the same 
social context and whether reputation is an influencing factor when considering adoption of 
the public cloud. 
Similarly, Firdous (2011) says that trust is based on prior knowledge and experience. 
According to Alruwaili and Gulliver (2014) reputation includes assessment of cloud provider 
including security detection and prevention. There should be sufficient information about the 
cloud service provider - however important to note that the associated risk of insufficient 
information about cloud service provider can be mitigated through a detailed SLA (Alruwaili 
and Gulliver, 2014). 
Norr et al. (2016) says that social psychology theory tells us that trust assessment of an 
unknown entity can be influenced by known entities who recommend it and that reputation is 
affected by the different entities opinions that can impact, negatively or positively an 
unknown entity’s reputation. 
Therefore, there is support for the idea that there needs to be consideration of the perception 
of reputation, in further support of the fact that reputation should be considered as a 
relationship CSF for confidence in the public cloud.  
Although there is a clear link between trust and reputation, reputation is considered in this 
study because it is a relationship factor that has a strong impact on the decision of whether or 
not government should deploy to the public cloud. Before a government enter into a 
relationship with a CSP often reputation is one of the few types of information on which they 
can base their decision, or they form a perception of reputation after having experience or 
relationship with the cloud service provider. 
3.3.5.2 Link between Reputation and Cloud Critical Success Factors (CCSFs) 
Where there is the perception of a poor reputation in any of the cloud CSFs there will be a 
lack of confidence in these factors. Therefore, reputation is a relationship critical success 
factor that is required in order to achieve confidence in all of the cloud critical success 
factors. Reputation is a way of establishing credibility of the CSP in terms of issues such as 
security and control over data (Ahmed and Hossain, 2014) and a way to validate cloud 
attributes generally (Huang and Nicol, 2013) 
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Reputation has been established as a relationship CSF that has an effect on the confidence in 
all of the cloud critical success factors. To understand how reputation plays a role in relation 
to government confidence in the public cloud and which areas of the cloud are particularly 
affected this association is important. For example, it would be considered a factor for 
success in terms of having confidence in the public cloud if the government perceived a 
positive reputation about the security and privacy capability of the public cloud service 
provider. 
3.4 Cloud Critical Success Factors (CCSFs) 
In examining a relationship where governments do not have confidence to move sensitive 
data and critical systems to the public cloud, not only is it important to investigate the 
relationship factors such as perception of risk or negotiation as in the previous sections, but it 
is also important to investigate the cloud factors that are associated with the relationship 
factors. In consideration of the fact that the study looks specifically at government, the public 
cloud and sensitive data and critical systems, the adopted cloud factors in this study are 
chosen based on the fact that they have a direct link with governments concerns and include 
general factors that are also a concern for all organisations, and more specific factors that 
may be of particular concern to government such as governance and compliance. In fact, all 
cloud factors are relevant and of utmost importance for a government considering the public 
cloud.  
3.4.1 Governance (CSF) 
One of the main issues that governments face considering deployment to the public cloud is 
governance. Governance refers to the level and type of control that governments have over 
their data and systems that are deployed to the cloud. The more governance that a 
government maintains the more likely they will be confident to deploy to the public cloud 
(Haag et al., 2014, Nycz and Polkowski, 2015, Diez and Silva, 2013). 
Due to the nature of the public cloud, that it is provided by a third-party provider and hosted 
on a third-party platform, there is a loss of governance of the owner of the data, unlike private 
clouds where the physical infrastructure is under the direct control of IT departments, there 
are no other parties involved and they can secure the servers with a firewall. However, with a 
public cloud most of this control is lost, there are other parties involved which include the 
cloud provider (CP) and the cloud service provider (CSP) and the cloud is shared by multiple 
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tenants (Jansen and Grance, 2011, Takabi et al., 2010). This is further supported by the 
ENISA Security & Resilience in Governmental Clouds report (ENISA, 2011) that says that it 
is challenging for public bodies to manage their security requirements in traditional IT 
environments and this problem is made worse in cloud environments because they have to 
understand that there is a shift in the balance of accountability and responsibility for functions 
such as governance and control of IT and data operations (ENISA 2011). Thus, there has 
been a shift to indirect governance and control over IT infrastructure and data, this is 
especially the case with PCC and SaaS deployments, although these issues can be overcome 
by effective negotiation with the provider (ENISA, 2011). 
According to Kanwal (2014) continuous access to data is required under all situations and 
cloud architecture is different from traditional IT infrastructures and therefore, availability of 
data is more crucial. Ownership and control of data should remain with the customer as much 
as possible, this is achieved through process execution and data ownership. Process execution 
control ensures control over activities and processes performed on applications by cloud 
providers, if an organisation has sensitive data or critical applications in the cloud they would 
prefer themselves to have a high level of control in the processing of the applications.  Data 
ownership refers to where there is a need for the customer to feel that they still own the data 
and that it is not owned by the cloud provider. Ownership guarantees data is under the control 
of the organisation and only authorised entities can access the data. Data ownership includes 
access control policies which define access rights in the cloud (Kanwal, 2014). 
An additional consideration in the public cloud is the employees of the cloud provider and 
cloud service provider, over which government require a level of governance (Brender and 
Markov, 2013, CSA Guidance, 2011). There is a loss of control and concerns related to the 
employees of the CP and the CSP and there are implications for backup, disaster recovery 
and security. Firdhous et al (2011) say that there is a multiple stakeholder problem because of 
open space security and mission critical data handling issues. Some of the responsibilities for 
administration and operations are delegated to the cloud provider, and even though the 
customer would like to have the same type and standard of service that they would have if 
they hosted the cloud themselves, the cloud provider will have a different policy. Moreover, 
because there are three main parties involved in PCC, namely; the cloud provider (CP), the 
cloud service provider (CSP) and the cloud customer (CC), there will be a change in the level 
and type of governance that a government has.  
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One of the issues raised in the Principal Agent Theory, that is a cause of the ‘adverse 
selection’ issue highlighted by the theory, is that in a cloud service relationship it is very 
difficult to verify quality. However, governments need a certain level of knowledge and 
control over data and systems in order to have an effective principal – agent relationship. 
Another relevant problem that is raised in the Principal Agent Theory is that it is very 
difficult to monitor the actions of the provider; this would clearly be an issue for government 
in terms of the required governance. According to the positivist agency theorists the way to 
resolve this problem, which could lead to a ‘moral hazard’, is to establish a bilateral 
governance mechanism between the user and the CSP (Huntgeburth, 2015).  
The cloud is characterised by multi-tenancy and each party has their own Security 
Management Process (SMP) that they want to enforce on the cloud assets, no individual 
stakeholder can control or maintain the entire security process of the cloud services because 
they do not have the required information or perspective, multi-tenancy means that different 
security requirements will have to be maintained in the same service (Almorsy 2011) and 
therefore, there is a loss of governance. 
All of these issues lead to a decrease in the type and level of governance that governments 
have over the cloud and their associated assets.  In reference to these issues, the change 
towards indirect governance and control over IT infrastructure and data through the use of the 
public cloud presents a significant challenge. However, some of these issues can be overcome 
by negotiation.  
Governance has implications for other considerations of the cloud and the relationship 
between the cloud CSP and the government. In reference to trust, as part of establishing a 
trustworthy environment, Abbadi and Alawneh (2012) say that the cloud provider should not 
interfere with customer application data and should pass control over the data to the 
customer. Here a clear association between governance and trust is made.  
The link between governance and trust has also been mentioned by Kanwal (2014) who said 
that control and ownership of data and applications stored in a cloud is very important to 
increase the level of confidence of cloud customers.  Moreover, trust will be low if the 
customer does not retain much control over their critical assets in the cloud platform.  Trust 
models increase this confidence through guaranteeing a level of data control through adopting 
authorisation and authentication mechanisms. This requires defined access rights or the 
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authorization, authentication and visibility of stored data at different physical locations.  
(Kanwal, 2014). 
Additionally, the relationship between risk and governance is mentioned by Elena (2013) 
who says that risk management decision processes are significantly influenced by concerns 
about loss of governance. Moreover, risk perception significantly affects IT innovation 
strategies and risk perception is directly influenced by cloud computing applications (Elena, 
2013). Therefore, risk as a relationship factors is associated, through influence, by cloud 
factors. 
In order for government to achieve governance they have to be able to specify their 
governance requirements and have their governance requirements understood, this would 
lead to more confidence in the public cloud. Therefore, in order to achieve governance there 
is a need for effective negotiation and thus, there is a link between governance as a cloud 
critical CSF and negotiation as a relationship critical success factor (RCSF). This relationship 
has also been established in section 3.3.4 in consideration of negotiation.   
Therefore, in addition to the general need that government have to retain a certain level of 
governance over data, in order to achieve for example compliance and security privacy, there 
is a clear link between governance as a Cloud Critical Success Factor (CCSF) and risk, trust, 
negotiation (ability to specify requirements and have requirements understood) and 
collaboration as Relationship Critical Success Factors (RCSF).  
3.4.1.1 Sub Cloud CSFs of Governance 
The relationship that a user has with a cloud service provider is something that takes place on 
an ongoing basis due to the way the service is provided. Therefore, there is a continuing 
reliance on the cloud service provider (Huntgeburth, 2015). This idea is reflected within the 
different cloud factors, specifically, the sub critical success factors of this study where there 
is consideration of an ongoing dependency on the cloud provider. Within governance these 
Cloud sub CSFs include knowledge and control over data, processes and applications, 
knowledge and control over third party issues, knowledge and control of CSP employees and 
auditing and measuring the CSP. These are factors that are important in an ongoing 
relationship.    
In order to answer the research question of the study ‘Are there certain cloud related factors 
that are affected by relationship factors that may affect government confidence in the public 
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cloud?’ it is necessary to consider the specific areas within each cloud factor. The reason for 
this is that the study wants not only to find out the relationship factors that affect government 
confidence in the public cloud but the specific areas of the cloud that are affected by these 
relationship factors. This will allow the researcher to identify the specific areas of the cloud 
that are an issue in the government – CSP relationship which may affect public cloud 
adoption. This approach would offer a greater level of insight, for example, if governments 
feel that they do not have the ability to specify governance requirements, it would provide 
more insight and be more useful to practitioners if it was discovered which specific areas of 
governance, such as control over data or control and knowledge of CSP employees, are 
affected by relationship factors.  
Through a review of the literature and models for cloud adoption a number of sub cloud 
factors found within cloud factors are identified. If these are achieved, then it is considered 
that this is successful and there will be increased confidence in the public cloud.  
Table 3-1: Cloud Sub Critical Success Factors  (CSFs) - Governance 








Data control (Kanwal, 2015). 
Data execution (Brender and Markov, 2013). 
Data availability (Kanwal, 2015). 
Knowledge of data location (Brender and Markov, 2013, (CAIQ) (v3.0.1). 
Process execution (Kanwal, 2015). 
Remote access control (Firdhous et al 2011). 
Accessibility (Norr et al. 2016). 
Control over definition of access rights (Norr et al. 2016). 
Accountability over deployed applications and systems (Jansen and Grance, 2011).  
Control over transfer of data (Brender and Markov, 2013). 
Continuous access during all situations – normal and disaster (Kanwal, 2015). 
Clear ownership rights over data (Jansen and Grance, 2011). 
Knowledge of movement of data within the cloud (CSA Guidance). 
Knowledge of who has control over data (CSA Guidance). 
Collaborative governance structures (CSA Guidance). 
Knowledge and control over CSP employees (Brender and Markov, 2013, CSA Guidance) . 
Control over other tenants in cloud (Jansen and Grance, 2011) (Access control) Takabi et al (cited in Alhamad et al 2010). 
Not share cloud resources with competitors (other tenants) (Almorsy, 2011). 
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Clarity of roles and responsibilities (Jansen and Grance, 2011). 
Alignment of policies regarding assignment of roles (Jansen and Grance, 2011). 
Transparency of CSP actions (Firdhous et al 2011). 
Knowledge of third party relationships (Alhamad et al. 2010, Firdhous et al. 2011). 
Control over third parties (Takabi et al (cited in Alhamad et al 2010). 
Third party identity management (Takabi et al (cited in Alhamad et al 2010). 
Trust in supply chain (CSA Guidance). 
Policy integration with third parties (Takabi et al (cited in Alhamad et al 2010) (Jansen and Grance, 2011). 
Multiple distributed clouds used by CSP – trust relationship required between customer, CSP and CPs (Fan and Peros, 
2014). 
Security requirements aligned between three parties (CP, CSP and customer) (Almorsy, 2011). 
Do CPs understand security requirements (Almorsy, 2011) 
Duality in trust (Kanwal, 2015). 
Dynamic SLA (Kanwal, 2015). 
Measuring other parties activities (Kans, 2012). 
Framework to monitor and measure risk (CSA Guidance). 
Clarity of who will have access to data (CSA Guidance). 
Mechanism for vetting those who have access to the data (CSA Guidance). 
Clarity of what activities for what type of information (CSA Guidance). 
Clarity of which users for which type of information (CSA Guidance). 
Control over security policy (Ahmad and Janczewski 2011). 
Direct point of contact in CSP (Jansen and Grance, 2011). 
Maintaining situation awareness (in order to weigh up options and set priorities) (Jansen and Grance, 2011). 
Ability to enforce control and maintain accountability (Jansen and Grance, 2011). 
Auditing mechanisms for data storage, protection and use (Jansen and Grance, 2011). 
Organisational practices (government) followed by CSP throughout system lifecycle). 
Adequate oversight to maintain accountability (Jansen and Grance, 2011). 
Control over deployed applications (Jansen and Grance, 2011). 
Sufficient recourse to address and resolve problems (Jansen and Grance, 2011). 
Sufficient risk mitigation through negotiated SLA (Jansen and Grance, 2011). 
Governance during migration to the cloud (Estonia Report). 
 
Table 3.1 illustrates that there are numerous cloud sub factors to be considered.  This study 
should consider sub cloud factors of cloud factors towards understanding the government – 
CSP relationship, however, from a practical perspective they are too numerous for all of them 
to be included in the questionnaire. Therefore, the sub cloud factors are consolidated to 
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reduce the number of variables in the questionnaire, illustrated in Table 3.2 as relevant cloud 
sub cloud factors of governance. 
Table 3-2: Summarised Cloud sub Critical Success Factors (CSFs) for Governance 
Governance – Cloud sub CSFs Description 
Knowledge and control over data, processes and applications. In order for the government to achieve a required level of 
governance they need a certain level of control over data, 
processes and applications and at least knowledge of what is 
taking place regarding these. 
Surety of other cloud tenants. Government need a certain level of control other cloud tenants 
or at least be assured of security and control by service 
provider and be assured. 
Knowledge and control over third party (CP) issues. Government require certain level of control and knowledge of 
the Cloud Provider (CP) as a third party. 
Clarity of roles and responsibilities / accountability (government and 
CSP). 
Important to know who is responsible for what in order to 
achieve governance. 
Dynamic SLA (towards mitigating risks, adapting to changing 
requirements). 
Governance requirements can change so a corresponding 
dynamic agreement is required. 
Control and knowledge of CSP employees. In order for the government to achieve a required level of 
governance they need a certain level of control over employees 
at the cloud service provider. 
Auditing and measuring of CSP. Auditing, monitoring, measuring of CSP performance, 
activities and risk. 
Collaboration. To ensure that governance is achieved both parties need to 
collaborate. 
Governance during migration to the cloud. When sensitive data and critical systems are migrated to the 
cloud the government are required to have governance. 
 
3.4.1.2 Summary 
It has been shown in the above that a lack or a loss of governance as a cloud critical CSF and 
sub cloud CSFs, which governments have over data and applications is linked to trust and the 
perception of risk as relationship CSFs in the public cloud. Therefore, a cloud critical success 
factor in this study is an acceptable level of governance that would decrease risk perception 
and increase confidence in the public cloud. 
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These links are the justification for investigating both the relationship critical success factors 
and the associated cloud critical success factors when investigating the relationship reasons 
that governments have for being reluctant to deploy to the public cloud. 
3.4.2 Compliance (CSF) 
The physical component of the public cloud is often located outside of the sovereign territory 
of a government that uses it; this gives rise to legal issues. Firstly, there are the legal issues 
that are related to the governments domestic laws such as those related to personal data of 
citizens and the legality of whether or not it can be stored on a server in another legal 
jurisdiction, and secondly, the laws of host countries whereby a country may have laws where 
they can subpoena data for investigation purposes, for example, in the United States a cloud 
provider can provide user information to a public authority which seriously diminishes the 
user’s data security (Ahmad and Janczewski, 2011). Therefore, there would be a perception 
of a risk to privacy of citizen data. In this situation where local authorities have to gather data 
for forensic purposes, users will be deprived of their privacy; examples of this include the 
Patriot Act in the US and the UK Regulation of Investigatory Powers Act 2000 (Ahmad and 
Janczewski 2011). These legal issues are important considerations because they relate 
directly to the control that governments have over citizen data, and are particularly a concern 
is security for more sensitive data and critical applications (Ahmad and Janczewski, 2011). 
Although a government would be justified in expecting that their data is protected in another 
third-party jurisdiction, there is no guarantee that international legal protection would be 
respected, there are however, international conventions that could protect this (Microsoft, 
2016A), for example, the Vienna Convention on Diplomatic Relations (VCDR) and/or the 
Vienna Convention on Consular Relations (VCCR) (Estonia Ministry of economic Affairs 
and Communications, 2013). 
However, local laws where the cloud provider is located may not protect the security and 
privacy rights of the user, and it may be impossible for the cloud provider and the user to 
comply with auditing and the law because each party is in a different jurisdiction. Clauses 
included in agreements by the providers of public clouds often say that terms of the 
agreement can be changed at their discretion and it is therefore important for the government 
in order to be compliant to remove these clauses from the contract in order to maintain 
compliance (Australian Government, 2011). 
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Moreover, there are restrictions of where the data can be located, for example, the EU 
Directive 95/46/EU does not allow data to be transferred outside of the EU (Ahmad and 
Janczewski 2011). There are also issues related to contractual obligation whereby the cloud 
provider may contractually prohibit the user from migrating to another cloud (Ahmad and 
Janczewski 2011).  
3.4.2.1 Sub Cloud CSFs of Compliance 
In order to answer the research questions of the study, it is necessary to consider the specific 
areas within each cloud factor.  
Table 3-3: Cloud Sub Critical Success Factors (CSFs) - Compliance 
Cloud CSF Cloud Sub CSFs 
Compliance 
• Security and Privacy. 
• Multiple stakeholders. 
• Third party CP. 
• Regulatory compliance – EEA (European Economic Area data protection laws --- government remain 
responsible not third party --- MAIN ISSUE location of data in public cloud must comply with privacy 
regulations in different jurisdictions (example of high risk when other governments pass laws to access data – 
e.g. supeona US) Patriot Act (Brender and Markov (2013). 
• Continuous review and assessment of service regarding government requirements to ensure contract adherence 
(Jansen and Grance, 2011). 
• CSP understands laws and regulations that impose security and privacy obligations (Jansen and Grance, 2011) 
(specifically – data location, privacy and security controls and records management).  
• Account for different legal jurisdictions (CSA Guidance). 
• Overcome issue of cloud being borderless with different jurisdictions and different laws – to establish 
compliance (ENISA 2014). 
• Governments prohibit or restrict data to be transferred outside country – like EU so servers have to be in EU. 
• Data location.  
• Investigative support. 
• Provider lock-in (also relates to endurance / or going out of business / takeover and this all links to ADV CONT 
This inform a CSF domain which may be under ADV CONT maybe on its own. 
• Confidentiality. 
• Auditability. 
• Must understand risks and define controls before sensitive data is placed in the cloud. 
• CSF ability to identify risks and associated controls relevant to the IT function that will be migrated to the cloud 
(Brender and Markov (2013). 
• Provider lock in (Brender and Markov (2013). 
• Auditability (Brender and Markov (2013). 
• Clarity on jurisdiction for arbitration (Brender and Markov (2013). 
• Data destruction (Brender and Markov (2013). 
• Data traceability and monitoring of irregular activities ---- when migrating data to cloud in electronic format it 
can be downloaded to a usb.  
• Security during data transfer. 
• Physical security and natural disasters, 
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• Articulate requirements – buyer and supplier – specifications should be clear (Johansson and Lahtinen, 2012), 
• Allocation of responsibilities – cloud employees understand duties (Kans, 2012). 
• Security of provider assessed against security management of user (CSA Guidance). 
• Consistency in risk management (CSA Guidance). 
• Survivability of provider (CSA Guidance). 
• How data is managed during transfer (during business continuity) (CAIQ) (v3.0.1). 
• Ability to define geographic locations of data procedure (CAIQ) (v3.0.1). 
• Data not migrated beyond acceptable geographic boundaries (CAIQ) (v3.0.1). 
• Clarity about which jurisdiction applies to the data (ENISA, 2011). 
• Local laws where CP operates protect interest of customer (Ahmad and Janczewski 2011). 
• Compliant firewalls (Continuity central). 
• Clarity of roles and responsibilities (managing risk and ensuring organizational requirements) (Jansen and 
Grance, 2011). 
• Ability to act with laws, regulations, standards and specifications – at national and local levels (Jansen and 
Grance, 2011).  
• Understanding of CSPs technology and implications it has for compliance (Jansen and Grance, 2011). 
• Sufficient risk mitigation through negotiated SLA (Jansen and Grance, 2011). 
• Compliance when migrating to the cloud (Estonia Report). 
 
Again, from table 3.3 above it can be seen there are numerous sub cloud factors to be 
considered and too numerous to be included in the questionnaire. Thus, the sub cloud factors 
have been summarised and consolidated as shown in Table 3.4 as relevant cloud sub cloud 
factors of compliance. 
The nature of the relationship between the government and the CSP has the unique 
characteristic of being on an ongoing basis, unlike with the purchase of software which is 
often a one-stop relationship with some after sales service. Compliance and the various sub 
aspects of compliance require attention on an ongoing basis. 
Table 3-4: Summarised Cloud Sub CSFs for Compliance 
Compliance CSFs Description 
Continuous auditing and assessment Can continuously assess and monitor the CSP for 
adherence to compliance. 
Clarity and confidence regarding jurisdiction  Clarity of law for arbitration, confidence that 
jurisdiction achieves compliance. 
Data management Includes transfer and location of data. 
Roles and responsibilities Allocation and clarity of roles and responsibilities. 
Security and privacy Defined security controls, identification and 
management of security risks. 
CSP ability to be compliant with government laws and 
regulations  
Ability to comply with laws and regulations, 




Confidence related to location of data U.S. subpoena.  
Compliance when migrating to the cloud The ability of the CSP to remain compliant when data 
in being migrated to the cloud. 
 
3.4.2.2  Summary 
Governments are bound by regulation and law because they are responsible for the data of 
their citizens as well as highly critical government data on which the security of the state 
depends. The lack of governance has been shown to be a concerning factor for governments 
considering the public cloud. Therefore, achieving the required type and level of governance 
has been considered a critical success factor where its achievement will bring confidence in 
the public cloud.  
3.4.3 Security and Privacy (CSF) 
Security and privacy is one of the main concerns that governments have when considering the 
public cloud. Security and privacy in cloud computing does not have a good reputation and 
has been the main reason that critical sectors such as healthcare and banking have been 
reluctant to use the public cloud, this is made worse by the fact that governments are not 
aware of the security mechanisms of their cloud service providers (Bamiah et al., 2012).   
Security has wide reaching implications and considerations from the prevention of malicious 
intruders to ensuring security in the cloud provider and cloud service provider. Each of the 
three parties, cloud customer, cloud service provider and cloud provider as a third party, have 
their own security requirements which may in fact conflict with each other, in other words 
each stakeholder has different security requirements that they want to impose on the same 
service (Almorsy, 2011). Alam et al. (2013) say that security has implications for user access, 
regulatory compliance, data location, data segregation, investigative support, recovery and 
long term viability. 
Although there are numerous advantages to the cloud, if security is not achieved then these 
advantages are worthless (Ahmed and Hossain, 2014). The main issue is that government 
data and systems are to entrusted to what is essentially a public internet, data storage where 
there is multiple tenancies and governments lack control and the traditional security controls 
of authorisation and authentication are not sufficient (Hashizume et al. 2013). There are a 
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number of different areas that need to be considered in relation to security and include the 
network, host, applications and data (Zwattendorfer et al., 2013, Hashizume et al. (2013).   
Where IT adoption theory does consider security it often considers security in a general and 
abstract level, however, there is neglect in the IT adoption theory where it does not consider 
that concern about security, especially in a cloud service relationship, is more weighted and 
specific which leads to organisations deferring their cloud adoption (Huntgeburth, 2015). 
Security and privacy is linked to negotiation because governments should be able to specify 
their security and privacy requirements and have them understood by the CSP. Furthermore, 
governments, as part of compliance and governance requirements need to be involved in 
security management processes, be aware of third party activities in this area, be able to vet 
the employees of service providers and have transparency and clarity of roles and 
responsibilities. In reference to a link between security and privacy and collaboration, all of 
these requirements need collaboration as a relationship CSF. 
3.4.3.1 Sub cloud CSFs of Security and Privacy 
In order to better understand the issues within the relationship that may have an effect on the 
willingness to adopt the public cloud, the sub cloud factors of security and privacy are 
considered in the investigation of the government – CSP relationship.  The sub cloud factors 
of security and privacy are presented in Table 3.5. 
Table 3-5: Sub cloud Critical Success Factors (CSFs) - Security and Privacy 
Cloud CSF  Cloud Sub CSFs 
Security and Privacy 
Identity and access management – authentication, authorization (Jansen and Grance, 2011). 
Ability to specify security requirements (Almorsy). 
Sufficient involvement in the security management processes of the CSP (Almorsy). 
Awareness of security efforts by third party (CP) (Jansen and Grance, 2011). 
Different security policy for different types of data (sensitivity) (CSA Guidance). 
Offered encryption when data moving through public network (CAIQ) (v3.0.1). 
Continuous monitoring of security performance (Almorsy, 2011). 
Continuous monitoring of security policy adherence (Almorsy, 2011). 
Effective disposal of hard drive (Kidman, 2013). 
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Protection against data loss (Venkatraman, 2014). 
Protection against shared technology vulnerability (Venkatraman, 2014). 
Protection against malware on IaaS (Venkatraman, 2014). 
Protection against malicious insiders (CSP, CP) (Venkatraman, 2014). 
Protection against DOS attackes (Venkatraman, 2014). 
Secure interfaces and APIs (Venkatraman, 2014). 
Rapid response against attack. 
Data access (Estonia Report). 
Data handling (Estonia Report). 
Data lifetime management (Estonia Report). 
Data access auditing (Estonia Report). 
Separation of duties and least privilege (Estonia Report). 
Isolation of tenant applications (Jansen and Grance, 2011). 
Vetting employees (Jansen and Grance, 2011). 
Being notified of breaches (Jansen and Grance, 2011). 
Compliance with laws and regulations (Jansen and Grance, 2011). 
Assured about security related to multi-tenant environment (Jansen and Grance, 2011). 
Understanding of virtualization and isolation employed by CSP and the risks involved for the government (Jansen 
and Grance, 2011). 
Sufficient risk mitigation through negotiated SLA (Jansen and Grance, 2011). 
Assured about security for internet-facing service (Jansen and Grance, 2011). 
Clarity of roles and responsibilities (managing risk) (Jansen and Grance, 2011). 
Understanding of CSPs technology and implications it has for security (Jansen and Grance, 2011). 
Transparency of CSP and CP security and privacy controls – to assess risk (Jansen and Grance, 2011). 
Security and privacy when migrating to the cloud (Estonia report). 
 
From Table 3.5 above it can be seen there are numerous cloud sub factors, too many to be 
included in the questionnaire. As with governance and compliance the factors have been 
summarised and consolidated as shown in Table 3.6 as associated sub cloud factors for 
security and privacy. 
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Continuing with idea that the relationship between the government and the CSP is an ongoing 
bilateral exchange, the sub cloud CSFs of security and privacy reflect what is required in this 
type of relationship, these include the continuous monitoring of policy adherence, sufficient 
involvement in security and surety regarding CSP employees. All of the factors are important 
in an ongoing relationship to ensure government confidence in the public cloud. Therefore, in 
order to achieve these sub cloud CSFs a negotiation and collaborative relationship between 
the government and the CSP is required.  
Table 3-6: Summarised Sub cloud Critical Success Factors (CSFs) for Security and Privacy 
Security and Privacy CSFs Description 
Security of third parties. Requires encryption. 
Continuous monitoring of policy adherence and performance. The CSP continuously monitors security adherence and provides 
updates to the customer. 
Sufficient involvement in security.  Government employees allowed to be directly involved in security 
and privacy within CSP organization. 
Tailored security and privacy policy for differing needs. These needs are related to a public cloud solution for government 
including consideration of sensitive data, critical systems, more 
permanent cloud solution government (including advanced digital 
continuity). 
General – security and privacy provision. Intrusion detection, encryption, data loss, malicious insiders, DOS 
attacks, security and privacy during migration to the cloud. 
Clarity of roles and responsibilities. Clarity about who is responsible for what, includes who has 
authorisation and access rights. 
Surety regarding CSP employees. Need for insider logging activity (ENISA, 2011). 
 
3.4.4 Performance and Offering (CSF) 
Performance and offering in this study refers to the standards of performance of the cloud 
service in terms of speed, efficiency and capacity, and offering in terms of the types of 
service that is available according to customer requirements. Governments have unique and 
specific performance and offering requirements due to their nature, and therefore, if these are 
achieved, they are considered as success factors. 
According to Kanwal (2015) performance is related to detection of malicious behavior which 
is a high priority for cloud customers and quality of service transparency offered by the cloud 
service provider. Quality of service transparency is important because it helps the customer to 
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detect any deviation from their specifications in their agreement. Moreover, Pilevari et al. 
(2013) says that user satisfaction is strongly related to efficiency and performance which 
includes response time, usability, customization, adaptability, flexibility, inter-operability and 
scalable storage. Quality of service can be evaluated in two ways; firstly, by measuring 
quality of service attributes such as response time through port and network bandwidth and 
secondly, based on feedback. Di Modica (2014) says that is important that the cloud service 
provider offer support services whereby the cloud service provider helps customer to exploit 
the cloud to the full. 
Another important aspect of performance and offering is availability of service and disaster 
recovery which should be established in the agreement (Brender and Markov, 2013). For 
disaster recovery, there are two situations to consider firstly, where the cloud service provider 
recovers in the case of a disaster, and secondly, customer recovery which is one of the main 
reasons or advantages for cloud adoption in the first place. 
A pertinent issue related to performance and offering is provider lock-in and long-term 
viability. The agreement between the CSP and the customer should include provisions for the 
case of bankruptcy or takeover of the CSP or CP, during which time data should be available 
or it will be available to transfer to a replacement application or another provider. 
In fact, long term dependency on CSPs is mentioned as an agency issue in Huntgeburth’s 
(2015) Cloud Service Relationship Theory, this is because there may need to be a change in 
the CSP or the CSP may go out of business. In any case one of the considerations of the 
Cloud Service Relationship Theory is switching concerns and that is why end of service is 
addressed as a sub cloud issue in the examination of the relationship in the study under the 
performance and offering cloud factor.   
The literature shows that one of the main issues with the cloud is that it offers a standardised 
service (Hon et al., 2012), which often means there is less room for more customisable 
solutions, something that a government would need in a cloud solution. However, for larger 
organisations that are regulated, which include governments and government departments, 
there should be increased negotiation in order to insist that requirements are met (Hon et al. 
2012). Standardised offering is a problem and providers do not consider those who wish to 
pay for differing services, the result of this situation is that there is restriction and inflexible 
negotiation (Di Modica, 2014). Therefore, there is need for more refined SLAs based on 
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specific needs of customer which can be achieved through dynamic SLA management and 
negotiation (Di Modica, 2014). Thus, there is an opportunity for negotiation on requirements. 
Services that are offered by the CSP do have an effect on the willingness to adopt the cloud. 
The literature, cited in the above, has shown that one of the main issues with cloud service 
offerings is that they are often standardised as cloud providers are offering a large scale. This 
is a problem that is recognised by the Principal Agency Theory and is applicable to the cloud 
service relationship. In the agent-principal relationship the government outsources cloud 
services to the CSP, and where the problems arise is either when the government as the 
principal does not have enough information about a CSP which would lead to what is referred 
to as ‘adverse selection’ (Huntgeburth, 2015), or where the CSP would not perform as they 
were expected to, this is referred to as the ‘moral hazard’ (Huntgeburth, 2015). The theory 
suggests that the interest of the CPS is to provide the service at a minimum cost, and 
therefore, the standardisation in the service may occur. The government on the other hand has 
different interests in this regard which includes a tailor-made service to suit their specific and 
unique requirements. Therefore, it is important to address performance and offering towards 
understanding the relationship between the government and the CSP and how this has an 
impact on the government’s willingness to adopt the public cloud.   
In order to ensure a tailored-made performance and offering and on an ongoing basis to 
achieve quality of service transparency continuously and monitor performance against the 
terms of a negotiated agreement, there is a need, therefore, for both negotiation and 
collaboration as relationship CSFs towards adoption of the public cloud. Moreover, this 
adherence to negotiated and agreed performance as a cloud critical success factor is also 
related to trust in the CSP that they will adhere to agreements and the perception of risk that 
they will not adhere to agreed terms and condition.  
Therefore, there is an association between the need to negotiate, as a relationship CSF, the 
terms for performance and offering, as a cloud CSF, specifically, there is a need for 
governments to be able to negotiate a more customised cloud solution to meet government 
needs. 
Moreover, it has been shown here that performance and offering is also linked to the need to 
collaborate where it is necessary for a government to monitor on an ongoing basis the service 
provision and performance in order to check if it complies with what has been established in 
agreements. Finally, the issue of standardisation can also be associated with the perception of 
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risk because if a service is standardised then there is the real risk that governments would not 
get what they require in terms of service and offering. 
3.4.4.1 Cloud Sub Critical Success Factors of Performance and Offering 
Towards answering the research questions and achieving the aims of the study, it is necessary 
to consider the specific sub areas of performance and offering as a cloud factor. These sub 
critical success factors offer further insight into the specific areas of the cloud that may be a 
concern in relation to relationship factors. The sub cloud factors of performance and offering 
are presented in Table 3.7. 
Table 3-7: Sub cloud Critical Success Factors (CSFs) - Performance and Offering 
Cloud CSF Cloud Sub CSFs 
Performance and Offering Custom environment and negotiation of each provision (CSA Guidance). 
Ability to provide service in stipulated time (Jansen and Grance, 2011). 
Ability to provide service in stipulated cost (Jansen and Grance, 2011). 
All contractual requirements explicitly recorded in SLA (Jansen and Grance, 2011). 
Dynamic / flexible SLA (Jansen and Grance, 2011) (Kanwal et al., 2014). 
Sufficient risk  mitigation through negotiated SLA (Jansen and Grance, 2011). 
Different security policy for different types of data (sensitivity) (CSA Guidance). 
Availability assured (Jansen and Grance, 2011). 
No conflict for key resources (Jansen and Grance, 2011). 
Offers business continuity (CAIQ) (v3.0.1). 
Understands continuity needs (CAIQ) (v3.0.1). 
Sufficient length of support cycle (for security and performance).  
Sufficient notice of disruption to applications (Kidman, 2013). 
Up to date applications (Estonia Report). 
Negotiable contract (Jansen and Grance, 2011). 
Additional service of specialized staff for specific security purposes (Jansen and Grance, 
2011). 
Backup and recovery (Jansen and Grance, 2011). 
Continuous evaluation of SLA (Jansen and Grance, 2011). 
Support life cycle. 
As with the previous sub cloud factors for the other cloud factors in previous sections, there 
are too many to be included in the questionnaire from a practical perspective. As with the 
other cloud factors in the above, the cloud sub factors have again been summarised and 
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consolidated, shown in Table 3.8, as relevant cloud sub cloud factors for performance and 
offering. This summarisation and consolidation allows the specific sub areas of the cloud to 
be addressed in the research of this study. 
Again, because the relationship between the government and the CSP is an ongoing 
relationship, whereby it is IT as a service rather than IT as a product (Huntgeburth, 2015), 
this should be reflected in the sub cloud CSFs for performance and offering. In relation to this 
type of relationship the following cloud sub CSFs for performance and offering are 
important: a dynamic and flexible SLA, continuous monitoring of performance, additional 
specialised staff for government specific needs, sufficient support lifecycle, sufficient notice 
of disruption and end of relationship issues (see Table 3.8).  
Table 3-8: Summarised Sub cloud Critical Success Factors (CSFs) for Performance and Offering 
Performance and offering CSFs Description 
Customisable cloud environment. Can the service be customised for individual 
service requirements?  
Dynamic / flexible SLA. Can the agreement change according to 
changing requirements on an ongoing basis? 
Continuous monitoring of performance. The CSP monitors performance against 
agreements. 
Meet government specific requirements. Time / efficiency / availability.  
Additional specialised staff for government 
specific needs. 
Security / governance / compliance. 
Backup and recovery. Disaster recovery / business continuity. 
Sufficient support lifecycle. After sales service / includes guaranteed and 
extended support. 
Sufficient notice of disruption. The CSP informs the customer in sufficient 
time of any disruptions to the service. 




This chapter has highlighted both the relationship and cloud factors that are pertinent to 
understanding and revealing potential issues in the government – CSP relationship that may 
influence adoption of the public cloud. The importance of these factors has been shown 
individually and in association with other factors, where it has been shown that there is an 
inextricable association between relationship and cloud factors, that need to be considered 
together to understand the relationship. The relevance of these factors in the relationship were 
explained and how they can potentially create negative intentions towards cloud adoption. 
Moreover, in particular reference to cloud factors, there was an explanation of the relevance 
of the individual specific sub cloud factors found within the general cloud factors.  
Identifying and understanding the relationship, cloud and sub cloud factors was important 
towards the development of research methods, where they are applied in order to understand 
























•  To present the methodological approach 
•  To show justification and development of adopted methods  














This chapter presents the methodological approach used in this study which includes a mixed 
methods approach using both qualitative and quantitative data. There is an explanation and 
justification for this research methodology in order to achieve the aims of the study and to 
answer the research questions. Moreover, the adopted methods are also introduced which 
include a questionnaire as the quantitative method and a semi-structured interview as the 
qualitative method. The justification, development and use of the questionnaire and the semi-
structured interview is presented with an explanation of sampling, conducting the method and 
the approach for analysing the data. Finally, the ethical issues are also addressed.   
It has been established that governments are reluctant to place sensitive data in the public 
cloud because of a number of concerns related to governance, compliance, security and 
privacy and service offering. These issues are negotiated between government and the CSP 
and the literature shows that there is currently a level of perception of risk and low level of 
trust in relation to cloud adoption. This study aims to reveal the relationship and associated 
cloud factors that are responsible for this of lack of confidence in the public cloud. 
It is within the relationship between the government and the CSP that specific requirements 
of government are negotiated, specifically; these are the cloud related requirements such as 
governance, compliance and security which are negotiated in a relationship context. 
Therefore, cloud factors and relationship factors are inextricably linked, this has been 
established in the research design presented in Chapter 3, and need to be considered together 
in order to understand cloud concerns within the relationship. Moreover, relationship factors 
may affect the consideration of these cloud specific factors, and it is one of the premises of 
this study that the problem lies not only with the concerns about cloud-specific factors but in 
the relationship where those cloud factors are considered, negotiated and collaborated on. 
Therefore, the methodology will be developed to reveal the association between these 
relationship and cloud factors according to the established research design of the study. 
It is these cloud and associated relationship factors that are considered in the development of 
the questions in the research methods. To provide an example, it is already known that 
governance is a major concern for governments in the public cloud; however, this study 
wants to find out how the associated relationship factors are relevant to this concern, whether, 
for example, there is a perception of risk or a perception of the inability to specify 
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requirements that are causing this concern, for example, because governments cannot specify 
their requirements or they do not trust the CSP.  
4.2 Methodological Approach 
Here the methodological approach is presented and justified as approach to achieve the aims 
and objectives and research questions of the study. The methodology is exploratory and 
includes a mixed methods approach using both quantitative and qualitative research.  
4.2.1 Research Philosophy 
In consideration of the research approach there needs to be consideration of the philosophical 
foundations. Because the study uses a mixed methods approach it is necessary to consider the 
research philosophy for each method.  
A positivist philosophy is rejected in this study because there is the criticism  
(Crossan, 2003) that it does not provide a way of examining in-depth people and their 
behavior. This is due to the nature of man where it is impossible to establish laws and a 
positivist approach to research is basically about studying things as hard facts and that the 
relationships between these hard facts are established as laws (Crossan, 2003). People are not 
objects and they are open to feelings, opinions, perceptions and attitudes which would be 
rejected by positivists (Crossan, 2003). The present study is concerned with opinions and 
attitudes of the government personnel who are responsible for making decisions about the 
public cloud, therefore, the positivist approach is rejected. 
Anti-positivism has been a response to the limitations of the abovementioned positivism and 
it says that the social world cannot be investigated in the same way as the natural world. 
Moreover, the position of anti-positivism is to reject empiricism and the scientific approach 
in social research and try to understand the interpreted experience of people of their situation. 
Anti-positivism consider that a phenomenon is both experienced and then interpreted using 
an individual’s ideology, therefore, knowledge is something personally experienced and is 
not something that is acquired (Dash, 2005). Moreover, an anti-positivism approach sees the 
experienced situation as complex which can only be understood when all of the aspects of the 
situation are explored (Dash, 2005). Anti-positivism criticises the objectivity of science and 
prefers understanding subjectivity. The interviews in this study adopt an interpretative 
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approach because they aim to reveal the interpreted experience of the participants in relation 
to their relationship with the CSP and the concerns they may have.  
4.2.2 Exploratory Approach 
The study is based on a problem; that governments are reluctant to move to the next stage of 
cloud computing by placing sensitive in the public cloud and that a solution to this problem 
lies in the relationship that governments have with the cloud service provider. Therefore, 
there is an identified problem but the reasons for this problem which is the reluctance or lack 
of confidence of government is not fully understood. Therefore, it was found to be 
appropriate to adopt an exploratory approach to look for new insights into the problem and to 
generate ideas as part of the overall recommendations that the study will offer.  
4.2.3 Qualitative Research 
Within qualitative research there are a number of different approaches that exist which 
include to understand, to describe and to interpret phenomena experienced by individuals 
(Holloway and Wheeler, 2013). This study is concerned with trying to understand the 
phenomena of the relationship between the government and the CSP and the associated cloud 
factors of the public cloud, and therefore, adopts an exploratory approach. Moreover, 
qualitative research is used to help researchers explore the behavior and feelings of people 
(Holloway and Wheeler, 2013).  
Qualitative interviewing has become increasingly popular in the social sciences and it is 
important to justify this approach in relation to the aims and objectives of the study (King and 
Horrocks, 2010). According to Tracy (2012) qualitative research is about being immersed in 
a scene and then trying to make sense of it. Importantly for the present study qualitative 
research is about understanding the ways that people see their world (Merriam, 2009) and this 
study is concerned with revealing issues related to the relationship between the government 
and the CSP and associated cloud factors. Therefore, a qualitative method, in this case, semi-
structured interviews is adopted for this purpose.   
4.2.4 Quantitative Research   
Quantitative analysis involves data in the form of numbers and employs mathematical 
approaches to investigate their properties, referred to as statistical analysis which is designed 
to measure, make comparisons, examine relationships, test hypotheses, explore and explain 
(Walliman, 2011). Quantitative data can result from different research strategies and may 
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range from simple counts which could include the frequency of occurrences or more complex 
data which include test scores or prices (Saunders et al., 2016). Quantitative data by itself has 
little meaning and has to be analysed in order to derive meaningful information, this can be 
achieved through quantitative analysis techniques such as tables or diagrams which illustrate 
frequency of occurrence and statistical analysis that allow comparisons to be made through 
establishing relationships (Saunders et al., 2016).        
The study uses a questionnaire to collect quantitative data about relationship and cloud 
factors towards answering the research questions which include to reveal issues about 
relationship factors and cloud factors and if there are certain cloud related factors that are 
affected by relationship factors, this is towards understanding the issues that may affect 
confidence in the public cloud.  
4.2.5 Mixed Methods Research 
Mixed methods research involves using both quantitative and qualitative data in a single 
study, which can allow complex phenomena to be examined in detail (Hickman, 2015). Using 
mixed methods is a way of capitalising on the strengths of qualitative and quantitative 
research while at the same time compensating for their limitations (Hickman, 2015). 
This study will use questionnaires and although they can be a valuable method, they are more 
valuable when used in tandem with other methods, this is because one method is often not 
adequate (Gillham, 2008). 
It is important to have a valid reason for the adoption of a mixed-methods approach and this 
relates to the appropriateness of this approach in answering the research questions of the 
research and the additional value that it offers (Hickman, 2015). The main research question 
of the study relates to revealing an understanding of relationship factors and associated cloud 
factors. There has been much written about the reasons that governments are reluctant which 
include factors such as trust and risk perception in relation to the CSP and the service they 
offer and cloud-specific factors such as security and privacy, governance and compliance, 
although these issues are known, the study will find out how these issues manifest in the 
relationship. This is based on the idea that the solutions to improving government confidence 
in the public cloud include technological solutions (improving security through technology) 
and improving the relationship, this study is concerned with contributing to the latter.  
Therefore, this study is concerned with these factors within the relationship between the 
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government as a customer and the CSP when they negotiate in the relationship. Using a 
questionnaire allows these known factors, derived from the literature, to be measured to 
further understand the relationship. 
However, assumptions should not be made that the factors derived from the literature are the 
only factors that exist. In order to reveal new perspectives and concerns about the relationship 
and associated cloud concerns it is necessary to also employ a semi-structured interview. A 
semi-structured interview can provide a more detailed understanding of the issue. To provide 
an example that is related to the present study; a questionnaire may reveal that there are low 
levels of trust among government officials in relation to governance, or that government 
officials perceive a risk in relation to the management of data, and a semi-structured 
interview could reveal the reasons why there are these low levels of trust or high risk 
perceptions. The reason behind this approach is to achieve complementarity where the results 
of one of the methods can clarify or elaborate on the results of the other method, moreover, 
where quantitative processes provide the outcomes; the qualitative results reveal the 
processes behind the outcomes (Hickman, 2015). Adding a qualitative component here by 
investigating the experiences and perspectives of those individuals responsible for decision 
making will add a significant insight to the study (Hickman, 2015).  
However, the knowledge we know, and the knowledge we don’t is not the only justification 
for a questionnaire. Because we need to examine associations between cloud and relationship 
CSFs the questionnaire is the only way to do this because there are multiple variables and 
numerous combinations of those variables, and the only way to examine the relationship 
between them is with a questionnaire. 
4.2.6 Reliability and Validity 
In reference to reliability and validity they are important considerations for the development 
of the methodology and the analysis of the data. It is important that results are generalisable 
to the real world beyond the experiment itself. In order to achieve this there is a need for 
internal validity where independent variables are determined for the effect they have on the 
dependent variables, the external validity refers to the extent to which findings are 
generalisable (Walliman, 2011). In order to determine validity and reliability the data is 




Credibility is about how adequate or credible the social world under investigation is 
presented. One way of ensuring the validity is to check with the respondents. Groenwald 
(2004) suggests giving participants a copy of the questionnaire or interview transcript to 
validate them, this was achieved through a pilot study for both the questionnaire and the 
interview. Moreover, the researcher has to ensure that the methodology is credible, including 
data collection methods and interpretation of results (Lincoln and Guba, 1985).  
4.2.8 Transferability 
Transferability refers to how the researcher’s working hypothesis can be used in other 
contexts (Lincoln and Guba, 1985). The researcher has to make sure that the data and its 
description is rich enough in order for other researchers to be able determine if the findings 
are transferable to other contexts.  
4.3 Methods 
4.3.1 Introduction 
Here the adopted methods to achieve the aims and objectives and answer the research 
questions are presented. There is an explanation of why and how they are adopted for the 
study, specifically in relation to gaining qualitative and quantitative data. There is an 
explanation of how they are developed based on secondary research about relationship and 
cloud factors that are relevant to the government – CSP relationship.  
The mixed methods design that is used in this study is a ‘convergent parallel’ design, this 
involves using qualitative and quantitative data concurrently to gain different but 
complementary data in order to answer the research question (Hickman, 2015).  
Therefore, in reference to how qualitative and quantitative aspects are mixed, this study uses 
the ‘integration’ procedure suggested by Zhang and Creswell (2013) which means 
quantitative and qualitative data are collected concurrently but then analysed separately and 
the results are integrated during the interpretation stage. 
4.3.2 Questionnaires 
The term questionnaire is used to refer to all techniques where data is collected whereby a 
person is asked to respond to preset questions in a predetermined order and is one of the most 
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widely used data collection techniques used in the survey strategy (Saunders et al., 2007). It 
is important that the questionnaire is designed in a way that will allow the researcher to 
answer the research questions and achieve the study’s objectives (Saunders et al., 2007). 
In the present study, the questionnaires are based on knowledge that is already known about 
governments, their reluctance to adopt the public cloud and the associated reasons why, 
which are related to trust and risk perception and other relationship concerns and cloud 
specific concerns such as governance, compliance, security and privacy and performance.    
The use of questionnaires in this study is appropriate to answer the following research 
questions: 
1. What are the relationship and cloud factors that may affect the confidence of the Saudi 
government to adopt the public cloud? 
 
2. Do relationship related factors and cloud factors affect each other which affects 
government confidence in the public cloud? 
4.3.2.1 Justification for using questionnaire 
The variables that are found within the relationship are already known, there are known 
issues of trust and risk perception related to government adoption of the cloud, and there are 
known cloud-specific issues such as governance, compliance and security. A questionnaire is 
suitable to reveal the level of opinion in terms of agreement related to these known factors 
within the context of the relationship. According to Gillham (2008) the researcher determines 
the questions and predetermines the possible answers, but the real intention is to find out 
which answers are selected. In other words, the researcher knows that there may be issues, for 
example, of trust and risk as relationship factors in relation to security and privacy as cloud 
factors, and the questionnaire will reveal if there are issues in these areas and to what extent.  
Because the study is concerned with a number of relationship variables and cloud-related 
variables, in addition to the numerous variables that arise from the various combinations 
between the two, it would only be possible to address all of them using a questionnaire. 
Additionally, the responses to these numerous variables have to be analysed and a 
questionnaire using closed questions on a Likert scale will provide the type of data that is 
easier to analyse.     
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As an example, the questions in the questionnaire will address risk perception and trust in the 
relationship with the CSP and risk perception and trust in relation to requirements from the 
cloud. Together these form the critical success factors (CSFs), both relationship CSFs and 
cloud CSFs, success factors in that they would give confidence to governments as potential 
customers of the public cloud. This approach will reveal not only whether governments do 
not have confidence in the relationship with the CSP but also the specific areas or CSFs for 
cloud computing where there may be issues. 
4.3.2.2 Sampling 
There were four organisations that were identified for the study and each of these 
organisations had a limited number of personnel both senior and technical who are involved 
in the decision-making process either as those directly responsible for making decisions and 
those that influence decisions, all of which having a relationship with the CSP in some way. 
Because these organisations were government organisations and there were significant 
security considerations, given that the study is researching the issue of government in the 
cloud, the researcher had to liaise with a senior manager in each organisation to identify and 
have access to potential respondents.  
Importantly, the criteria for selecting respondents for the questionnaire was that they were 
senior personnel who were involved in decision making about the cloud and have a 
relationship with the CSP, or that they were technical personnel who were involved in or who 
had influence over the decision-making process and have experience in dealing with the CSP. 
Because respondents to the questionnaire are selected according to these criteria in order to 
answer the research questions of the study, a non-probability sampling approach is adopted, 
specifically purposive sampling. Purposive sampling is selecting participants in a study based 
on their experiences or expertise that is a requirement in order to answer the research 
questions where there is a need for particular characteristics that are relevant to the theoretical 
concerns of the study (Howitt and Cramer, 2011). Purposive sampling is used when the 
respondents are selected with a specific purpose in mind and are specialists in a particular 
area (Neuman, 2014) again, in this study that specific purpose is to reveal the concerns found 
in the government – CSP relationship that could impede public cloud adoption. Moreover, it 
is inappropriate to use purposive sampling where there is a need to have a representative 
sample (Neuman, 2014), something that was not possible in this study due to the specialized 
nature of participants and the narrow criteria for selection. Therefore, there is a need for a 
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sampling strategy that is suitable for selecting unique participants that are particularly 
informative in terms of the research questions under investigation (Neuman, 2014), 
specifically here, those who can inform about decisions to adopt the cloud. A further reason 
for using purposive sampling, in addition to selecting specialised participants, is to reach 
groups that are difficult to reach (Neuman, 2014). 
The point made in the above about identifying difficult to reach groups is relevant to the 
approach that the researcher of this study used to identify potential participants. To locate 
people who are specialists and decision makers and fit the criteria of this study the researcher 
had to use a certain amount of local knowledge and experts of where such people are located 
(Neuman, 2014). In this study, the researcher uses senior personnel in each of the four 
identified government organisations to identify suitable personnel according to the study 
criteria. It would not have been possible for the researcher to identify these personnel because 
of two main reasons, firstly; the researcher does not have inside knowledge of these 
organisations in terms of personnel and what they do, and secondly; because these are major 
government organisations in Saudi Arabia there are security considerations, the researcher 
cannot simply access these organisations and the personnel without the authority knowing 
who will be interviewed.           
In reference to the size of the sample it is important to note that a sample of at least 30 is 
required if the researchers wants to carry out any type of statistical analysis, however, this 
may be considered a minimum number and it is recommended that there are more in the 
sample (Cohen et al., 2013). In studies that adopt non-probability sampling sample size is an 
ambiguous issue, this is because it is more important that the selection of the sample relates 
to the purpose of the study (Saunders et al., 2016), and because the study adopts purposive 
sampling, the sample size is not as important as selecting respondents based on the criteria 
that they are directly involved in or have influence over government decisions to adopt the 
public cloud. 
One of the statistical analyses used in this study is correlation analysis using Spearman’s 
correlation coefficient, and in reference to sample sizes using this technique it was found that 
the median sample size from five journal articles, between 2006 and 2010, varied between 73 
and 178 (Fraley and Vazire, 2014)    
A total of 95 respondents were identified from all of the four government organisations which 
included Saudi Customs, Immigration Department, Ministry of Finance and the National 
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Information Centre. All of these 95 potential respondents were given the questionnaire via 
email, this was administrated through the liaise in each organisation. In total, there were 80 
responses and 15 did not respond.    
4.4 Development of the Questionnaire 
In chapter three the relationship factors that are critical to the success of the relationship 
between government and the cloud service provider, and therefore, critical to ensure 
confidence in the public cloud, were established. Moreover, towards achieving the aim of 
determining the specific areas of the cloud within the relationship the cloud critical success 
factors and cloud sub critical success factors were also established in chapter three. 
These factors form part of the research enquiry and are therefore, included in the 
questionnaire towards achieving the aims of the study and answering the research questions. 
The following is a sample of the questionnaire to illustrate this structure. 
Example of question structure:  
Relationship CSF: ability to specify requirements (negotiation) 
Main question: You are able to specify your requirements in relation to the following: 
Cloud CSF: Governance 
Sub Cloud CSFs:  
• Knowledge and control over data, processes and applications 
• Surety of other cloud tenants 
• Knowledge and control over third party (CP) issues 
• Clarity of roles and responsibilities / accountability (government and CSP) 
• Dynamic SLA (towards mitigating risks, adapting to changing requirements) 
• Control and knowledge of CSP employees 
• Auditing and measuring of CSP 
• Collaboration 
• Governance during migration to the cloud 
Based on the question structure described above, below (Table 4.1) is an example of a 
question in the questionnaire, note that the question is associated with the relationship factor 
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of risk perception in relation to the cloud related factor of governance and the associated 
factors within governance. 
 Sample question:  
You can effectively specify your requirements in relation to the following: (Negotiation) 
Table 4-1: Questionnaire question example 
Question 1- Strongly disagree 2- Disagree 3- Neutral 4- Agree  5- Strongly Agree 1 2 3 4 5 
NEGOTIATION DOMAIN 
Q5 
You can effectively specify your requirements 
 
    
 
GOVERNANCE 1 2 3 4 5 
Q6A You can effectively specify your governance requirements      
Q6A 1-8 You feel can effectively specify your governance requirements in relation to the 
following: 
Q6A 1 Your need to have knowledge and control over data and 
processes 
     
Q6A 2 Assurance about other cloud tenants      
Q6A 3 Knowledge and control over third party issues      
Q6A 4 Clarity of roles and responsibilities      
Q6A 5 Dynamic SLA      
Q6A 6 Control and knowledge of CSP employees      
Q6A 7 Auditing and measuring of CSP      
Q6A 8 Governance during migration      
 COMPLIANCE 1 2 3 4 5 
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Q6B In the relationship with the CSP you are able to specify 
compliance requirements 
     
Q6B 1-8 
You can effectively specify your compliance requirements in relation to the 
following: 
Q6B 1 Continuous auditing and assessment      
Q6B 2 Clarity and confidence about jurisdiction      
Q6B 3 Data management      
Q6B 4 Roles and responsibilities for compliance      
Q6B 5 Security and privacy      
Q6B 6 CSP ability to be compliant      
Q6B 7 Data location      
Q6B 8 Compliance when migrating      
SECURITY AND PRIVACY 1 2 3 4 5 
Q6C In the relationship with the CSP you are able to specify 
security and privacy requirements 
     
Q6C 1-7 
You can effectively specify your security and privacy requirements in 
relation to the following: 
Q6C 1 Security related to third parties      
Q6C 2 Monitoring of policy adherence      
Q6C 3 Sufficient involvement in security      
Q6C 4 Tailored security and privacy policy      
Q6C 5 General security / privacy provision      
Q6C 6 Clarity of roles and responsibilities      
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Q6C 7 Assurance regarding CSP employees      
PERFORMANCE AND OFFERING 1 2 3 4 5 
Q6D In the relationship with the CSP you are able to specify 
performance and offering requirements 
     
Q6D 1-9 
You can effectively specify your performance and offering requirements in 
relation to the following: 
Q6D 1 Customisable cloud environment      
Q6D 2 Dynamic / flexible SLA      
Q6D 3 Continues monitoring of performance      
Q6D 4 Meet government specific requirements      
Q6D 5 Additional specialised staff for government needs      
Q6D 6 Backup and recovery      
Q6D 7 Sufficient support lifecycle      
Q6D 8 Sufficient notice of disruption      
Q6D 9 End of relationship      
 
Drafting the questions is a key stage in questionnaire construction, and part of this process is 
to identify the key topics especially in terms of which questions come first and how they lead 
one to another (Gillham, 2008). In this study, the questions are organised according to the 
identified relationship and associated cloud factors and proceed starting with trust, then risk, 
followed by negotiation and then collaboration and finally reputation. Although it has been 
stated that questions about attitudes and opinions are difficult to write, questions should be at 
a simple level because if they are not they may not be suitable for a wide-ranging 
questionnaire (Gillham, 2008). In consideration of this, the questions in the questionnaire are 
written in a simple way, this is achieved through a tiered system, illustrated in the following 
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where the relationship factor ‘trust’ and the cloud factor ‘governance’ are highlighted (see 
Figure 4.1): 
Figure 4-1: Questionnaire Structure 
Q1  You trust your CSP             
                  
QUESTION 2A GOVERNANCE           
Q2A In the relationship with the CSP you trust them in relation to governance   
          
Q2A 1-
8 
You trust the CSP in relation to the following governance issues:  
          
Q2A 1 Your need to have knowledge and control over data and processes  
Q2A 2 Assurance about other cloud tenants     
Q2A 3 Knowledge and control over third party issues    
Q2A 4 Clarity of roles and responsibilities     
Q2A 5 Dynamic SLA       
Q2A 6 Control and knowledge of CSP employees    
Q2A 7 Auditing and measuring of CSP     
Q2A 8 Governance during migration           
 
In order to achieve the aims of the study it is necessary to reveal people’s opinions based on 
their experiences of CSPs. The most common way of revealing these opinions in a 
questionnaire is to ask to respondents to rate their level of agreement or disagreement on a 
scale of five points (Smith et al. 2012). Some studies do employ a seven-point scale, 
however, it is more difficult to find descriptive terms for each point as they increase in 
number, and the five point scale is more commonly used, this is an odd number, and 
therefore, allows for a neutral response (Tullis and Albert, 2013).  In this study 1 indicates 
strongly disagree, 2 disagree, 3 neutral, 4 agree and 5 strongly agree. Moreover, in this 
approach there is the assumption that the people that participate have attitudes towards the 
issues that are being investigated and that these attitudes can be reflected in the rating system 
(Smith et al., 2012). To ensure this, this study has chosen participants who have had dealings 
with cloud services providers and are influential in the decision-making process.  
Specifically, in line with the aims and objectives of the study which include finding out the 
relationship factors that could affect the government’s confidence to place sensitive data in 
the public cloud, there is a need to examine concerns that are related to risk perception and 
trust within the context of a relationship. There are a number of relationship-based critical 
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success factors (CSFs) based on risk, trust, collaboration, negotiation and reputation that have 
been identified in the literature as well as cloud CSFs based on governance, compliance, 
security and performance as cloud factors, that are used to form the questions. Moreover, the 
literature has revealed that there are a number of different concerns that relate not only to 
government use of the cloud generally, but also to government use of the public cloud for 
sensitive data on a longer-term more permanent basis. These concerns are found within the 
cloud factors and are presented as sub cloud factors in this study.   
4.4.1 Relationship Critical Success Factors 
The literature has also shown that the reluctance, both of governments and other 
organisations, to use the public cloud is related to issues such as trust and risk perception and 
within these issues, for example, the ability to specify requirements and have requirements 
understood. These ideas are found in general theories of trust, risk perception and 
collaboration such as Protection Motivation Theory (PMT), Risk Compensation Theory and 
Collaboration Fluency, and theories of trust that are related to IT procurement (Rothstein, 
2007). More specifically in relation to the study, there are numerous Cloud Trust Models that 
have been proposed to help organisations overcome trust concerns. Together these theories 
and models serve to inform issues when considering the reasons why governments are 
reluctant and have concerns about placing sensitive data in the public cloud. Therefore, a 
method that is designed to investigate the reasons related to such concerns should be based on 
ideas of trust, risk perception, collaboration, negotiation and perception of reputation. 
The study aims to find out trust and risk related concerns within the relationship where 
government requirements for the cloud are negotiated. In order to discover relationship-
specific issues and associated cloud-specific concerns it was first necessary to establish 
Critical Success Factors (CSFs) of an effective relationship as standards against which 
aspects of the relationship in this study can be investigated. These CSFs are derived from the 
literature. For example, a relationship CSF is that the CSP is able to understand the 
government’s requirements and respondents will be questioned to find out the extent to which 
they feel this is true in relation to areas of the cloud. Furthermore, an associated sub cloud 
CSF could be governance over data and the questions are also designed to see if the 
participants have any issues about these factors in the relationship. These ideas are based on 
the premise, derived from the literature, that in a more successful relationship there would be 
the establishment of trust, a decrease in the perception of risk, effective negotiation, a 
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perceived positive reputation and collaboration which would include, for example, the ability 
to specify requirements and have those requirements understood and catered for. In this study 
success in these areas will form Critical Success Factors (CSFs) for an effective relationship 
and will be categorised under relationship factors that will be investigated using the 
questionnaire. In addition to these relationship CSFs there are the cloud CSFs themselves 
which include governance, compliance, security and privacy and performance and offering, 
and the sub Cloud CSFs in each of these areas. These CSFs form the basis of the questions in 
the questionnaire.  
Figure 4.2 below shows the relationship CSFs, here it shows how the questions are structured 
in the questionnaire, the first box represents the relationship CSFs that are being addressed, 
the second box represents the cloud CSFs that are considered with the relationship CSFs, and 
the third box represents the sub cloud CSFs within each cloud factor. To provide an example, 
a question will be concerned with the issue of trust (relationship CSF) and will question to 
find out if there is an issue of trust in relation to the cloud CSF of governance and each of the 










Figure 4-2: Critical Success Factors (CSFs) for Questionnaire Development 
The relationship CSFs are derived from the literature about general theories of trust, risk and 






























Table 4-2:  Relationship Factors 
 General Theories of Trust, Risk and Collaboration 
IT Trust Models and 
Theories Cloud Trust Models 
Trust 
Trust in what provider will do that is not in 
contract (Blomqvist et al. 2008). 
Sharing of information between parties 
(Blomqvist et al. 2008). 
Trust is required for better communication 
and collaboration (Grudinschi et al. 2014). 
Trust required for governance (Blomqvist 
et al. 2008). 
Trust can develop quickly if intense 
interaction and collaboration (Blomqvist et 
al. 2008). 
Relationship takes time to establish 
(Thomson et al. 2009). 
Trust in ability. 
Trust in integrity. 
Trust in Benevolence. 
Trust in confidentiality 
(Firdhous et al. 2011). 
Control and transparency 
(Firdhous et al. 2011). 
Two-way trust (Kanwal, 2015). 
Ongoing trust – measurement of performance 
(Kanwal, 2015, Filali and Yagoubi, 2015). 
Aligned interests (Jansen and Grance, 2011). 
Extent to which cloud service meets 
expectations (Burda and Teuteberg, 2014). 
Trust is goodwill, integrity and competence 
(Huang and Nicol, 2013). 
 
Risk 
Ability to mitigate risk (Protection 
Motivation Theory). 
Service provider alleviates perception of 
risk (Protection Motivation Theory). 
Risk perception (privacy, 
security etc.). 
Extent of willing 
vulnerability (Burda 
Third parties not bound by SLA (Alhamad et 
al. 2010). 
Flexible risk management program that 
adapts to constantly changing risk landscape 
(Jansen and Grance, 2011). 
Collaboration 
Trust = better communication and 
collaboration (Grudinschi et al., 2014). 
Clarity of roles and responsibilities 
(Thomson et al. 2009). 
Mechanism to measure parties activities in 
terms of roles and responsibilities 
(Thomson et al. 2009). 
Reciprocation (Thomson et al. 2009). 
IT procurement and 
importance of 
collaboration in the public 
sector (Grudinschi et al. 
(2014). 
Dynamic / flexible SLA (Di Modica, 2014, 
De La Prieta et al. 2015, Filali and Yagoubi, 
2015). 
Continuous monitoring of SLA adherence 
(Alhamad et al. 2010, Marudhadevi et al. 
2014). 
Informed how data/systems will be managed. 
Transparency of QOS for SLA adherence 
(Kanwal, 2015). 
Real time agreement (De La Prieta et al., 
2015). 
Collaborative development of SLA (CSA 
Guidance). 
Negotiation 
Governance and ongoing process that 
requires continuous negotiation to create 
equilibrium (Thomson et al., 2009). 
 
Express business needs 
(Johanssen and Latinen, 
2012). 
Ability to specify / articulate requirements 
(Di Modica, 2014, Alruwaili and Gulliver, 
2014). 
Having requirements understood (Di Modica, 
2014). 
Ability to negotiate each area of SLA (Di 
Modica, 2014). 
Resolution of conflicting objectives 
(Dastjerdi and Buyya 2015, Alhamad et al. 
2010). 
Needs of customer are considered / offered 




Reputation achieved through numerous 
interactions where trust is built (Thomson 
et al., 2009). 
Link between trust and reputation (Huang 
and Nicol, 2013). 
Prior knowledge 
experience with CSP 
(Firdhous et al. 2011). 
Reputation of CSP (Parwar et al. 2012, Norr 
et al., 2016). 
Sufficient information of CSP (Alruwaili and 
Gulliver, 2014). 
 
The aforementioned relationship factors shown in Table (4.2) serve to inform the relationship 
CSFs found under the areas of trust, risk, collaboration, negotiation and reputation. It would 
be difficult to consider all of the factors in Table (4.2) in the questionnaire so they are 
summarised into relationship CSFs as shown in Table (4.3) below. These CSFs form the basis 
of the development of the questionnaire. 
Table 4-3: Relationship Critical Success Factors (CSFS) 
 
 
4.4.2 Cloud Critical Success Factors 
To address the concerns of government in relation to the public cloud it is also necessary to 
consider the specific concerns that they have related to using the cloud itself. Although 
Trust in ability. 
Trust in integrity. 
Low perception of risk. 
Ability to specify requirements. 
Requirements are understood / considered by 
CSP. 
Sufficient information about CSP. 
Perception of positive reputation of CSP. 
Communication / sharing information. 





governments do share common concerns with other organisations such as security and 
privacy, they have their own unique concerns due to the type of data that they handle and the 
need to be compliant with laws. Particular concerns for governments include governance, 
compliance, security and privacy and performance and offering. Here each of the areas of 
cloud CSFs identified in the literature are presented followed by a summarisation.   
Table 4-4: Cloud Critical Success Factors (CSFs)-Governance 








Data control (Kanwal, 2015). 
Data execution (Brender and Markov, 2013). 
Data availability (Kanwal, 2015). 
Knowledge of data location (Brender and Markov, 2013, (CAIQ) (v3.0.1). 
Process execution (Kanwal, 2015). 
Remote access control (Firdhous et al 2011). 
Accessibility (Norr et al. 2016). 
Control over definition of access rights (Norr et al. 2016). 
Accountability over deployed applications and systems (Jansen and Grance, 2011). 
Control over transfer of data (Brender and Markov, 2013). 
Continuous access during all situations – normal and disaster (Kanwal, 2015). 
Clear ownership rights over data (Jansen and Grance, 2011). 
Knowledge of movement of data within the cloud (CSA Guidance). 
Knowledge of who has control over data (CSA Guidance). 
Collaborative governance structures (CSA Guidance). 
Knowledge and control over CSP employees (Brender and Markov, 2013, CSA Guidance). 
Control over other tenants in cloud (Jansen and Grance, 2011) (Access control) Takabi et al (cited in Alhamad et al 2010). 
Not share cloud resources with competitors (other tenants) (Almorsy, 2011). 
Clarity of roles and responsibilities (Jansen and Grance, 2011). 
Alignment of policies regarding assignment of roles (Jansen and Grance, 2011). 
Transparency of CSP actions (Firdhous et al 2011). 
Knowledge of third party relationships (Alhamad et al. 2010, Firdhous et al. 2011). 
Control over third parties (Takabi et al (cited in Alhamad et al 2010). 
Third party identity management (Takabi et al (cited in Alhamad et al 2010). 
Trust in supply chain (CSA Guidance). 
Policy integration with third parties (Takabi et al (cited in Alhamad et al 2010) (Jansen and Grance, 2011). 




Security requirements aligned between three parties (CP, CSP and customer) (Almorsy, 2011). 
Do CPs understand security requirements (Almorsy, 2011). 
Duality in trust (Kanwal, 2015). 
Dynamic SLA (Kanwal, 2015). 
Measuring other parties activities (Kans, 2012). 
Framework to monitor and measure risk (CSA Guidance). 
Clarity of who will have access to data (CSA Guidance). 
Mechanism for vetting those who have access to the data (CSA Guidance). 
Clarity of what activities for what type of information (CSA Guidance). 
Clarity of which users for which type of information (CSA Guidance). 
Control over security policy (Ahmad and Janczewski 2011). 
Direct point of contact in CSP (Jansen and Grance, 2011). 
Maintaining situation awareness (in order to weigh up options and set priorities) (Jansen and Grance, 2011). 
Ability to enforce control and maintain accountability (Jansen and Grance, 2011). 
Auditing mechanisms for data storage, protection and use (Jansen and Grance, 2011). 
Organisational practices (government) followed by CSP throughout system lifecycle. 
Adequate oversight to maintain accountability (Jansen and Grance, 2011). 
Control over deployed applications (Jansen and Grance, 2011). 
Sufficient recourse to address and resolve problems (Jansen and Grance, 2011). 
Sufficient risk mitigation through negotiated SLA (Jansen and Grance, 2011). 
Governance during migration to the cloud (Estonia Report). 
 
Table 4-5: Summarised Critical Success Factors (CSFs) for Governance 
Governance CSFs Description 
Knowledge and control over data, processes and applications. Governance requires a certain level of control over data and 
processes, it is also an important consideration for compliance. 
Surety of other cloud tenants. Governance requires government has a level of control over 
other parties in the cloud. 
Knowledge and control over third party (CP) issues. Knowledge and control of the CP as a provider of the cloud to 
the CSP is required for governance. 
Clarity of roles and responsibilities / accountability (government and 
CSP). 
In order to maintain a level of governance it is necessary to 
know who is responsible for what, in both the government and 
the CSP. 
Dynamic SLA (towards mitigating risks, adapting to changing 
requirements). 
Governance is negotiated in the SLA. 
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Control and knowledge of CSP employees. Governance is only possible is government know who the 
employees are and has the required level of control over 
employees. 
Auditing and measuring of CSP. Auditing, monitoring, measuring of CSP performance, 
activities and risk. 
Collaboration. Governance requires collaboration between government and 
CSP. 
Governance during migration to the cloud. Government need a level of involvement and control over 
migration to the cloud. 
 
4.4.3 Combination of Relationship and cloud Critical Success Factors (CSFs) 
In the above the relationship and cloud critical success factors have been identified and 
summarised. In the following the structure of the questionnaire, based on the identified CSFs, 
is explained. The starting point of the question is the relationship CSFs because the study 
aims to address the relationship, followed by the cloud CSFs as it is important to understand 
specific areas where there are concerns and an associated lack of confidence. For example, 
governments may feel that they cannot specify their governance requirements specifically in 
relation to the CSPs employees, but may be more confident in specifying governance 
requirements in relation to data control. In this regard, Table 4.6 illustrates the question 
structuring of the questionnaire. 
Table 4-6: Questionnaire Structure 
Relationship 
CSF 
























Data location (traceability) 
  
 
Based on the question structure described above, below (Figure 4.3) is an example of a 
question in the questionnaire, note that the question is associated with the relationship factor 
of risk perception in relation to the cloud related factor of governance and the associated sub 
factors within governance.  
You perceive a risk in relation to the following: 
Figure 4-3: Questionnaire question example 
RISK DOMAIN 
1. Strongly Disagree  2. Disagree  3. Neutral  4. Agree  5. Strongly Agree 
Q3 In your relationship with the CSP you do not perceive a risk      
QUESTION 4A GOVERNANCE 
Q4A  When engaging in the relationship with the CSP you do not 
perceive a risk in relation to governance 
     
Q4A 1-8 
In the relationship with the CSP you do not perceive a governance risk in relation 
to the following: 
Q4A 1 Your need to have knowledge and control over data and 
processes 
     
Q4A 2 Assurance about other cloud tenants      
Q4A 3 Knowledge and control over third party issues      
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Q4A 4 Clarity of roles and responsibilities      
Q4A 5 Dynamic SLA      
Q4A 6 Control and knowledge of CSP employees      
Q4A 7 Auditing and measuring of CSP      
Q4A 8 Governance during migration      
 
Now that the contents of the questions have been established how the questions should be 
asked needs to be addressed. In the above it was shown that the questionnaire is designed to 
find out about a number of relationship and cloud related factors.  
Balanced scores are a way of measuring attitudes and they have to be balanced by using an 
equal balance of negative or positive statements (Brace, 2008). The most commonly used 
number of points on this scale is five. The questions are presented as level of agreement on a 
Likert scale with two levels of agreement, two levels of disagreement and a neutral response 
which represents neither agree or disagree. 
4.4.4 Analysis of Questionnaire Data 
The data gained from the questionnaires was analysed using SPSS (Statistical Package for the 
Social Sciences) in order to answer the research questions. Analysis was carried out to find 
relationships in the data between relationship factors and cloud factors. Specifically, 
correlation analysis was conducted using Spearman’s correlation two-tailed significance in 
order to find correlations between the established variables towards achieving the aims of the 
study. Spearman’s rank order correlation is a non-parametric method of statistical analysis 
that measures the strength of association or statistical dependence between two ranked 
variables.  
4.4.5 Piloting of the Questionnaire 
In order to ensure the validity of the questionnaire, in other words to determine if the 
questionnaire is measuring what it is supposed to be measuring, it is necessary to pilot the 
questionnaire (Brace, 2008). Moreover, ensuring the reliability of the questionnaire requires 
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that the questions are checked for understanding by the participants and that they produce 
meaningful responses (Brace, 2008). 
Specifically, in order to test for reliability, the researcher checked with departmental 
management if the questions sounded clear and understandable. Moreover, the questions 
were also check to see if they contained any jargon (Brace, 2008). It is important to note that 
the questions in the questionnaire contain a lot of information about the cloud, including 
technical aspects, and this information is only familiar to those who are involved in the cloud 
from a technical perspective. Therefore, there may be some ideas and even jargon that needed 
to be verified for clarity of understanding. 
Another important aspect of a questionnaire that affects its reliability is the procedure or 
routing instructions of the questionnaire (Brace, 2008). In this study, the respondents to the 
questionnaire have to answer general relationship questions followed by associated cloud and 
sub cloud questions, all of which still contain a relationship element. Therefore, part of the 
piloting was to test not only if they understood the questions but if they understood that they 
were being asked about cloud and relationship factors at the same time. 
Specifically, to ensure validity those who participated in the pilot were checked to see if they 
could answer the questions properly, this was achieved through explaining the Likert scale 
responses. The piloting took place with five participants from the Saudi Customs and no 
problems were identified.   
4.5 Interview  
In reference to the mixed methodology approach discussed in the above, the questionnaires 
measured relationship and associated cloud concerns using predetermined factors, however, a 
weakness of the questionnaire is that it does not reveal new factors as new knowledge. 
Therefore, as part of the mixed methods approach, a semi-structured interview is adopted for 
this purpose. In order to answer the research questions, it is necessary to interview those 
responsible for making decisions about the adoption of public cloud and the possibility of 
deploying sensitive data, this also includes personnel who influence the decision to adopt the 
cloud due to their technical expertise in this area. In order to achieve this, the study conducts 
semi-structured interviews with senior management and senior technical personnel to reveal 
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the relationship reasons behind reluctance of using public clouds and the specific cloud 
factors that are affected.  
It is important to note that the main purpose of interviewing is not necessarily about testing a 
hypothesis or making an evaluation, but it is more about understanding the lived experience 
of other people and the meaning behind that experience (Seidman, 2013) something this 
study aims to do. In light of this it was felt that interviews were appropriate to understand the 
perception of senior decision makers in the relationship they have with cloud providers and 
the associated concerns.   
4.5.1 Semi-structured 
In qualitative research, different types of interviews can be used, these include semi-
structured and unstructured interviews. Semi-structured interviews were used in order to 
derive insights into the reasons why choices are made and what influences decisions. A semi-
structured interview is designed to obtain descriptions of the life world of the interviewee in 
order to interpret the meaning of a particular phenomenon (Kvale and Brinkmann, 2009).   
The researcher did not want to have a formal and full interview with a structure because it 
may make the interviewee feel uneasy but the researcher did want to have an informal chat 
either because there were specific areas that needed to be discussed. There was a need for 
some structure while at the same time being open in style (Gillham, 2000) thus the semi-
structured interview was adopted. In qualitative interviewing, there is focus on the opinion of 
the interviewee and they are encouraged to ramble or speak freely because it provides a 
deeper insight into what they see as important and relevant (Gillham, 2000).  
Because the issue that is being researched requires an in-depth exploration of the relevant 
issues and there may be a need to encourage interviewees to talk more deeply about 
something they have raised, there may be a need to use probing questions in order for 
interviewees to clarify and extend their responses which interviews are suitable for (Gillham, 
2000).   
4.5.2 Development of the Semi-Structured Interview 
The semi-structured interviews are designed to investigate the relationship between 
government and cloud service provider in order to determine the reasons why governments 
are reluctant to adopt the cloud. As with the questionnaire the primary focus is on the 
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relationship factors in the negotiation, however, the questions will also try to find out the 
cloud related factors that are of concern to governments when considering the public cloud. 
In the development of the interview it is first important to focus on the research questions in 
order to decide what specific questions can be asked and can these questions be answered by 
talking to people (Gillham, 2000). Importantly, the questions are designed to allow the 
participant to speak freely about the topic being questioned, for example the question ‘Do you 
trust your CSP?’ is not intended as a closed question where the participant will simply say 
‘yes’ or ‘no’, it is the responsibility of the interviewer to probe further into the answers to 
each question, in this case the interviewer will ask why they trust or not trust their CSP. 
In a semi-structured interview the researcher will have a list of questions and themes to be 
covered (Saunders et al., 2007). In this study, the themes which include trust, risk, 
negotiation, collaboration and reputation, which have also been identified for the 
questionnaires, are found within relatively simple and understandable questions which can be 
elaborated on in the answers. The interview questions are as follows:    
1. Do you currently have plans to use the public cloud for sensitive data and critical 
systems? 
2. What are the concerns that you have about the public cloud? 
3. How is your relationship with your CSP?  
4. Do you trust your CSP? 
5. In relation to your CSP, do you perceive any risks? 
6. Are you able to negotiate effectively with your CSP? 
7. Do you feel that concerns can be resolved through the relationship with the CSP?  
8. Does your CSP accommodate all your needs? 
9. Are you kept informed by your CSP? 
10. How do you collaborate with your CSP? 
11. How involved are you with the provision of the public cloud as a service? 
12. Do you perceive a positive reputation of your CSP? 
 
It is important to note that there is certain amount of flexibility in a semi-structured interview, 
so the above questions do not have to be strictly adhered to, depending on the responses of 
the participant the researcher may adjust questions to probe deeper into certain issues, or they 
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may include other questions that prevent the participant from straying away from the research 
topics.  
4.5.3 Conducting Interviews 
Arrangements for the interviews are made with each of the participants individually. Because 
of the senior status of the participants and the nature of the job of the researcher permission 
was not required to use available offices on the premises; this was case for all four 
organisations. The researcher is a trainer in Saudi Customs department and could also 
facilitate a room without permission.  
It is important in Saudi culture that when interviewing a participant that their immediate 
superior manager is informed, some of the participants in this study are senior officials and it 
requires informing the ministers themselves. 
It was important that the interview was conducted in a room where there are no interruptions, 
no background noise and no curious intrusions (Gillham, 2000). The interviews lasted 
between one to one and a half hours, this was to allow for flexibility in terms of allowing for 
respondents who may want to elaborate of their responses or to allow the researcher to probe 
further based on responses.  
The interviews were be audio recorded and conducted in English. It is important to ensure 
that the participants’ words are preserved as accurately as possible and the best way to ensure 
this is through audio recording, moreover, this also records the questioning as well (Holloway 
and Wheeler, 2013) so that the researcher can check the responses against the questions for 
further clarity. 
4.5.4 Analysis of Interview Data  
It is difficult to separate the data collection from the data analysis because even when the 
researcher is collecting the data, in the case of the present study conducting the interviews, 
the researcher may anticipate results based on what they have already heard (Seidman, 2013).  
Seidman (2013) says that in order to analyse the words that are spoken properly it is better to 
transform them into a written text through transcription, moreover, it is important that words 
are transcribed directly so that interpretation by the researcher is minimised. 
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The researcher analyses the data looking for emerging themes or substantive statements and 
then organising those ideas. Not only is it important to derive themes but it is also important 
to organise them in a way that shows how they are conceptualised and how they are related to 
each other, they will also involve a hierarchical representation which will include sub-themes 
(King and Horrocks, 2010).  
Although there are two main approaches to analysing the interview transcripts, namely; 
meaning and content analysis (Kvale, 2008), it is possible that interview analysis is 
conducted without following a specific analytical method, that the researcher can switch 
freely between different techniques (Kvale, 2008). In light of this it was decide to adopt this 
approach, for example to derive meaning from the transcripts through coding and 
categorising through attaching key words to a segment of text. 
4.5.4.1 Coding 
Coding is about marking different sections of the data by using labels and proceeds towards 
the categorisation of data into themes (Holloway and Wheeler, 2013). The researcher reads 
through the transcript and identifies what they feel is important to both the researcher and the 
participant. During this initial coding, the researcher identifies words or phrases that the 
participant use in order to discern important ideas that are found within the data (Holloway 
and Wheeler, 2013). The method that is adopted is manual coding. 
4.5.5 Piloting of Interview 
Piloting of the semi-structured interview was carried out in order to check for clarity in the 
question and to find out if the questions elicited long or elaborate answers, in other words, did 
the design of the questions encourage the respondents to speak freely and in depth about 
areas that the researcher is interested in. 
Like with questions in the questionnaire the order in which questions are asked and the links 
between them are important, and also like with a questionnaire the interview schedule has to 
be piloted and refined (Smith et al., 2012). 
A small sample of three people from the same population of those who are to be interviewed 
was taken for the interview piloting. The pilot test was then checked for ambiguous sounding 
questions, questions that lack relevance and questions that contain jargon or advanced 
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vocabulary (Smith et al., 2012). Overall, the participants were satisfied with the clarity of the 
questions. 
4.5.6 Sampling 
The study requires that those who will take part in the interviews will have both knowledge 
of the subject and influence over the government decision making process or direct 
involvement. From the chosen organisations are personnel who are responsible for strategy 
formulation and implementation of cloud technology for the government. Therefore, it was 
decided to adopt purposive sampling because it is a form of sampling where there is no 
attempt to create a sample that statistically represents a certain a population but instead 
chooses people ‘with purpose’ that will allow the researcher to explore their research 
questions (Matthews and Ross, 2010 p.167). These participants in the research are chosen 
based on experiences that are related to the topic that is being researched, so that they can 
reveal much about the research area (Matthews and Ross, 2010).  
Purposive sampling was adopted because it is a form of non-probability sampling where 
individuals are included in the study because they fit certain criteria because, for example, 
they have the specialist skills or knowledge that is relevant to the research (Jupp, 2006). 
There are some types of type of research that require the researcher to decide about which 
types of participants are likely to contribute relevant data. Therefore, the study adopts 
purposive sampling which is to choose the participants that are relevant to the study and its 
aims and objectives.  
For the present study participants were chosen because of their specialist knowledge of 
information systems in their respective departments and ministries and because they are 
involved in the decision and deployment of government services to the cloud and have 
significant influence in this process.  
For the semi-structured interviews the sample will include those senior government officials 
and technical staff who are directly involved in, or influence the decision of whether or not to 
adopt the public cloud for sensitive data. Specifically, in the present study there will be senior 
personnel from the Ministry of Finance Saudi Arabia, Saudi Customs which is under the 
Ministry of Finance, the Saudi Immigration Department and the National Information Centre, 
both under the Ministry of Interior. In total, there are 12 participants in the interviews, three 
from each of the aforementioned organisations. Those interviewed are in senior positions in 
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ministries and government agencies in Saudi Arabia and are directly responsible for decision 
making. For research that involves a homogenous group, 12 interviews are enough (Saunders 
et al., 2016). The participants in this study are homogenous because they are government 
cloud experts.   
4.5.7 Access 
Before the participants were selected for the study the researcher had to gain access to them. 
Due to the nature of the researcher’s job he is well acquainted with senior officials in the four 
organisations. These acquaintances hold senior positions in IT and were deemed to be 
suitable for this study because of their decision-making powers. Moreover, these senior 
officials were able to introduce the researcher to other senior officials who are also involved 
in decisions about IT and cloud deployment, helping the researcher to identify 12 participants 
in total.    
4.5.8 Ethical Considerations for Interviews 
Ethical issues may arise using interviews due to the complexities of researching something 
that may be private and then opening those accounts to the public (Kvale, 2008). Ethical 
issues have to be considered throughout the entire interview research from the beginning to 
the final report (Kvale, 2008). 
An important ethical issue is the informed consent to participate in the study and participant 
confidentiality (Kvale, 2008). In light of this the participants in the study were provided with 
two documents. The first document is an information sheet about the purposes of the study 
and the rights of the participants in terms of their right to confidentiality, data privacy and 
protection and their right to leave the study at any time. The second document is an informed 
consent form whereby potential participants give signed consent to participate in the study. 
Confidentiality in the present research is assured and any identifying data of the participants 
will not be reported (Kvale, 2008). The participants were told about the nature of the study 
and about their rights to leave the study at any time, moreover, they were informed that the 
study will be anonymous and their data will be kept in a secure location.  
People are vulnerable to the apparent interest of an interviewer and because of this the 
interviewee may disclose extraordinary information, and the relationship between interviewer 
and interviewee is impersonal which seems to facilitate disclosure (Gillham, 2007). 
Therefore, because participants may be willing to speak more freely, it is important to respect 
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their anonymity and not disclose what any individual has said about their organisation and the 
issue being investigated.    
4.6 Summary 
This chapter presented the methodological considerations, including the research philosophy, 
for the study. Moreover, the approach to the research and the adopted methods were 
described and justified. The chapter also include an in-depth description of the development 
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The results of the questionnaires are presented in this chapter which include the relationship, 
cloud and sub cloud factors and the connections between them. These factors are analysed in 
order to reveal the issues in the relationship towards achieving the aims and objectives and 
answering research questions of the study. The analysis considers both the cloud factors and 
the relationship factors and the interplay between them towards understanding the reasons for 
the reluctance to adopt the public cloud by government. Specifically, cloud and sub cloud 
factors are analysed against the relationship factors in order to show where in the relationship 
between the government and the CSP the issues about the public cloud are. Moreover, 
towards further understanding the relationship, analysis is conducted between relationship 
factors to see if there are links between them, and this is conducted in relation to all cloud and 
sub cloud factors. The reason for this analysis is to see if relationship factors have different 
implications for different cloud and sub cloud factors. 
5.2 Reliability Statistics 
Cronbach’s Alpha is a mathematical method for calculating reliability and is used for 
assessing the reliability of the variables, namely, the relationship, cloud and sub cloud 
factors. The initial part of the reliability analysis, showed in Table 5.1 indicated that the 
Cronbach's Alpha was 0.988 for 333 items.  
Reliability was established for all variables, namely, the relationship, cloud and sub cloud 
factors in the questionnaire. This was achieved through employing internal consistency with 
Cronbach’s Alpha. The calculated Cronbach’s Alpha for each factor is presented below in 
Table 5.1. The results show that all of the relationship factors received a high level of 
reliability. Factors with Alpha coefficient values of greater than 0.7 are considered to be 







Table 5-1: Reliability Statistics 
  Reliability Statistics 
No DOMAIN Cronbach's Alpha 
N of 
Items 
1 TRUST DOMAIN 0.918 37 
2 RISK DOMAIN 0.875 37 
3 NEGOTIATION – specify 
requirements 
0.912 37 
4 NEGOTIATION – CSP understand 
requirements 
0.919 37 
5 NEGOTIATION – ability to 
negotiate 
0.94 37 
6 COLLABORATION – effectively 
collaborate 
0.916 37 
7 COLLABORATE – effectively 
communicate 
0.919 37 
8 REPUTATION – sufficient 
information 
0.894 37 
9 REPUTATION – perceive positive 
reputation 
0.918 37 
10 OVERALL RELIABILITY 0.988 333 
 
5.3 Trust Domain – Relationship Factor 
This chapter is organised according to the relationship factors and considers frequencies, 
correlation with cloud factors and sub cloud factors, and correlation with other relationship 
factors in relation to cloud factors. 
The results show that in response to the statement ‘you trust your CSP’ the vast majority of 
respondents, 92 percent agreed with this idea, with 31 percent strongly agreeing (see Figure 
5-1). Only 6 percent disagreed with this idea. Therefore, there is an overall high level of trust 




Figure 5-1: You Trust Your Cloud Service Provider (CSP) 
 
5.3.1 Trust and Governance 
Trust is analysed against the various cloud factors and associated sub cloud factors in order to 
show the interplay between relationship and cloud factors. In reference to trust in governance 
generally, there were a significant number of respondents, 25 percent, who gave a neutral 
response to the statement that they trust their service provider. The majority of the 
respondents, 44 percent, disagreed with the idea that they trust their CSP. However, a 
significant number, 28 percent agreed and 4 percent strongly agreed that they trust the CSP in 
relation to governance. In comparison to trust generally, when respondents were asked about 
trust in relation to a cloud factor specifically, in this case governance, there was a significant 
decrease in the level of trust. This shows that for consideration of governance as a specific 
cloud factor here shows less trust in the CSP (see Figure 5-2). However, it has to be noted 
that a quarter of the respondents gave a neutral response, which indicates a level of 























Figure 5-2: Trust Cloud Service Provider (CSP) in Relation to Governance 
 
 
5.3.1.1 Trust and Sub Cloud Factors of Governance  
 
For the sub cloud factors of governance, the government trusted the CSP the least in relation 
to Control and knowledge of CSP employees, this was followed equally by Dynamic SLA and 
Assurance about other cloud tenants, there was also mistrust of Knowledge and control over 
third party issues. These are issues that are pertinent to government in consideration of the 
cloud and governance over data and systems. Governments have a specific duty to protect 
data and that would include knowing about who is employed by the CSP and potentially has 
access to government data, or at the least be assured by the CSP about their employees. In 
regard to the dynamic SLA one of the reasons for government being reluctant to adopt the 
public cloud is standardisation of service, the evidence from the results here support this idea, 
where there is a lack of trust in a flexible service level agreement that would support 
governance. The public cloud service is provided by the CSP; however, the cloud and 
associated infrastructure is provided by a cloud provider (CP) as a third party. It is clear from 
these results that the government do not have confidence because they do not trust that they 
will be given sufficient knowledge and control over these third parties.   
Sub cloud factors of governance where there was a level of trust included clarity of roles and 
responsibilities. This means that the government trust the CSP in terms of clarity of roles and 























will be clear about who is responsible for what aspects of governance. The same was found to 
be true for auditing and measuring the CSP for governance and governance during 
migration. However, the latter two are expected from a CSP by all types of orgasnisation and 
are not a particular concern to government (see Figure 5-3). Overall, there is a high level of 
mistrust that the CSP will offer provision for governance that are a particular interest for 
government. Moreover, the results have shown that this level of mistrust is not reflected in 
trust of the CSP generally.  
Because the results clearly show levels of trust and levels of mistrust, this study has shown 
that it is necessary to address trust not just generally, but in relation to cloud factors and sub 
cloud factors in order to fully understand which aspects of the cloud are a concern in relation 
to trust. This has been evidenced by the fact that there are certain areas of governance where 
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5.3.1.2 Trust with other relationship factors (governance) (Spearman correlation) 
 




























Trust weak weak weak moderate moderate weak NC weak 
 
There were positive moderate correlations between the government trusting the CSP about 
governance and having the perception that they can negotiate and collaborate for governance, 
evidenced by Spearman correlations of 0.508** and 0.595. Overall, there was a statistically 
significant positive correlation shown between trust and collaboration for most sub cloud 
factors of governance. These included Your need to have knowledge and control over data 
and processes, Assurance about other cloud tenants and Knowledge and control over third 
party issues, this means that trust and the ability to effectively collaborate are essential for 
these sub cloud factors. 
There was found to be a positive correlation between trust of the CSP and perception of a 
positive reputation for the cloud factor of governance generally, although this was weak at 
0.277* (Spearman). Moreover, the correlation between trust and reputation was non – 
existent for all sub cloud factors of governance except governance during migration. Overall 
these results show that where the government mistrust or trust the CSP it does not mean that 
they perceive a negative or positive reputation respectively for governance.   
5.3.1.3 Trust and Compliance 
There was a high level of disagreement with the idea that the government trust the CSP in 
relation to compliance. This enforces the idea that although the respondents felt confident that 
they trust their CSP generally, there was a high level of mistrust for compliance as a cloud 
factor. This was evidenced by 63 percent disagreeing that they trust their CSP in relation to 
compliance. Although it should be noted that 14 percent were neutral, but only 9 percent in 
total were in agreement that they could trust in relation to compliance. 
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It is important to note at this point that governance and compliance cloud factors would be of 
particular concern to government as the literature suggests, governance because government 
need a certain level of knowledge and control over data and systems, and compliance because 
governments have to be compliant with their own and international requirements (see Figure 
5-4). 
There was a much higher level of mistrust in the compliance that is offered by the CSP than 
there was for governance. Compliance requirements for government are unique and specific 
to government, and if a government cannot achieve compliance it would go against their own 
regulation and laws. Therefore, this mistrust in compliance is a contributing factor to 
government reluctance in the public cloud. 
Figure 5-4: Trust in Relation to Compliance (Q2B) 
 
 
5.3.1.4 Trust and Sub Cloud Factors of Compliance 
Compliance is an important issue for government because they have to be compliant with 
local and international laws and regulations. The results show that the government do not 
trust their CSP in relation to the CSP’s ability to be compliant. There was also a lack of trust 
in the area of data location, this is also important as part of achieving compliance. There was 
further concern in the area of compliance which was evidenced by the fact that the 
government did not trust the CSP in the area of roles and responsibilities for ensuring 























auditing and assessment were there was also a low level of trust (see Figure 5-5).  However, 
there was a high level of trust in compliance during migration to the cloud. 
Despite the general mistrust in the area of compliance, the government respondents did feel 
that they could trust their CSP in relation to clarity and confidence about jurisdiction, 
jurisdiction is a specific concern for compliance because compliance requires that data should 
be located in particular locations and that there is knowledge about where data is located. 
Moreover, there was a high level of trust in data management and security and privacy as a 
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5.3.1.5 Trust with other relationship factors (Compliance) (Spearman correlation) 







































A lack of trust in certain areas of compliance may affect other relationship factors, for 
example a lack of trust may affect the perceived ability to negotiate or collaborate with the 
CSP in these same sub cloud areas. In reference to negotiation, a positive and moderate 
correlation of 0.516** between trusting the CSP in relation to compliance and being able to 
negotiate compliance was found. Both the frequencies for trust with compliance and 
negotiation with compliance showed a high level of disagreement. Therefore, in relation to 
compliance where the government mistrust the CSP they also feel that they cannot negotiate 
with the CSP. 
As for the sub cloud factors of compliance, statistically significant correlations were found 
between trusting the CSP and being able to negotiate (understand requirements) with the CSP 
in relation to Continuous auditing and assessment, and given there was a high level of 
mistrust for this sub cloud factor it means that where the government mistrust the CSP about 
continuous auditing and assessment, they also feel that they cannot negotiate (understand 
requirements) in the same area, the same was found to be true for roles and responsibilities 
for compliance. The remaining sub cloud factors of Data management, Data location and 
Compliance when migrating were shown to have no or weak correlations with no statistical 
significance in these correlations between trust and negotiation. Therefore, for areas that are a 
particular concern for government, trust has less of an effect on negotiation.  
The strong link between trust and collaboration is evidenced by the fact there were strong 
correlations between trusting the CSP in relation to compliance and the government having 
the perception that they have the ability to collaborate with the CSP about compliance as well 
as having a perception of a positive reputation. This was evidenced with a positive strong 
correlation of 0.662** and 0.637** respectively (see Table 5.3). Positive correlations 
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between trust and collaboration were found for 5 out of the 8 sub cloud factors for 
compliance which included Continuous auditing and assessment, Clarity and confidence 
about jurisdiction, Data management, Roles and responsibilities for compliance and Security 
and privacy. Overall, this means that for these areas of the cloud where there was trust there 
was an associated ability to collaborate and a positive perception of reputation, or where there 
was mistrust there was the idea that they could not collaborate or perceived a negative 
reputation. Therefore, because collaboration is required to achieve compliance it is important 
that the government trust the CSP. 
The above correlation between trust and reputation for compliance could not have been 
related to having sufficient information about the CSP because there was no statistically 
significant correlation between trust and sufficient information about CSP in relation to 
compliance. 
5.3.1.6 Trust and Security and Privacy 
In response to whether or not the respondents trust the CSP in relation to security and privacy 
it was found that the majority, 96 percent, agreed that they trust their provider, with more 
than 23 percent strongly agreeing, this was a very strong result in comparison to only 4 
percent who disagreed. These results were in stark contrast for the results for governance and 
compliance. This indicates that security and privacy is something that is not an issue 
generally for the respondents, that they generally trust their CSP (see Figure 5-6). These 
results are apparently in contrast to much literature which suggests that customers have trust 
issues with security and privacy.  
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5.3.1.7 Trust and Sub Cloud Factors of Security and Privacy 
Continuing with the theme that has emerged from the other cloud and sub cloud factors, 
where there is a low level of trust it is related to areas of the cloud that are particularly 
important to government, these particular concerns have been identified in the literature about 
government concerns about the cloud. An example of this was a high level of mistrust, at 63 
percent disagreement and 20 percent strong disagreement, in relation to security of third 
parties. The issue of mistrusting the CSP in relation to third parties was also a trust issue for 
governance. Therefore, here there is evidence to suggest that third parties is a concern 
generally for government.  
In reference to a tailored security and privacy and policy there was a very high level of 
mistrust with 46 percent disagreeing and 45 percent strongly disagreeing with this idea. This 
closely relates to the idea found in the results cited in the above that there is a level of 
mistrust regarding a flexible agreement. Overall, therefore, there is a mistrust in the idea of 
flexibility on the part of the CSP in regard to agreements and policies.  
Security is an area that is the responsibility of all parties. Governments would be expected to 
have their own security and privacy protocols that they would have to follow, however, they 






















security and privacy. A significant 64 percent felt they could not trust the CSP in this regard. 
Again, this is something that is beyond the government’s control.  
In addition to not having confidence that responsibilities for security are not clearly 
established, the government also mistrusted the CSP in reference to assurance regarding CSP 
employees, where 70 percent disagreed and 28 percent strongly disagreed with this idea. 
Therefore, almost all respondents were concerned about the employees of the CSP in relation 
to security. Together with the high level of mistrust about third parties, it is clear that the 
government have a high level of concern about parties or individuals that they are not aware 
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5.3.1.8 Trust with other relationship factors (Security and Privacy) (Spearman 
correlation) 




































5.3.1.9 Trust with Security and Privacy 
There was a positive weak correlation between trust in security and privacy and the ability to 
negotiate and collaborate for security and privacy. This was also found to be the case for 
having sufficient information about the CSP. Therefore, trust has the same effect on the 
ability to collaborate for security and privacy than it does on the ability to negotiate for 
security and privacy. So it can be said that trust is a determining factor in decisions to be 
made about the public cloud so far as it affects negotiation and collaboration. 
No statistically significant correlation was found between trust and the perception of a 
positive reputation for security and privacy. This is an important finding because the 
literature suggests that perception of a positive reputation is one of the key factors for the 
willingness to adopt the cloud and it would be expected that if a CSP had a positive 
reputation for security and privacy they would trust the CSP. Therefore, trust is not a 
determining factor on adoption as a result of its affect on reputation. 
For the relationship between trust and negotiation, the sub cloud factors that received positive 
correlations were Tailored security and privacy policy (0.453**) and Clarity of roles and 
responsibilities (0.415**). For collaboration, only 2 out of the 7 were found to have a positive 
correlation, however, even these were moderate, they also included Tailored security and 
privacy policy (0.468**) and Clarity of roles and responsibilities (0.549**). Therefore, trust 
has an effect on the ability to negotiate and collaborate only for these two sub cloud factors. 
For sufficient information (reputation domain) the sub cloud factors of security and privacy 
only Clarity of roles and responsibilities was found to have a significant moderate correlation 
(0.400** Spearman) and for reputation the only correlation was for Clarity of roles and 
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responsibilities where a positive strong correlation was found (0.695 ** Spearman 
correlation).  
Overall, therefore, where trust is analysed against the other relationship factors of 
negotiation, collaboration and reputation although there was little correlation found in 
relation to security and privacy, for the sub cloud factor Clarity of roles and responsibilities 
there was consistently a correlation. This means that trust in this sub cloud factor results in a 
perceived ability to negotiate and collaborate and the perception of a positive reputation.  
5.3.1.10 Trust and Performance and Offering 
In consideration of the government trusting the CSP in relation to performance and offering 
generally, there was a high level of trust with 76 percent agreeing and 19 percent strongly 
agreeing and only 5 percent disagreed (see Figure 5-8).  
Figure 5-8: Trust in Relation to Performance and Offering (Q2D) 
 
5.3.1.11 Trust and Sub Cloud Factors of Performance and Offering  
There was a high level of trust for those areas that are related to performance specifically. 
This included trust where the relationship ended and sufficient notice of any disruption, 
moreover, the majority of the government respondents trust that they will receive sufficient 
support from their CSP (see Figure 5-9).  
Again, as with other cloud factors, a level of mistrust was found for the associated sub cloud 
factors that were particularly relevant to government. For meet government’s specific 























there was a high level of mistrust included specialised staff for government needs with all of 
the government respondents disagreeing with the idea that they trust the CSP in this area. 
Moreover, towards achieving governance, government need to have specialised staff inside 
the CSP organisation as well as a dynamic / flexible SLA, however, a high level of mistrust 
was expressed for these sub cloud factors, with 56 percent disagreement and 44 percent 
strong disagreement, and 63 percent disagreement and 31 percent strong disagreement 
respectively (see figure 5.9). Again, where requirements are considered that are of particular 
relevance to government, a level of mistrust is perceived. 
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5.3.1.12 Trust with other relationship factors (Performance and Offering) (Spearman 
correlation) 








































There was a positive, however, weak correlation between trust in the CSP’s performance and 
offering and ability to negotiate and collaborate for performance and offering. Because most 
of the respondents agreed that they trusted the CSP in relation to performance and offering, 
this means that where they trust their CSP in relation to performance and offering, to a certain 
extent, they feel that they can negotiate and collaborate for the same cloud factor. Again, trust 
is therefore, a factor that has a bearing on the ability to negotiate and collaborate to a specific 
cloud factor, in this case Performance and Offering, as was also the case for Security and 
Privacy. 
The following sub cloud factors of performance and offering were found to have a correlation 
between trust and collaboration: Dynamic / flexible SLA (0.455**) and Additional specialised 
staff for government needs (0.438**), both of which there was a strong level of disagreement 
for trust. Therefore, for these sub cloud factors, which are a particular concern or relevance 
for government, a lack of trust is associated, to a certain extent, with a perceived lack of 
ability to collaborate. Here, therefore, there are two issues about adoption of the cloud that 
are related to sub cloud factors that government need to be concerned about, firstly they 
cannot trust the CSP and secondly, they cannot collaborate with the CSP. The opposite is 
found to be true for the sub cloud factors Sufficient notice of disruption and End of 
relationship, where a positive perception of trust is associated with a perceived ability to 
collaborate. From other results for these sub cloud factors there is always a positive 
perception. These are seen as standard conditions of a contract and it is expected that a CSP 
offers assurances about them as standard which has been reflected in the positive results.    
There was no statistically significant correlation between trust and perception of positive 
reputation and having sufficient information about the CSP in relation to the cloud factor of 
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performance and offering. Therefore, trust was not related to reputation, which is different to 
what is expected because there should be a correlation between trust and reputation, however, 
this was not the case where performance and offering were concerned. A correlation that was 
found in the sub cloud factors of performance and offering was Customisable cloud 
environment, which had a moderate correlation (0.462**) Spearman. For this particular sub 
cloud factor there was a low perception of trust which is therefore, associated with a negative 
perception of ability to negotiate, the was also the case for Dynamic / flexible SLA. 
Overall, therefore, trust has a determining effect, or is determined by other relationship 
factors, especially negotiation and collaboration, for sub cloud factors that are a particularly 
relevant to government. From this idea, which has already been determined from previous 
results, levels of concern or confidence are affect by these government-specific concerns. 
Table 5-6: Trust and Sufficient Information with Performance and Offering 2D 16D 
Sub cloud Factors of Performance and 
Offering 
Correlation (Spearman) 
Customisable cloud environment 0.538 (**) moderate correlation 
Dynamic / flexible SLA 0.345 (**) weak correlation 
Continuous monitoring of performance 0.333 (**) weak correlation 
Back up and recovery 0.261 (*) weak correlation 
Sufficient support lifecycle 0.463 (**) moderate correlation 
Sufficient notice of disruption 0.490 (**) moderate correlation 
End of relationship 0.358 (**) weak correlation 
 No correlation / No statistically significant 
correlation 
Meet government specific requirements 0.004 




In the case of performance and offering where the respondents are asked about trust in this 
area generally, there was a very high level of trust, however, where respondents are asked 
about trust in relation to the specific sub cloud factors of performance and offering there was 
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a variation in levels of trust, in relation to some areas there was a high level of mistrust. This 
reveals that the respondents demonstrate a high level of certainty about certain ideas within 
the cloud factors. This has been shown to be the case for all of the cloud factors for each of 
the relationship factors. Where respondents demonstrate clear distinctions between trusting 
and not trusting CSPs in relation to certain sub cloud factors, it reveals a high level of 
confidence in their opinion. Moreover, in reference, for example, to trusting the CSP in 
relation to performance and offering there was a very high level of trust in relation to this 
generally, however, for some of the sub cloud factors there was a high level of mistrust. Not 
only does this demonstrate that respondents show a level of certainty in relation to certain 
issues it also shows that there is a clear need to not only ask about cloud factors generally but 
to look at the individual aspects of cloud factors, namely the sub cloud factors.  
5.4 Risk Domain – Relationship Factor 
In this section, the results for risk are addressed whereby it is analysed against cloud and sub 
cloud factors. 
5.4.1 Risk  
Respondents were asked if they do not perceive a risk with their cloud service provider. The 
vast majority of the respondents (89 percent) disagreed with the idea that they did not 
perceive a risk and only 3 percent agreed, less than the 8 percent that responded neutral, this 
means that they perceived a risk (see Figure 5-10). This result is in stark contrast to trust 
where there was an overall positive perception. This means that although the government 
perceive a risk, they do trust the CSP. 
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Figure 5-10: Risk Perception 
 
5.4.1.1 Risk and Governance 
The results in the above show that there is a high level of perception of risk generally, this 
idea was also found where the respondents were asked about risk in relation to governance. 
The vast majority of respondents, 85 percent, perceived a risk in relation to governance and 
none of the respondents did not perceive a risk (see Figure 5-11).  
 











































5.4.1.2 Risk and sub Cloud Factors of Governance 
For most of the sub cloud factors of governance there was a high level of disagreement. This 
high level of disagreement was especially high for a Dynamic SLA with 83 percent of 
respondents disagreeing and 15 percent strongly disagreeing, knowledge and control over 
third parties 75 percent and 23 percent and assurance about other cloud tenants at 71 percent 
and 21 percent respectively (see Figure 5-12). Again, as a recurring finding of this study, 
where there seems to be an issue is with the sub cloud factors of governance that are 
especially a concern or relevance to government. 
There were only two sub cloud factors where there was a higher level of agreement that the 
respondents did not perceive a risk which were governance during migration at 76 percent 
agreeing and 16 percent strongly disagreeing, and clarity of roles and responsibilities with 55 
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5.4.1.3 Risk with other relationship factors (Governance) (Spearman correlation) 









































There was a positive moderate correlation between risk and negation in relation to 
governance, this was evidence by a 0.423 (**) Spearman correlation, the same was found to 
be true for sufficient information with a moderate correlation of 0.416** (see Table 5.7). 
Because there were positive correlations for sub cloud factors that were standard and sub 
cloud factors that are considered to be of particular concern to government, where both 
positive and negative perceptions of risk were found, this means that there is a correlation 
between a negative perception of risk and a perceived inability to negotiate and a correlation 
between positive perception of risk and ability to negotiate, both for governance.  
Although there was a correlation between risk and reputation, it was weak and there were no 
significant correlations for the associated sub cloud factors of reputation. 
There was no statistically significant correlation between risk and specifying requirements in 
relation to the cloud factor of governance. Moreover, out of the 8 sub cloud factors only 2 
showed a correlation, however, they were weak. Therefore, the perception of a risk for 
governance is not associated with the government’s ability to specify governance 
requirements. 
Although no correlation was found between risk and effectively communicate there were 
positive correlations for five of the eight sub cloud factors of governance between risk and 
effective communication. However, there was no pattern in terms of the sub cloud factors that 
would be of particular concern to government, some of these sub cloud factors that showed a 
correlation were those that are of a particular concern to government and some were not. This 
means that for sub cloud factors that show a low perception of risk there is an associated 
perceived ability to be able to communicate during collaboration, and the opposite was found 
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to be true for those sub cloud factors where a risk was perceived. These findings further 
enforce the idea that risk is linked to the governments perceived ability to effectively 
communicate. 
5.4.1.4 Risk and Compliance 
The idea of perceiving a risk in relation to a specific cloud factor was also found to be true in 
relation to compliance where most of the respondents, 69 percent, disagreed and 8 percent 
strongly disagreeing, with idea that they did not perceive a risk in relation to compliance. 
Only 15 percent of the respondents agreed that they did not perceive a risk, and 9 percent 
responded neutral (see Figure 5-13).  
Figure 5-13: Risk in Relation to Compliance (Q4B) 
 
 
5.4.1.5 Risk and Sub Cloud Factors of Compliance 
Despite the fact that there was shown to be a high perception of risk in relation to compliance 
generally as a cloud factor, where there is an examination of the results for the sub cloud 
factors of compliance there is a significant amount these factors where a risk is not perceived. 
Specifically, for Clarity and confidence about migration, Data management, Security and 
privacy and Compliance when migrating there was a low perception of risk. However, there 
were sub cloud factors of compliance where a risk was perceived which included Data 
location, CSP ability to be compliant, Roles and responsibilities for compliance and 























Therefore, the concern about sub cloud factors that are of particular relevance to government 
is also found here. Data location is especially a concern for government when it comes to 
achieving compliance, moreover, the government should have confidence in the CSP that 
they will be able to be compliant. Because there was a perception of risk in relation to the 
roles and responsibilities for compliance this means that there could be a lack of clarity about 
who is responsible for compliance. Finally, there is a perception of risk in relation to 
continuous auditing and assessment, this means that the government respondents feel that 
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5.4.1.6 Risk with other relationship factors (Compliance) (Spearman correlation) 
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For compliance, there were positive and moderate correlations between risk and trust, ability 
to negotiate, effectively collaborate and positive reputation. This means that risk is linked to 
these relationship factors where compliance is concerned. 
In reference to the link between risk and reputation, for five out of the eight sub cloud factors 
of compliance there were positive correlations. Four of these correlations were for sub cloud 
factors that are considered to be of a particular concern for government as evidenced by the 
literature and results in this study. The result show that the perception of risk for compliance, 
whether high or low, is correspondingly associated with a perception of reputation of the CSP 
in relation to compliance, whether negative or positive. Therefore, reputation could have a 
bearing on the decision to adopt the public cloud.  
A weak correlation was found between risk and understand requirements, and the associated 
sub cloud factors had either weak or no correlations.  Moreover, no correlation was found for 
compliance between risk and specify requirements and no noteworthy correlation for the 
associated sub cloud factors. Therefore, risk is not related to the perception that requirements 
are being understood. As for risk and effective communication there was also no correlation, 
therefore, any risk that the government may perceive about compliance cannot be attributed 
to the ability of the government to effectively communicate for compliance.    
For the relationship between risk and negotiation for all of the sub cloud factors of 
compliance, except one, there were positive correlations, most of them moderate or strong, in 
particular Data location had the highest correlation at 0.6647* Spearman. The results indicate 
that where there is either a high or low perception of risk, it is correspondingly associated 
with a high or low perception of the ability to negotiate for compliance.  
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5.4.1.7 Risk and Security and Privacy 
The perception of risk was asked in relation to all four of the main cloud factors. Where the 
respondents were asked about the perception of risk in relation to security and privacy the 
results showed similar results to governance and compliance where 74 percent disagreed that 
they did not perceive a risk. However, it is important to note that 21 percent of the 
respondents agreed that they did not perceive a risk (see Figure 5 15).  
Figure 5-15: Risk in Relation to Security and Privacy (Q4C) 
 
5.4.1.8 Risk and Sub Cloud Factors of Security and Privacy 
In reference to the sub cloud factors for security and privacy there was evidence of a 
perception of risk in relation to Assurance regarding CSP employees where 91 percent 
disagreed that they did not perceive a risk and 5 percent strongly disagreed, Clarity of roles 
and responsibilities whereby 68 percent disagreed, Security related to third parties where 54 
percent disagreed and 30 percent strongly disagreed, and finally Tailored security and 
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Where there was a high level of agreement, which means that the respondents did not 
perceive a risk was the highest for General security / privacy provision with 74 percent 
agreeing and 3 percent strongly agreeing, followed by Monitoring of policy adherence with 
65 percent and 24 percent agreeing and strongly agreeing respectively, and finally, Sufficient 
involvement in security at 18 percent 0 percent respectively.   
Again, this is a recurring idea there is a high perception of risk in areas that would be of 
particular concern or relevance to government, although it is important to note that all of 
these sub cloud factors are important to government, the additional requirement to know 
about third parties is something that governments would be obligated to know about 
according to law and also for security purposes, as they are obligated to do everything 
possible to protect citizen data. Tailored security and privacy policy is also something that is 
required by government. 
5.4.1.9 Risk with other relationship factors (Security and Privacy) (Spearman correlation) 
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In consideration of the relationship between risk and other relationship factors only risk and 
specify requirements showed a moderate positive correlation, this was followed by risk and 
CSP understand requirements which showed a weak correlation (see Table 5.9). No 
correlations were find between risk and other relationships for security and privacy. 
There was no statistically significant correlation between risk and collaboration in relation to 
security and privacy. For the sub cloud factors, there were either weak or no correlations. The 
only sub cloud factor worth a mention is Clarity of roles and responsibilities with a 
Spearman correlation of 0.685**. There was also no correlation in the relationship between 
risk and reputation, but as with risk and collaboration, the only sub cloud factor where there 
was a correlation between risk and reputation was Clarity of roles and responsibilities with a 
correlation of 0.654**.    
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Where the study determined if there was a relationship between a perception of risk for 
security and privacy and the perceived ability to effectively communicate for security and 
privacy, very little correlation was found. Therefore, a perception of risk for security and 
privacy, negative or positive, is not linked to the perceived ability to effectively communicate 
for security and privacy.   
5.4.1.10 Risk and Performance and Offering   
Where respondents were asked about the perception of risk in relation to performance and 
offering the results were the opposite to the aforementioned cloud factors of governance, 
compliance and security and privacy. There were 78 percent of respondents who agreed with 
the idea that they do not perceive a risk in relation to performance and offering, in addition to 
this there were 14 percent who strongly agreed with this idea, only 3 percent disagreed. This 
was in stark contrast to the other three cloud factors where a majority perceived a risk (see 
Figure 5-17).  
Figure 5-17: Risk in Relation to Performance and Offering (Q4D) 
 
5.4.1.11 Risk and Sub Cloud factors of Performance and Offering 
For the sub cloud factors of performance and offering there was a perception of risk for a 
Customisable cloud environment with 78 percent disagreeing and 19 percent strongly 
disagreeing with idea that they do not perceive a risk. This was followed by Additional 
specialised staff for government needs with 70 percent disagreeing and 30 percent strongly 
disagreeing, all respondents also perceived a risk for Dynamic / flexible SLA with 63 percent 






















risk for Meet government specific requirements with 58 percent disagreeing and 36 percent 
strongly disagreeing (see Figure 5-18). 
Although there was initially a low level of perceived risk for performance and offering 
generally, looking at the sub cloud factors it has been shown that there is significant 
perception of risk in some of the sub cloud factors of performance and offering which include 
those areas which are related to the particular needs of government, a customisable cloud 
environment and a Dynamic SLA have been shown to be of importance to government, as 
well as the need for specialised staff to cater for government needs. 
Despite the negative perception of risk for the aforementioned cloud factors, there were some 
sub cloud factors where there was a positive perception of risk, they included End of 
relationship with 75 percent agreeing and 15 percent strongly agreeing, Sufficient notice of 
disruption with 71 percent agreeing and 15 percent strongly agreeing, Backup and recovery 
with 69 percent and 15 percent respectively, and finally, the least perception of a risk was 
found for Sufficient support lifecycle with 78 percent agreeing and 15 percent strongly 
agreeing that they do not perceive a risk. 
As with the results for the other cloud factors, for the sub cloud factors that are generally a 
condition for most customers of the public cloud there is a much lower perception of risk. 
These cloud factors are general and are expected as part of a standard service provision.  
In keeping with the other cloud factors, although there was certainty about whether or not a 
risk was perceived for the cloud factor, there was more certainty about how the government 
felt about individual sub cloud factors.  
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5.4.1.12 Risk with other relationship factors (Performance and Offering) (Spearman 
correlation) 
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For performance and offering, there were only correlations found between risk and trust 
which was weak and risk and CSP understands requirements which was found to be 
moderate. For the latter the sub cloud factors of performance and offering Customisable 
cloud environment, Dynamic / flexible SLA, Continuous monitoring of performance, 
Additional specialised staff for government needs, Sufficient support lifecycle, End of 
relationship, all of which showed positive weak Spearman correlations. 
Although there was no statistically significant correlation between risk and collaboration in 
relation to performance and offering, the sub cloud factor Continuous monitoring of 
performance showed a strong correlation (0.634** Spearman). This means that although 
generally there is no link between the perception of risk and collaboration, there was a 
perceived ability to collaborate for this sub cloud factor.   
Although there was no correlation between risk and effectively communicate, the sub cloud 
factor Continuous monitoring of performance received a strong positive correlation (0.634** 
Spearman) as with previous results. Therefore, for this sub cloud factor, which always 
receives a very low perception of risk, there is often an associated high perception of the 







5.5 Collaboration Domain – Relationship Factor 
5.5.1 Collaboration 
Respondents mostly agreed with the idea that they could collaborate with the CSP, this was 
evidenced by 90 percent agreement with this idea (see Figure 5-19). 
Figure 5-19: Collaboration General 
 
 
5.5.1.1 Collaboration and Governance 
Although the respondents largely agreed that they could collaborate with the CSP, where the 
respondents were asked about collaboration for governance generally they mostly disagreed 
with this idea. The results showed that 68 percent disagreed and 5 percent strongly disagreed 
with this idea, however, there was a significant amount, 24 percent, who agreed with this idea 






















Figure 5-20: Collaboration for Governance (Q12A) 
 
 
5.5.1.2 Collaboration and Sub Cloud Factors of Governance 
The opinion that respondents disagreed that that they could collaborate on governance 
continues where they are asked about collaboration and the sub cloud factors of governance. 
There was disagreement for collaboration for Knowledge and control of CSP employees with 
88 percent disagreeing, Dynamic SLA with 81 percent disagreeing, Knowledge and control 
over third party issues with 53 percent disagreeing and a significant 34 percent strongly 
disagreeing, similar results were found for Assurance about other cloud tenants at 54 percent 
and 33 percent respectively, finally the Need to have knowledge and control over data and 
processes with 64 percent disagreeing. Therefore, these results show that government 
respondents feel that they cannot collaborate on these areas of governance and in 
consideration of the fact that these are areas that are essential for government in the public 
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Where there was a positive perception that the government respondents could collaborate 
with the CSP was for Auditing and measuring of CSP with 89 percent, Governance during 
migration at 68 percent with 23 percent strongly agreeing, there was also some agreement for 
Clarity of roles and responsibilities at 63 percent agreeing that they could collaborate, 
however, it is important to note that 34 percent did disagree with this idea (see Figure 5-21). 
5.5.1.3 Collaboration with other relationship factors (Governance) (Spearman 
correlation) 















































A strong correlation was found between the perceived ability to collaborate with the CSP for 
governance and the ability to negotiate for governance. Moderate correlations were found 
between the ability to collaborate with the CSP for governance and trust, effectively 










5.5.1.4 Collaboration and Compliance 
The majority of the respondents, 55 percent disagreeing and 16 percent strongly disagreeing, 
that they could collaborate with the CSP about compliance, however, a significant 28 percent 
did agree that they could collaborate on compliance (see Figure 5-22). 
Figure 5-22: Collaborate for Compliance (Q12B) 
 
 
5.5.1.5 Collaboration and Sub Cloud Factors of Compliance 
Despite the fact that there was a high level of disagreement with the idea that the government 
respondents could collaborate on compliance, when asked about the sub cloud factors of 
compliance there was a high level of agreement that they could collaborate for all of the sub 
cloud factors except one. Where there was a disagreement it was for the sub cloud factor of 
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5.5.1.6 Collaboration with other relationship factors (Compliance) (Spearman 
correlation) 













































In reference to the perceived ability of the government to collaborate for compliance, strong 
correlations were found for trust in compliance and perceived positive reputation (see Table 
5-12). This means that because there was a high level of disagreement with the idea that the 
government could effectively collaborate for compliance, there was an associated strong 
mistrust and perception of a negative reputation for compliance.     
5.5.1.7 Collaborate and Security and Privacy 
Security and privacy was a cloud factor that the government respondents felt they could 
collaborate for with the CSP. This was evidenced by the fact that 66 percent agreed and 14 
percent strongly agreed with this idea and only 5 percent disagreed, there were a significant 
number, 15 percent, responded neutral (see Figure 5-24). 
 
























5.5.1.8 Collaboration and Sub Cloud Factors of Security and Privacy 
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As was found to be the case for other relationship factors where the government respondents 
were asked about the associated sub cloud factors, there was a mixture of opinions. 
Moreover, the results again show that where the government respondents have less 
confidence in a particular relationship factor regarding the sub cloud factors, is in the areas 
that would be of particular concern to a government considering the public cloud. 
Specifically, there was a high level of disagreement with Tailored security and privacy policy 
with 79 percent disagreeing, Clarity of roles and responsibilities with 74 percent 
disagreement and Security related to third parties with 71 percent disagreement. The highest 
level of disagreement was for Assurance regarding CSP employees whereby 60 percent 
disagreed and 40 percent strongly disagreed (see Figure 5.25). There were high levels of 
agreement for General security / privacy provision 73 percent agreeing and 23 percent 
strongly agreeing, followed by Sufficient involvement in security at 65 percent agreement, 
although it is important to note that 29 percent gave their answer as neutral. This was similar 
to Monitoring of policy adherence with 65 percent agreeing and 30 percent giving their 
answer as neutral (see Figure 5-25).  
5.5.1.9 Collaboration with other relationship factors (Security and Privacy) (Spearman 
correlation) 

















































    
Between the perception of being able to effectively collaborate with the CSP for security and 
privacy and other relationship factors, there were three moderate correlations with other 
relationship factors which included CSP understands requirements, ability to negotiate, and 
effectively communicate. Because there is a high level of agreement with the idea that the 
government can effectively collaborate for security and privacy there was an associated 
positive perception that the government had the ability to negotiate and effectively 
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communicate for security and privacy as well as the perception that the CSP understood these 
requirements. 
5.5.1.10 Collaboration and Performance and Offering  
Almost all of the government respondents agreed with the idea that they could collaborate 
with their CSP in relation to performance an offering. This was clearly evidenced by the fact 
that 85 percent agreed and 13 percent strongly agreed with this idea, moreover, none of the 
respondents disagreed that they could collaborate on performance and offering (see Figure 5-
26).  
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5.5.1.11 Collaboration and Sub Cloud Factors of Performance and Offering 
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Where the respondents were asked about the sub cloud factors of performance and offering 
the results were contrasted with performance and offering generally. Again, as with other 
results shown in this study there was a high level of disagreement with those sub cloud 
factors that would be a particular concern to government. This high level of disagreement 
was shown to be evident for Additional specialised staff for government needs with all of the 
respondents disagreeing or strongly disagreeing, Meet government specific requirements with 
75 percent disagreement and Customisable cloud environment with 68 percent disagreement 
and 20 percent strongly disagreeing. There was also a strong level of disagreement with the 
idea that the government respondents could collaborate on the issue of a Dynamic / flexible 
SLA with 64 percent disagreeing and 34 percent strongly disagreeing with this idea (see 
Figure 5-27) 
5.5.1.12 Collaboration with other relationship factors (Performance and Offering) 
(Spearman correlation) 














































There was little correlation between the perceived ability to effectively collaborate with the 
CSP and other relationship factors for performance and offering. The results show that the 
perceived ability to collaborate for performance and offering was moderately linked to the 
ability to effectively communicate for the same cloud factor (see Table 5-14). Therefore, the 
ability to collaborate for performance and offering has very little bearing on other 






5.6 Negotiation - Relationship Factor 
Negotiation as a relationship factor is analysed against the various cloud and sub cloud 
factors. Here negotiation is addressed generally and in subsequent sections different aspects 
of negotiation are addressed. 
5.6.1 Negotiation 
There was a very high level of agreement with the idea that the government respondents 
could negotiate with their CSP. This was evidenced by 81 percent agreeing and 6 percent 
strongly agreeing with this idea, moreover, only 6 percent disagreed with this idea (see Figure 
5-29). 
 
Figure 5-28: Negotiation 
 
 
5.6.2 Negotiation with Cloud Factors and Sub Cloud Factors 
Firstly, negotiation with each cloud factor is addressed followed by sub cloud factors, 






















5.6.2.1 Negotiation and Governance 
Figure 5-29: Negotiation Q10A Governance 
 
A majority of the respondents disagreed with the idea that they could negotiate with their 
CSP in relation to governance. This was evidenced by the results which show that 53 percent 
disagreed with the idea with 1 percent strongly disagreeing. However, it is fair to say that a 
significant number, 30 percent and 1 percent agreed and strongly agreed, respectively, that 
they could negotiate governance with their CSP. Moreover, 15 percent gave the response as 
neutral meaning they neither agreed or disagreed with this idea (see Figure 5-30).    
5.6.2.2 Negotiation and Sub Cloud Factors of Governance 
The results for the sub cloud factors of governance also showed a high level of disagreement 
that the government respondents could negotiate with the CSP. There were strong levels of 
disagreement in particular for Control and knowledge of CSP employees with 63 percent 
disagreeing and 31 percent disagreeing, Dynamic SLA with 65 percent and 19 percent, 
Knowledge and control over third party issues with 58 percent and 35 percent, Assurance 
about other cloud tenants at 73 percent and 18 percent, and Need to have knowledge and 
control over data and processes at 49 percent and 18 percent, all respectively for disagree 
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In line with the idea that the respondents did not feel they could negotiate with their CSP 
about governance generally as a cloud factor, there were only two sub cloud factors where the 
government respondents felt that they could negotiate, these were Governance during 
migration 88 percent agreeing and Auditing and measuring of CSP with 74 percent agreeing 
and 6 percent strongly agreeing.  
Where there is a commonality between these results and the results for the relationship 
factors of trust and risk is that where there is a level of confidence, in this case confidence 
that the government can negotiate in relation to the sub cloud factors of Governance during 
migration and Auditing and measuring of CSP, these are for sub cloud factors that are general 
and would be expected in a standard SLA, whereas the other sub cloud factors are those that 
would be of a particular concern to government.   
5.6.2.3 Negotiation with other relationship factors (governance) (Spearman correlation) 










































Overall, for governance there were significant links between the ability to negotiate and the 
other relationship factors, with the exception of effectively specify requirements. Particularly, 
there was a strong positive correlation between the ability to negotiate for governance and the 
ability to collaborate for governance, this was evidenced by a Spearman correlation of 0.707 
(**). 
5.6.2.4 Negotiation and Compliance 
There was also a high level of disagreement with the idea that the government respondents 
could negotiate for compliance generally as a cloud factor. In total 59 percent of the 
respondents disagreed with this idea and 8 percent strongly disagreed. However, there was a 




Figure 5-31: Negotiation and Compliance 
 
5.6.2.5 Negotiation and Sub Cloud Factors of Compliance 
Despite the fact that the government respondents mostly felt that they disagreed with the idea 
that they could negotiate in regard to compliance, they did feel that they can negotiate with 
the CSP for most of the sub cloud factors for compliance. The most agreement was found for 
Data management with 88 percent, followed by Compliance when migrating at 81 percent, 
Clarity and confidence about jurisdiction at 78 percent and Continuous auditing and 
assessment at 70 percent (see Figure 5-33). Therefore, the government respondents felt that 
they were confident to negotiate the issue of jurisdiction. 
The initial response for compliance as a cloud factor was shown to be different to the 
responses for the sub cloud factors, again this is a recurring theme that when asked about sub 
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5.6.2.6 Negotiation and Security and Privacy 
There was a high level of agreement with the idea that the government respondents could 
negotiate security and privacy with 83 percent agreeing and 11 percent strongly agreeing with 
this idea, and only 6 percent in disagreement (see Figure 5-34). 
Figure 5-33: Negotiation and Security and Privacy 
 
 
5.6.2.7 Negotiation and Sub Cloud Factors of Security and Privacy 
There were mixed opinions when the respondents were questioned about the sub cloud 
factors of security and privacy. There was very strong agreement with the idea that the 
government could negotiate General security / privacy provision with 89 percent agreement 
and 11 percent strongly agreeing with this idea, this was followed by Monitoring of policy 
adherence with 71 percent in agreement and 15 percent strongly agreeing, there was also 
agreement that the respondents could negotiate for Clarity of roles and responsibilities and 
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As with the other relationship factors and the associated sub cloud factors there was 
disagreement in the areas that can be considered to be a particular concern to government. 
Security related to third parties received the highest level of disagreement at 76 percent, 
followed by Assurance regarding CSP employees with 59 percent disagreeing and a 
significant 29 percent strongly disagreeing, and finally, Tailored security and privacy policy 
with 46 percent disagreement and 29 percent strongly disagreeing. Concern about third 
parties which include those who provide the cloud infrastructure is a concern for government 
because they need to ensure that they are compliant and protect citizen data. 
5.6.2.8 Negotiation with other relationship factors (Security and Privacy) (Spearman 
correlation) 










































There were positive and moderate correlations between the ability to specify requirements for 
security and privacy and effectively collaborate, effectively communicate and perceived a 
positive reputation for security and privacy. Positive but weak correlations were found 
between ability to negotiate and trust, effectively specify requirements and CSP understands 
requirements, no correlation was found between ability to negotiate for security and privacy 
and trust in security and privacy (see Table 5-16). The latter finding shows that while it may 
be assumed that trust in a particular cloud factor may have a positive effect on other 
relationship factors such as the ability to collaborate or communication, in this case this is not 
true for the ability to specify requirements. Having enough information, perceiving a positive 
reputation, the ability to communicate and collaborate are more likely to have an impact on 
the ability to negotiate for security and privacy. Interestingly, the other two aspects of 




5.6.2.9 Negotiation and Performance and Offering 
There was also a high level of agreement with the idea that the government respondents could 
negotiate with their CSP about performance and offering, this was evidenced by 78 percent of 
the respondents agreeing with this idea and 15 percent strongly agreeing, in fact only 1 
percent disagreed (see Figure 5-36).  
Figure 5-35: Negotiation and Performance and Offering 
 
 
5.6.2.10 Negotiation and Sub Cloud Factors of Performance and Offering 
Again, there were mixed results when the respondents were questioned about the sub cloud 
factors of performance and offering. Although the respondents agreed that they could 
negotiate performance and offering generally, there was disagreement of 66 percent with 
Additional specialised staff for government needs (see Figure 5-37). This would suggest that 
government may feel reluctant to adopt the public cloud because they feel they cannot 
negotiate specialised staff within the CSP that can look after government needs. Likewise, 
there was also a high level of disagreement that the government could negotiate for 
government requirements to be met with 64 percent disagreeing and a significant 19 percent 
strongly disagreeing with this idea. There was also a high level of disagreement that the 
government could negotiate a Customisable cloud environment with 64 percent disagreeing 
and 14 percent strongly disagreeing, this is closely related to the idea of a Dynamic / flexible 
SLA whereby government can hope to achieve a tailored and flexible service in order to meet 






















government could negotiate a Dynamic / flexible SLA was high with 53 percent disagreeing 
and 40 percent strongly disagreeing. Therefore, there is a lack of confidence that the 
government can negotiate for these performance and offering sub cloud factors that are of 
particular interest to government considering the public cloud, and therefore, this may be a 
contributing factor for reluctance to adopt the public cloud. 
Where there was a particularly high level of confidence was for Continuous monitoring and 
performance with 88 percent of respondents agreeing that they could negotiate this area. This 
was followed by End of relationship with 79 percent agreeing and 20 percent strongly 
agreeing, Sufficient notice of disruption with 78 percent and 19 percent and Sufficient support 
lifecycle with 69 percent and 13 percent, all for agreement and strong agreement respectively 
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5.6.2.11 Negotiation with other relationship factors (Performance and Offering) 
(Spearman correlation) 






































The overall link between the ability to negotiate for performance and offering and other 
relationship factors was weak at best. Therefore, the perceived ability to negotiate for 
performance and offering has no link to other relationship factors where performance and 
offering is concerned (see Table 5-17).  
5.7 Negotiation (Specify Requirements) Relationship Factor 
Negotiation, specifically the ability to specify requirements, as a relationship factor is 
analysed against the various cloud and sub cloud factors. Specifically, the perceived ability of 
the government to specify requirements for governance, compliance, security and privacy and 
performance and offering is analysed as well as an analysis of how the perceived ability to 
specify requirements is linked to other relationship factors. 
5.7.1 Negotiation (Specify requirements)  
There was a very high level of agreement with the idea that the government respondents 
could specify requirements with their CSP. This was evidenced by 80 percent agreeing and 








Figure 5-37: Negotiation – Specify Requirements 
 
 
5.7.1.1 Negotiation (specify requirements) and Governance 
The respondents agreed with the idea that they could specify requirements with their CSP in 
relation to governance. This was evidenced by the results which show that 89 percent agreed 
with the idea with 11 percent strongly agreeing (see Figure 5-39). 
Figure 5-38: Negotiation (specify requirements) and Governance 
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5.7.1.2 Negotiation and Sub Cloud Factors of Governance 
The results for the sub cloud factors of governance showed that there was a high level of 
disagreement the government respondents could negotiate with the CSP for two of the sub 
cloud factors of governance. There were strong levels of disagreement in particular for 
Knowledge and control over third party issues with 69 percent disagreeing, and Dynamic 
SLA with 64 percent disagreeing (see Figure 5-40). 
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For previous relationship factors, there was often a difference between the level of agreement 
for the cloud factors and the level of agreement for the associated sub cloud factors. Often 
there is more certainty when sub cloud factors are addressed. In the case of negotiation where 
there is confidence to negotiate with the CSP, there is an associated confidence to negotiate 
for most cloud factors with the exception of Knowledge and control over third party issues 
and Dynamic SLA. Again, these are factors that are of particular concern and relevance to 
government, however, they were the only two sub cloud factors, there were sub cloud factors 
that would be of particular concern to government where positive responses were given, they 
included assurance about other tenants and control and knowledge of CSP employees. This 
was the only time that these government particular concerns received positive responses, it is 
important to note that specifying requirements is something that the government have a level 
of control over which could explain their perceived ability to specify for these requirements.   
5.7.1.3 Negotiation (specify requirements) and Compliance 
There was a high level of agreement with the idea that the government respondents could 
negotiate for compliance generally as a cloud factor. In total 71.3 percent of the respondents 
agreed and 25 percent strongly agreed with this idea see Table 5-18. 
 
 
Table 5-18: Negotiation of Compliance  




Strongly Disagree 0 0.0 0.0 0.0 
Disagree 0 0.0 0.0 0.0 
Neutral 3 3.8 3.8 3.8 
Agree 57 71.3 71.3 75.0 
Strongly Agree 20 25.0 25.0 100.0 
Total 80 100.0 100.0   
5.7.1.4 Negotiation (specify requirements) and Sub Cloud Factors of Compliance 
Although the government respondents mostly felt that they disagreed with the idea that they 
could negotiate generally in regard to compliance, they felt that they can negotiate (specify 
requirements) with the CSP for most of the sub cloud factors for compliance. The most 
agreement was found for Data management with 78 percent agree and 21 percent strongly 
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agree, followed by Compliance when migrating at 79 percent and 14 percent, Clarity and 
confidence about jurisdiction at 54 percent and 10 percent and Continuous auditing and 
assessment at 65 percent and 30 percent, all respectively (see Figure 5-41). 
The initial response for compliance as a cloud factor was shown to be different to the 
responses for the sub cloud factors – this is a recurring theme that when asked about sub 
cloud factors in particular, where in this case the initial response was negative, upon 
consideration of the sub cloud factors the responses were more positive. This supports the 
idea of including consideration of sub cloud factors in this study. 
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5.7.1.5 Negotiation (specify requirements) with other relationship factors (Compliance) 
(Spearman correlation) 
Table 5-19: Negotiation with other relationship factors (compliance) (Spearman correlation) 
Relationship 
factors 





































There was a positive and moderate correlation between ability to specify requirements for 
compliance and all other relationship factors except sufficient information about CSP which 
had a weak correlation and general ability to negotiate requirements and CSP understands 
requirements which had no correlation (see Table 5-19). Therefore, there is a link between 
the perceived ability to negotiate and other relationship factors which means that the ability to 
negotiate or otherwise has a significant influence on other relationship factors where 
















5.7.1.6 Negotiation (specify requirements) and Security and Privacy 
There was a high level of agreement with the idea that the government respondents could 
specify requirements for security and privacy with 73.8 percent agreeing and 20 percent 
strongly agreeing with this idea (see Table 5-20). 
Table 5-20: Negotiation and Security and Privacy Q6C 




Strongly Disagree 0 0.0 0.0 0.0 
Disagree 0 0.0 0.0 0.0 
Neutral 5 6.3 6.3 6.3 
Agree 59 73.8 73.8 80.0 
Strongly Agree 16 20.0 20.0 100.0 
Total 80 100.0 100.0   
 
5.7.1.7  Negotiation (specify requirements) and Sub Cloud Factors of Security and 
Privacy 
Respondents gave mixed opinions when questioned about the sub cloud factors of security 
and privacy. There was very strong agreement with the idea that the government could 
specify requirements for General security / privacy provision with 51 percent agreement and 
49 strongly agreeing with this idea, this was followed by Monitoring of policy adherence 
with 61 percent in agreement and 15 percent strongly agreeing, there was also strong 
agreement, 80 percent, that the respondents could specify requirements for Sufficient 
involvement in security (see Figure 5-42). 
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As with the other relationship factors and the associated sub cloud factors there was 
disagreement in the areas that can be considered to be a particular concern to government. 
Security related to third parties received a high level of disagreement at 49 percent disagree 
and 23 percent strongly disagree, the same was true Assurance regarding CSP employees 
with 64 percent disagreeing and a significant 26 percent strongly disagreeing, and finally, 
Tailored security and privacy policy with 28 percent disagreement and 4 percent strongly 
disagreeing. Concern about third parties which include those who provide the cloud 
infrastructure is a concern for government because they need to ensure that they are 
compliant and protect citizen data. 
5.7.1.8 Negotiation (specify requirements) and Performance and Offering 
There was also a high level of agreement with the idea that the government respondents could 
specify requirements for performance and offering, this was evidenced by 60 percent of the 
respondents agreeing with this idea and 40 percent strongly agreeing, see Table 5-21.  
Table 5-21: Negotiation and Performance and Offering Q6D 




Strongly Disagree 0 0.0 0.0 0.0 
Disagree 0 0.0 0.0 0.0 
Neutral 0 0.0 0.0 0.0 
Agree 48 60.0 60.0 60.0 
Strongly Agree 32 40.0 40.0 100.0 
Total 80 100.0 100.0   
5.7.1.9 Negotiation (specify requirements) and Sub Cloud Factors of Performance and 
Offering 
There were also mixed results when the respondents were questioned about the sub cloud 
factors of performance and offering. Although all the respondents agreed that they could 
specify requirements for performance and offering, there was disagreement of 70 percent 
with Additional specialised staff for government needs (see Figure 5-43). This shows that 
government may feel reluctant to adopt the public cloud because they perceive they cannot 
negotiate specialised staff within the CSP that can be responsible government needs. There 
was also disagreement that the government could specify requirements for a Customisable 
cloud environment with 44 percent disagreeing, however, it is important to note that 43 
percent gave a neutral response. The level of disagreement with the idea that the government 
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could specify requirements for a Dynamic / flexible SLA was very high with 95 percent 
disagreeing. Thus, there is a lack of confidence that the government can specify requirements 
for these performance and offering sub cloud factors that are of particular interest and 
importance to government. 
 193 
 





































1% 0% 0% 
19% 



































Strongly Disagree Disagree Neutral Agree Strongly Agree
 194 
 
Where there was a very high level of confidence was for Continuous monitoring and 
performance with 73 percent of respondents agreeing and 20 percent strongly agreeing that 
they could specify requirements for this area. This was followed by End of relationship with 
76 percent agreeing and 23 percent strongly agreeing, Sufficient notice of disruption with 81 
percent disagreeing and 8 percent strongly disagreeing and Sufficient support lifecycle with 
65 percent agreement and 28 percent strong agreement (see Figure 5-43). These are sub cloud 
factors that although would be important to government, they are part of any standard 
contract and this is reflected in the high levels of confidence by the government. 
5.8 Negotiation (Understand Requirements) Relationship Factor 
Part of a successful negotiation is having your requirements understood, in this case 
government requirements understood by the CSP. The negotiation stage is where 
requirements are negotiated and if the government feel that the CSP does not understand their 
requirements then they may feel that they will not achieve what they need from that 
negotiation. The results show that the vast majority of the government respondents, nearly 90 
percent did not feel that the CSP understood their requirements (see Figure 5.44). This result 
was in sharp contrast to the perception of the ability to negotiate generally. Again, as with the 
cloud factors and sub cloud factors, here where a specific aspect of a relationship factor is 
investigated a level of mistrust occurs. Specifically, although there is a high level of trust for 
negotiation generally, for a specific aspect of negotiation then opinions sharply change. 
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5.8.1 Negotiation - understand requirements 
Figure 5-43: Negotiation – understand requirements 
 
Although there was a high level of confidence by the government that they have the ability to 
negotiate their requirements, something that they have more control over, within the same 
negotiation domain they did not feel that the CSP understood their requirements. This was 
evidenced by 56 percent disagreement and 33 percent disagreement with this idea, and only 
11 percent in agreement (see Figure 5.44). 
5.8.2 Negotiation – Understand requirements with Cloud Factors and Sub Cloud 
Factors 
5.8.2.1 CSP Understand Governance Requirements 
Continuing with the government feeling that the CSP does not understand their requirements, 
the same was found to be true for governance requirements where 86 percent disagreed and 























Figure 5-44: Negotiation – understand requirements and governance 
 
5.8.2.2 Negotiation – Understand requirements and Sub Cloud Factors of Governance 
The high level of disagreement that government respondents had about having their 
governance requirements understood was found to be the case for many of the sub cloud 
factors of governance. There were only three sub cloud factors of governance where they felt 
that the CSP did understand their governance requirements and this included governance 
during migration, auditing and measuring of CSP and clarity of roles and responsibilities for 
governance. Therefore, in these areas the government feel that they are understood, however, 
in the other areas of governance they feel they are not. For the latter, these are areas of 
governance that are of particular concern for government. This represents a real concern from 
the government, that they feel that the CSP does not understand most of their governance 
requirements, especially governance requirements related to the employees of the CSP, a 
dynamic SLA with provisions for governance, control and knowledge of third party issues in 
relation to governance and assurance about cloud tenants. This has serious implications for 
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5.8.2.3 Negotiation (CSP understands requirements) with other relationship factors 
(Governance) (Spearman correlation) 














































The government’s perception that the CSP understands the CSP governance requirements 
was moderately and weakly associated with other relationship factors for the same cloud 
factor. It is worth noting that there was a positive strong correlation between CSP 
understands governance requirements and the perception of a strong reputation of the CSP for 
governance (see Table 5-22). This means that because there was a negative perception by the 
government that the CSP understands their governance requirements, there was an associated 
negative perception of reputation in relation to governance. This has implication for the CSP 
that they may have a negative reputation for governance because they do not understand 
governance requirements properly. 
5.8.2.4 Negotiation – Understand Requirements and Compliance 
The perception by the government respondents that the government understood their 
requirements was also found to be negative for the cloud factor of compliance with over half 
of the respondents disagreeing (see Figure 5.47). However, there were a significant number, 
38 percent who responded neutral, this means that there is a significant level of uncertainty 




Figure 5-46: Negotiation – Understands requirements Q8B Compliance 
 
5.8.2.5 Negotiation – Understand requirements and Sub Cloud Factors of Compliance 
The government felt that the CSP did not understand a number of requirements within 
compliance, these included Continuous auditing and assessment, Clarity and confidence 
about jurisdiction and Roles and responsibilities for compliance. However, for the majority 
of sub cloud factors there was very little concern about having requirements understood (see 
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5.8.2.6 Negotiation (CSP understands requirements) with other relationship factors 
(Compliance) (Spearman correlation) 











































There was very little correlation between the government believing that the CSP understands 
their compliance requirements and other relationship factors. Negative correlations were 
found between CSP understand requirements and effectively specify requirements and 
effectively communicate (see Table 5-23). This means that because the government did not 
feel that the CSP did understand their compliance requirements, there was an associated 
positive perception that the government could specify compliance requirements and 
effectively communicate for compliance requirements. 
5.8.2.7 Negotiation – Understand Requirements and Security and Privacy 
The majority of the respondents, 73 percent agreed and 6 percent strongly agreed with the 
idea that the CSP understood their security and privacy requirements. Only 5 percent were in 




Figure 5-48: Negotiation understand requirements Q8C Security and Privacy 
 
5.8.2.8 Negotiation – Understand requirements and Sub Cloud Factors of Security and 
Privacy 
 
As for the sub cloud factors of security and privacy there was disagreement with the idea that 
the CSP understood requirements for sub cloud factors that are a particular concern for 
government. Specifically, these included Security related to third parties, Tailored security 
and privacy policy and Assurance regarding CSP employees.  All of these sub cloud factors 
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5.8.2.9 Negotiation (CSP understands requirements) with other relationship factors 
(Security and Privacy) (Spearman correlation) 














































Between the relationship factor of CSP understands security and privacy requirements and 
other relationship factors, there were only two correlations that were moderate, these were 
effectively specify requirements and effectively collaborate (see Table 5-24). Therefore, there 
was a link between the perceived ability to specify security and privacy requirements and the 
perception that the CSP understands security and privacy requirements. Because there was a 
high level of agreement by the government with the idea that the CSP understood their 
security and privacy requirements, there was an associated positive perception that the 





5.8.2.10 Negotiation – Understanding requirements and Performance and Offering 
Figure 5-50: Negotiation Q8D Performance and Offering 
 
In contrast to security and privacy, where the government were asked about if the CSP 
understood their performance and offering requirements, they disagreed evidenced by 79 
percent disagreement. A significant 18 percent were in agreement (see figure 5-51). 
5.8.2.11 Negotiation - Understand requirements and Sub Cloud Factors of Performance 
and Offering 
For the sub cloud factors of performance and offering, there was disagreement with the idea 
that the CSP understand government performance and offering requirements for those that are 
a particular concern or relevance to government as suggested by the literature. These sub 
cloud factors include Customisable cloud environment, Dynamic SLA, Meet government 
specific requirements and Additional specialized staff for government needs. Until now this 
has been a recurring theme where there is a high level of skepticism for these types of sub 
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5.8.2.12 Negotiation (CSP understands requirements) with other relationship factors 
(Performance and Offering) (Spearman correlation) 
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There were no significant correlations between the relationship factor of CSP understands 
performance and offering requirements and other relationship factors, with the exception of 
risk with a moderation correlation (see Table 5.25). Therefore, the perception by the 
government that the CSP understands their performance and offering requirements is not 








5.9 Reputation – Relationship Factor 
5.9.1 Reputation – general agreement 
Most of the respondents, 60 percent, agreed with the idea that they perceived a positive 
reputation of their CSP, however, a significant number of the respondents, 33 percent, 
disagreed with this idea (see Figure 5-53). 
Figure 5-52: Reputation General 
 
Despite the fact that there was generally a level of agreement with the idea that the 
government agree that they perceive a positive reputation, there was a high level of 
disagreement with the idea that the government have sufficient information about the CSP. 
This was evidenced by the fact that 61 percent disagreed and 14 percent strongly disagreed 
with this idea, however, a significant 19 percent were in agreement (see Figure 5.54). 
Therefore, this means that having sufficient information is not linked to the perception of a 























Figure 5-53: Reputation – Sufficient Information 
 
5.9.2 Reputation with Cloud Factors and Sub Cloud Factors 
Reputation was analysed against the cloud factors and sub cloud factors in order to determine 
how the government felt about the reputation, as a relationship factor, of the CSP in relation 
to the cloud. 
5.9.2.1 Governance 
Where the government respondents were asked about whether they perceived a positive 
reputation for governance the vast majority, 80 percent, disagreed (see Figure 5-55).  
 











































5.9.2.2 Reputation and Sub Cloud Factors of Governance 
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The high level of disagreement with the idea that a positive reputation is perceived in relation 
to governance was further confirmed by the fact that the respondents disagreed they 
perceived a positive reputation for most of the sub cloud factors of governance. Specifically, 
there was a high level of disagreement with Knowledge and control over third party issues at 
90 percent, Assurance about other cloud tenants at 64 percent disagreement, Dynamic SLA at 
60 percent disagreeing and 38 percent strongly disagreeing and Control and knowledge of 
CSP employees 49 percent disagreeing and 30 percent strongly disagreeing (see Figure 5-56). 
There were only two sub cloud factors where the respondents agreed with the idea that they 
perceived a positive reputation, these were Governance during migration with 85 percent 
agreeing and Auditing and measuring of CSP with 41 percent agreeing, however, for this sub 
cloud factor there were more respondents at 44 percent that gave neutral as their answer (see 
Figure 5-56).   
5.9.2.3 Reputation and Compliance 
 
Figure 5-56: You Perceive a Positive Reputation in Relation to Compliance 
 
 
The respondents clearly did not perceive a positive reputation in relation to compliance where 

























5.9.2.4 Reputation and Sub Cloud Factors of Compliance 
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When the respondents were questioned about the sub cloud factors of compliance, the results 
confirmed the idea that the respondents did not agree that they perceived a positive reputation 
in this area. Particularly, there was a high level of disagreement for Data management at 75 
percent and Clarity and confidence about jurisdiction at 74 percent and Roles and 
responsibilities for compliance 63 percent disagreement and 19 percent strongly disagreeing. 
There was a high level of disagreement for CSP ability to be compliant at 83 percent overall. 
The only sub cloud factor for compliance where a positive reputation was perceived was for 
Compliance when migrating with 73 percent agreeing (see Figure 5-58). 
5.9.2.5 Reputation and Security and Privacy 
In the above it was shown that the respondents perceived a poor reputation for compliance, 
however, where the respondents were questioned about security and privacy there was a high 
level of agreement that they perceived a positive reputation, this was evidenced by the fact 
that 83 percent agreed and 13 percent strongly agreed with this idea with none of the 
respondents disagreeing. Therefore, the government respondents do not see a problem with 
security and privacy generally because they perceive a positive reputation (see Figure 5-59).  
 
























5.9.2.6 Reputation and Sub Cloud Factors of Security and Privacy 
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Where the respondents were asked about the perceived reputation for the sub cloud factors of 
security and privacy then the high level of a positive reputation is not seen for most of the sub 
cloud factors. There was a particular high level of disagreement with the idea of a positive 
reputation for Assurance regarding CSP employees where 64 percent disagreed and 36 
percent strongly disagreed, there was also a high level of disagreement for Tailored security 
and privacy policy at 84 percent and Clarity of roles and responsibilities with 74 percent 
disagreement (see Figure 5-60). 
There were only two sub cloud factors for security and privacy where a positive reputation 
was perceived and they were Monitoring of policy adherence with 83 percent agreement and 
General security / privacy with 69 percent agreeing and 23 percent strongly agreeing (see 
Figure 5-60). In reference to latter sub cloud factor it is a factor that is closely related to 
security and privacy as a cloud factor and for both there was a positive reputation. It is clear 
from these results that although there may be a positive reputation for security and privacy, 
where respondents are asked about the particular aspects of security and privacy then they 
start to say that they do not perceive positive reputations. 
5.9.2.7 Reputation and Performance and Offering 
There was also a very high perception of a positive reputation for performance with 73 
percent agreeing and 24 percent strongly agreeing and only 4 percent disagreeing (see Figure 
5-61).  
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5.9.2.8 Reputation and Sub Cloud Factors of Performance and Offering 
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There was also a positive perception of reputation for most of the sub cloud factors of 
performance and offering. Where there was a level of disagreement with this idea was again 
in relation to those sub cloud factors of performance and offering that are of particular 
concern or relevance to government. Specifically, these included Dynamic / flexible SLA with 
49 percent disagreeing and an even greater 51 percent for strongly disagreeing. This was 
followed by Customisable cloud environment with 85 percent in disagreement and Meet 
government specific requirements with 68 disagreeing and Additional specialised staff for 
government needs with 66 percent disagreeing and 34 percent strongly disagreeing (see 
Figure 5-62).    
5.10 Conclusion 
The findings showed that there was trust generally in the CSP but where respondents were 
asked about trust for specific cloud issues sometimes there was a negative response. This was 
found to be the case for governance and compliance. However, for security and privacy and 
performance and offering there was a positive perception of trust. Moreover, where the sub 
cloud factors for all cloud factors were considered, there was also a wide variation in trust, 
where there was strong trust for some sub cloud factors and a significant lack of trust for 
others, and rarely were there mixed opinions for sub cloud factors. The variation in these 
perceptions of trust coincides with sub cloud factors that are either a specific concern or 
relevance for government or sub cloud factors that are standard in SLAs where there is much 
less concern. For example, there was a low perception of trust for other cloud tenants, third 
parties, CSP employees and a dynamic SLA, all of which are especially important for 
government in the cloud, but for general areas such as governance during migration there was 
a high perception of trust. This pattern was found to be true for most of the sub cloud factors 
of governance, compliance, security and privacy and performance and offering where a high 
level of certainty was shown. 
These ideas were also found to be true for all of the relationship factors, where there was 
more negativity in those cloud areas that are especially important for government. This shows 
that there is certainty in the opinions of the respondents because of the variation in responses.    
In reference to analysis between relationship factors for each of the cloud factors, generally 
there was little correlation. Where correlations were revealed, these are relevant to the study 
because they offer a better understanding the relationship. For example, a correlation between 
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trust in governance and an ability to negotiate for governance contributes to 
recommendations for the CSP because it informs them that in order to, for example, improve 
negotiation there needs to be a certain level of trust. These correlations between the various 
relationship factors considered against the cloud factors offered a deep insight into the 
relationship and how relationship factors affect each other in consideration of the different 
cloud factors. 
Despite there being mostly weak and moderate correlations, the results did reveal some 
strong correlations that can inform the CSP about the changes they can make. For example, a 
strong correlation between trust in compliance and the ability to effectively collaborate for 
compliance would inform the CSP that they could improve collaboration to increase trust in 
the public cloud, or vice versa.    
Overall, these findings give a detailed picture of the relationship issues and associated cloud 
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The results of the interview are presented in this chapter. The first section deals with an 
overview about how the participants to the interview feel about the relationship factors, 
namely; trust, risk, negotiation, collaboration and reputation and the cloud factors, namely; 
governance, compliance, security and privacy and performance and offering.  
The second section offers a more in-depth insight into the relationship reasons and associated 
cloud factors towards understand why the Saudi government is reluctant to place sensitive 
data and critical systems in the public cloud. 
Table 6-1: Participant Information 
Participant Organisation Position Ministry Participant 
code 























Participant 4 Saudi Customs IT specialist Ministry of 
Finance 
P4CUST 
Participant 5 Saudi Customs IT specialist Ministry of 
Finance 
P5CUST 
Participant 6 Saudi Customs IT specialist Ministry of 
Finance 
P6CUST 





Participant 8 Immigration IT specialist Ministry of 
Interior 
P8IMM 
Participant 9 Immigration IT specialist Ministry of 
Interior 
P9IMM 














Participant 12 Ministry of 
Finance 




The Ministry of Finance Saudi Arabia, Saudi Customs which is under the Ministry of 
Finance, the Saudi Immigration Department and the National Information Centre, both under 
the Ministry of Interior are the organisations that the respondents were sampled from. 
6.2 Current Situation 
There was indication from some of the participants that they were at the consideration stage 
of the cloud which included testing, however, they had not started using the cloud for 
government purposes.  
One of the participants said the following: 
We have had testing with some cloud providers (P7IMM) 
The idea that there is not a direct working relationship and that they are still at the 
consideration for the public cloud is found in the following statement in response to a 
question about the relationship with the service provider: 
In this term there are no direct relation, the only relationship channels is during the 
workshop and seminar (P4CUST) 
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However, the National Information Centre, which overall is responsible for government IT 
and IS policy in the country, had more to say about the current relation with CSPs. One of the 
respondents said the following: 
 
We understand the importance of the public cloud and it is something that is part of 
our cloud strategy. Until now we have worked with CSPs in this area and have tested 
the public cloud (P3NIC) 
The researcher probed further and asked if that was with sensitive data, the respondent said 
the following: 
 
No, we do not test with sensitive data (P3NIC)   
6.3 Concerns about security and privacy 
Concern about security and privacy was a recurring theme throughout the interviews from all 
of the participants. When one of the participants was asked about the concerns that they have 
about the public cloud, they said the following: 
Confidentiality and security of government data. The cloud in this area is still not 
mature enough (P7IMM) 
There was a significant amount of mention that because it was the government data there was 
concern that there would be a breach of privacy in terms of protection of the data rights of the 
citizens, this is clearly expressed in the following statement: 
Since this is a Government Organization so, there is no guarantee it would not violate 
those rights Protection of data rights (P4CUST) 
One of the fears is that the cloud services in Saudi Arabia are in the hands of the largest local 
telecommunications company which is often a target for hackers. This concern is not 
associated with any relationship factors and is simply a perception of a security threat in the 
cloud. The following statement illustrates this idea: 
and if you mean security trust I can said we have some fears since currently who is 
leading the cloud service on this country is the biggest telecommunication companies 
which are they been target and frequently attacked from the hackers (P7IMM) 
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In the statement in the above the respondent says that although there is trust in security, there 
are concerns about the local CSP who are telecommunication companies that are frequently 
attacked by hackers. 
The perception of risk was also associated not only with external threat to security but also 
internal threats of the CSP themselves, in response to the question about whether the 
participant perceived any risks in relation to their CSP, they said the following: 
Yes, because of lack of the right resources (P7IMM) 
Within the social context of the cloud service relationship there are many different actors 
which include the cloud service provider (CSP), the cloud provider (CP), other users and 
certification bodies. Not only did the participants see the threat to security coming from 
external threats in the form of attacks, or from a weakness of the CSPs themselves, but they 
also perceived a security threat from other users of the cloud and even cited the issues of 
multi-tenancy: 
Shared infrastructure (i.e. Multi-Tenancy) raises a huge security concerns (P8IMM) 
A perception of risk has been acknowledged in relation to the sensitive data of government 
and given as a reason for not currently adopting the cloud. In response to the question about 
whether there are plans to adopt the public cloud one of the participants said the following: 
There is a plan but because the data is very sensitive, this plan is postpone (P4CUST) 
In fact, there was acknowledgement that the public cloud is not suitable for sensitive data, 
one of the participants said the following: 
Currently we have private cloud for sensitive data, and uses public cloud for non-
sensitive transactions (P4CUST) 
Evidence of a perception of risk is also found in the fact that there has been a reluctance to 
completely adopt the public cloud; one of the participants said the following when asked if 
they perceived any risks with their service provider: 





There were mixed views about the issue of trusting the CSP. One of the themes that emerged 
from the interviews was that many of the participants expressed ideas that were related to 
what they felt were the qualities of trust. 
One of the participants included both morality and professional conduct as attributes of trust, 
they said the following statement: 
am not sure, but this is depend and demonstrate a commitment to a moral standard of 
professional behavior, which they uphold at all times (P4CUST) 
In the statement in the above where the respondent was asked about trust they were not sure, 
but they did say that trust would depend on whether or there was moral and professional 
conduct on behave of the CSP. 
The qualities of trust were also expressed as an idea about reciprocation, one of the 
participants said the following: 
We can trust the cloud provider, we give them our data and trust them but they have 
to return the trust because it works both ways (P8IMM)  
The idea of trust was also associated with the idea of careful selection. Where there is control 
over the decision-making process and where a user has more information about the CSP, 
there will be less uncertainty and therefore, more trust. This idea is clearly emphasised in the 
following statement: 
We do trust our suppliers, and carefully select our public cloud provider (P8IMM) 
There were some generally positive responses about trust, the following responses indicate 
that generally there is trust, however, there is some indication of caution where specific issues 
are concerned. One of the respondents said the following; 
Yes, I trust the service provider I don’t have any problems as long as they know how 
important security is for us, then I don’t have any issues (P3NIC) 
Another respondent also expressed general trust, but in consideration of more specific issues: 
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Yes, I do we have had a relationship for a while now so we know them very well so 
that is why I trust them. However, I do worry sometimes about complying with the 
law, sometimes I worry that I can trust them about this (P2NIC) 
Overall, although there was trust it often came with conditions, or there was more certainty 
about trust where specific issues were concerned. In the statement above there was specific 
concern about trusting the CSP complying with the law. 
6.5 Negotiation 
There was the idea that negotiation with the service provider would be difficult because it is 
about a government and highly sensitive data and that negotiation about the cloud could 
breach national security, the following statements clearly highlight this issue: 
Currently I do not think so because still we have sensitive data due to National 
Security, which should be maintain and protected (P4CUST) 
And 
We can negotiate effectively but only if they understand that we have some very 
special requirements to protect our data, especially about the citizen (P9IMM) 
More generally, negative sentiments were expressed about negation with the CSP, where one 
participant said in response to whether or not they could negotiate with their CSP: 
Unfortunately, no. I don’t feel that they are easy to negotiate with (P8IMM) 
Another respondent said something similar but also mentioned the idea of a standardised  
where they mentioned the idea of a fixed service offered by CSPs: 
I don’t think that we really have the opportunity to negotiate with the CSP because 
they offer a fixed service (P10MOF) 
In relation to negotiation and government requirements, one of the participants said the 
following: 
I think they will be difficult to negotiate because they do not understand what we need 




In the statement above the respondent was saying that the government feel that they find it 
difficult to negotiate because the CSP do not have experience of government, and only have 
experience with private companies. 
However, not all of the responses were negative in this regard: 
I think we have a positive relationship with the provider and we have negotiated 
before for security provision, as long as they understand us I think we can negotiate 
all of our cloud needs (P6CUST) 
Overall, where there were negative ideas about the ability to negotiate is was often related to 
the concern that the CSP will not understand government needs, especially those related to 
security and privacy of government data.   
6.6 Collaboration 
One of the key features of the cloud is that it is not simply a product that an organisation buys 
but rather is an ongoing service with an ongoing relationship that requires collaboration in 
order to be effective. There was some negative opinion about collaboration from the 
respondents. One of the respondents indicated that they only receive the service without any 
collaboration: 
There is no cooperation. Just to get service (P10MOF) 
Another respondent indicated that the channels for collaboration were not properly 
established: 
We could collaborate, I don’t have any problem with that, but the problem is it is not 
clear who we should be working with, we should know who we can speak to in the 
cloud provider (P2NIC) 
There were indications that generally there was a perception that government could 
effectively collaborate with the CSP, this was evident in the following statements: 
In our department we have worked with more than one cloud provider, and generally 
we can collaborate effectively I don’t see any problems (P6CUST) 
One of the respondents highlighted the importance of effective collaboration: 
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Yes we have to collaborate with the provider and keep a continuous relationship with 
them (P5CUST) 
The researcher then probed further into this idea and asked why it was important to 
collaborate, the participant responded the following: 
They have to understand our needs and we have to make sure that they do what we 
want because they don’t fully understand our needs as a government department 
(P12MOF) 
The idea of specific needs of government was a recurring idea where respondents were 
questioned about collaboration. One of the respondents felt that collaboration with the CSP 
was important because of security and privacy reasons: 
We keep a lot of sensitive data especially about the citizen and the service provider 
needs to work closely with us to make sure that the data is protected (P1NIC) 
Another respondent echoed a similar idea: 
Yes we need to know how they will manage our data because we are responsible for 
that data (P7IMM) 
Here it can be seen that there was a need to collaborate with the service provider in order to 
protect citizen data and to make sure that it is managed properly. Overall, although there is 
generally a positive attitude towards collaborating with the CSP, the only real concerns in this 
area were related to the protection of sensitive data. 
This emerging idea that there was a link between collaboration and concern of the data was 
further supported by two respondents that acknowledged the idea that in order to achieve 
governance over data collaboration is required, however, it is not always the case that 
collaboration is effective and leads to the required level of governance: 
We need to be able to know where our data is all of the time and we should be able to 
manage the data anytime we want, so yes we need to collaborate with the service 
provide and have a positive relationship with them, but I don’t think we can 
collaborate to achieve this that we can manage and control our own data (P1NIC) 
In the statement above there is acknowledgement that there is a need to collaborate with the 
CSP, however, there is doubt that management and control of data can be collaborated for. 
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Similarly, another respondent said the following: 
A good collaboration with the provider is very important because we need to work 
with the provider so we have a level of oversight over the data that we put in the 
public cloud but even if we have a good relationship with them we can never really 
control our data, you have to accept that you will lose some control when you use the 
public cloud (P3NIC)  
Being kept informed by the service provider was an area that was questioned and it was 
closely associated with collaboration by the researcher. As part of the collaboration it is 
important that the CSP keeps the customer informed about the status of their data. In response 
to the question about whether or not participants felt they were informed the following 
response was received: 
It would be a very strict requirement that we are kept informed about our data, as you 
know we are not comfortable with our data being held outside of the country so you 
can understand why we need to know where the data is (P1NIC) 
6.7 Emerged Themes 
In addition to the ideas that were revealed about the considered relationship factors of this 
study, there were a number of different themes that emerged from the analysis of the 
interview data. These themes give further insight into the opinions about the public cloud and 
possible reasons for lack of adoption.  
6.7.1 Lack of understanding of the public cloud 
Some of the participants gave responses that showed that they did not fully understand the 
concept of the public cloud. In response to the question about whether they currently have 
plans to adopt the public cloud one of them said the following: 
Depends where is data hosting, for government they prefer to host their data in any 
government premises for commercial they prefer to host data inside country 
(P11MOF)  
From the statement above it is clear that government prefer to host their data in their own 




Further evidence that there was a misunderstanding about the nature of the public cloud was 
expressed in the following statement: 
but we can benefit from the benefits that the public cloud gives and implement the 
models of the public cloud at the centre, for example like Amazon is providing the 
service of the cloud and also other companies. Maybe we can build our own model of 
public cloud that we host at the centre and provide it to parts of interior ministry and 
the government can take benefits from it (P2NIC) 
In the statement above the participant says that the public cloud or the public cloud model can 
be adopted by the government organisation, that this government organisation can build their 
own cloud based on ideas from, for example, the Amazon public cloud, and be hosted at the 
NIC for other parts of the Ministry for Interior to use, however, by definition this is not a 
public cloud it is a private cloud. Therefore, there is a clear lack of understanding of the 
nature of the public cloud in this case. 
Further misunderstanding not only of the nature of the public cloud but also its benefits are 
expressed in a further statement by the same respondent. When asked if he means to take 
control of the public cloud under the administration of his organisation, he responded with 
the following: 
Yes yes! And we provide the same benefits and features that you can benefit from 
public cloud but under our control I expect the information centre and the Kingdom 
here the size is big and the budget does allow us to build the business that is available 
abroad and keep the secrets of the data that is here (P2NIC) 
In the statement above there is a claim by the respondent that they can provide the same 
benefits of the public cloud, that the country is large and they have the budget to build a 
public cloud that is like that of foreign companies, but keep the data within the country. 
There appears to be a contradiction in the understanding of the benefits of the public cloud, as 
stated in the literature the main benefit of the public cloud is that it takes advantage of scale 
and is offered at a very low cost in comparison to a private cloud, moreover, it takes away the 
burden and cost of establishing a cloud and is a readymade product.   
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6.7.2 Public Cloud Not Suitable for Saudi Government Use 
One of the main ideas that arose from the interviews was the fact that a number of 
participants felt that the public cloud, as a cloud solution, was not suitable for the purposes of 
government. One of the participants who held the highest position for distributed systems in 
the National Information Centre which is the organisation responsible for government data 
especially that of a highly sensitive nature said the following about the public cloud: 
we don’t have any plans and this subject is not even discussed because we have 
concerns about the use of the public cloud for government in general and especially 
in the interior (P1NIC)  
The reference in the above to the ‘interior’ refers to the Ministry of the Interior which is 
responsible for a large amount of very sensitive data.  
The same respondent was asked if these concerns could be alleviated by the presence of 
specialised employees in the cloud and he said the following: 
this will ease the concern but still there will be shared resources in the cloud what we 
know is public cloud cannot provide full isolated segment or infrastructure especial 
for you, it will be shared resource and this the idea of the cloud in general so if there 
is resources it will ease the concern but still there will be concern because at the end 
of the day is public cloud so there are a lot of obstacles related to the security 
(P1NIC) 
The statement above there was concern that although having the presence of government 
employees in the cloud, there will still not be a fully isolated part of the cloud offered to 
government.  
There was an amount of emphasis on the sensitivity of the data and that it should not leave 
the country for any reason, there was a certain element of expression that the data was not 
only sensitive in terms of being citizen data and there was a need to protect the privacy rights 
of citizens, but also that data of a national nature was very sensitive and its protection was 
necessary for the security of the country. In this case, the data should not go outside of the 




No. Sensitive data will not go out of the country or out of special data centre at all 
(P2NIC) 
The information that this respondent was referring to was the data that was kept by the 
National Information Centre as this data. The idea that this data is highly sensitive and should 
not go out of the country is also expressed by another official at the NIC who said the 
following in response to a question about plans to use the public cloud for sensitive data: 
I expect and according to my expectation and my experience at the centre the nature 
of the business at the centre doesn’t allow data to go out of the centre because of the 
importance of the data and because of the sensitive of the information that we keep 
(P3NIC) 
The idea of sensitive data not being able to be moved outside of the country was often 
expressed by the participants: 
The public cloud like I said to you depending on the nature of the business there is 
secret data and sensitive data which are very difficult to get out of the country and I 
don’t expect any country will allow it to get out of the country (P3NIC) 
Some of the respondents said that if the security and privacy concerns were resolved then 
there would be consideration of the public cloud. 
 Another idea that arose in relation to trust was the fact that a number of the participants felt 
that the CSP would not understand the needs of the government departments. 
Cloud providers are private organisations and most of their customers are also 
private organisations so how can we expect them to understand our needs as a 
government? (P2NIC)  
The national information centre is responsible for policy about distributed systems which 
includes the cloud, and it was respondents from this organisation that were very concerned 
about the issue of the location of data.  
6.7.3 Lack of Knowledge of Cloud Service Provider (CSP) 
Not knowing who the CSP is or not having much knowledge or awareness of the CSP was a 
common theme in the interviews. One of the respondents was further questioned about the 
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reasons that they did not intend to adopt the public cloud for government use and in addition 
to the security concerns, one of the participants said the following: 
data and services that are sensitive are locked at the public cloud and are operated by 
a company that we don’t know or don’t trust. Is it possible they provide enough 
protection or do they abuse the data which will affect the security side.  (P5CUST)       
In the statement above the respondent is saying that the company that operates the cloud is an 
unknown entity which cannot be trusted, and either they could provide the protection that is 
required or they could abuse the data.  
There was an indication that there was a high level of uncertainty about the cloud provider. In 
response to the question of whether participants perceived a positive reputation of their CSP 
there was the idea of not having enough information about their CSP: 
I’m not sure about their reputation because I do not know enough about them, I would 
need more experience (P10MOF) 
Another respondent said the following: 
I know who the company are and they do have a good reputation, but I’m not sure 
about their reputation for the cloud (P12MOF)   
This problem was also linked to a lack of dealing with the CSP. It is important to remember 
that although the organisations that are involved in this study did have a relationship with a 
CSP, it was either for the public cloud on a limited basis (i.e. non-sensitive data) or there was 
only consideration of the public cloud. Therefore, there was a limitation in terms of the extent 
and experience that they had with their CSP in relation to use of the public cloud. 
Moreover, there was evidence that government officials who are responsible for decision 
made about the cloud had little dealing with international public cloud providers from around 
the world: 
and if you mean security trust I can said we have some fears since currently who is 
leading the cloud service on this country is the biggest telecommunication companies 
which are they been target and frequently attacked from the hackers (P7IMM) 
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From the statement in the above, it is important to note that the perception is that the public 
cloud in Saudi Arabia is provided by the largest local telecommunications providers, which 
are often targeted by hackers. 
Another participant also indicated to the idea that there may be little or no dealing with 
international providers: 
Depends where is data hosting, for government they prefer to host their data in any 
government premises for commercial (organisations) they prefer to host data inside 
country (P11MOF) 
In the statement above, where the government does use a commercial CSP it is not from 
outside the country because the government prefers to have data hosted inside the country. 
This idea agrees with the previous statement where there is an indication that the local 
telecommunications company is the provider of public cloud services in Saudi Arabia. More 
support for this idea that local companies would be preferable due to security and privacy 
concerns for sensitive data is found in the following statement; 
of course the public cloud that comes with Window HP and Microsoft we don’t have 
any plans and this subject is not even discussed because we have concerns about the 
use of the public cloud for government in general and especially in the interior 
(P1NIC). 
In reference to reputation, there was the idea that the participants depended on the 
experiences of other government departments in Saudi Arabia as well as the private sector. 
The cloud provider that we use has been used by many different organisations in the 
government sector and we did not hear any issues about security (P2NIC) 
A number of the participants expressed the idea that they were not completely familiar with 
their CSP which increased the feeling of mistrust. Not knowing the CSP is a problem that has 
been highlighted in the literature (Huntgeburth, 2015) and a number of the participants 
expressed this idea of unfamiliarity. In response to the question about whether the participant 
trusted their CSP, one said the following: 
It is difficult for me to say if I really trust the provider because I do not know them 
very well, and we are not considering the public cloud in the near future so we do not 
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have much information about the provide and how they offer a public cloud service 
(P12MOF) 
In reference to the different cloud concerns there was a high level of uncertainty among the 
participants. Uncertainty was found to be associated with different cloud factor which 
included security and compliance. Moreover, this uncertainty is often expressed as part of the 
relationship. 
Im not sure about the provider and how they will offer us the security that we need, I 
don’t feel that they understand how important security is for our ministry (P11MOF) 
6.7.4  Dependency on Service Level Agreements 
An idea that came up in the interviews was that there was a level of dependency on the SLA 
as a means to ensure that the CSP will do as they are expected to do. This idea was in 
response to the question that asked if participants trusted their CSP (question 4). An 
illustration of this idea was provided by the following respondent: 
It is important to trust a CSP, we trust ours but they are local, however, I think that 
there should be assurances in the relationship and we can get that from the contract 
agreement that we have with them (P11MOF)  
Moreover, one of the participants said that the SLA gave them a certain level of control in the 
relationship: 
When you use the cloud you do not know where your data is and you do not know how 
it is managed which I think is big trust problem. The only way we can get any control 
about our data is with the service contract that we have with the provider (P2NIC)  
In response to the question about whether participants felt that they could effectively 
negotiate with their CSP, there was an overall feeling that they felt that they could but this 
was in reference to negotiation of the SLA, one of the participants said the following: 
Yes I can negotiate effectively with the cloud provider and it is not a problem for us to 
negotiate the agreement that we have between us (P5CUST) 
Overall, there was a certain level of confidence in the CSP found in the agreement between 
them and government. Dependency on the agreement between the government and the CSP 
was also found in a statement about the perception of risk: 
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The relationship is governed by the agreement that there is between us and them, 
where I feel that there is a risk is where they do not follow that agreement (P3NIC) 
6.8  Summary 
The interviews revealed that the main area of concern was security and privacy and 
compliance with the law about the storage of sensitive data. 
In reference to the relationship there were mixed perceptions about trust. As for negotiation, 
there were generally negative opinions about being able to negotiate with the CSP and the 
reason given for this was that government were concerned about the CSP understanding and 
servicing their requirements. The story was more positive for collaboration; however, it was 
often conditional on the CSP understanding government needs. Therefore, the concern about 
having needs understood is clearly evident.  
The concern about government specific needs was reflected in other emerged themes in the 
interviews. Specifically, these concerns were reflected in the idea that government felt that 
the cloud was not suitable for government use and lack of knowledge about the CSP. These 
ideas reflect a sense of knowledge and certainty that the government have about the issue of 
using the public cloud, however, there was also some evidence that there was a lack of 
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This study was based on the premise that in the investigation about trustworthiness in the 
cloud, studies were either focused on the cloud factors that affect trust such as security and 
privacy, compliance or governance (Aziz et al., 2013, Zwattendorfer et al., 2013, Haag et al.,  
2014, Nycz and Polkowski, 2015, Spiga et al., 2014, Hana, 2013), or they are focused on the 
relationship factors between the government and the CSP, for example trust and perception of 
risk (Huntgeburth, 2015, Ahmed and Hossain, 2014, Huang and Nicol, 2013, Burda and 
Teutberg, 2014, Ryan and Falvey, 2012, Ahmed and Hossain, 2014, Bochicchio et al., 2011, 
Baset, 2012, Zheng et al., 2014, Alruwaili and Gulliver, 2014). These studies in isolation do 
serve to offer, to a certain extent, an understanding of why government may be reluctant to 
use the public cloud. This study was based on the premise that both cloud and relationship 
factors are better considered together in order to understand government reluctance to adopt 
the public cloud. Therefore, the study offered a greater insight into the relationship and the 
cloud factors as concerns in that relationship. This is based on the idea that considering 
factors in isolation is weak and does not consider the full picture. 
This idea leads to a concept on which the research design of the study was based. The 
research design and the methodology that was developed was simple; cloud factors as critical 
success factors combined with relationship factors as critical success factors applied in the 
research design to reveal reasons why government are reluctant to adopt the public cloud.  
There is a symbiotic relationship between cloud factors and relationship factors, for example 
security as a cloud factor direct affects risk perception as a relationship factor, or relationship 
factors such as trust directly affects concerns about cloud factors such as compliance. 
This consideration offered a more comprehensive view of the relationship where the interplay 
between cloud factors and relationship factors is better understood and shows that 
consideration of one type of factor in isolation would not serve to better understand the 
situation where a government is considering the public cloud. Moreover, this more detailed 
consideration of relationship and cloud factors has been justified by limitations in the 
literature. For example, Fan et al. (2014) do consider the cloud factors that are relevant to 
trust, and a number of these cloud factors are addressed, however, only trust is considered as 
if it is the only relationship factor that is relevant to cloud concerns.  
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It was one of the intentions of the study to help stakeholders in the government-CSP 
relationship, especially the CSP, to alleviate and overcome concerns through a more detailed 
and in-depth understanding of those concerns. With this in mind, the study considered not 
only the general cloud factors such as governance or security and privacy, but the specific 
areas, as potential areas of concern, within each cloud factor, considered as sub cloud factors.  
Compliance and governance were areas that were shown to be of a particular concern for 
government because they have to adhere to their own, and international, laws and regulations 
regarding the management of citizen and government data (Hana, 2013, Diez and Silva, 
2013, Hon et al., 2012). This would explain the high level of mistrust by government in these 
areas. Security and privacy and performance and offering are general requirements for all 
users of the public cloud and the literature has shown them to be especially a concern for 
government in relation to citizen data, however, this study has shown that there is a very high 
level of trust generally in these areas which is in stark contrast to the literature. 
In reference to part of the first aim of the study, which states to reveal relationship factors 
within the government - CSP relationship that may have an impact on the government’s 
intention to adopt the public cloud, the relationship values were tested alone and most did not 
offer an explanation for the reluctance of the Saudi government to adopt the public cloud. 
The government mostly trust their CSP and felt they could negotiate and collaborate with 
their CSP. However, the government did feel that they perceived a general risk with their 
CSP and they also perceived a negative reputation. The positive result for trust generally and 
negative result for reputation generally is further supported by the finding that trust was 
generally not linked to reputation. 
7.2 Cloud and sub cloud factors and relationship factors 
Where the relationship factors, which include trust, risk, negotiation, collaboration and 
reputation are considered against the various cloud and sub cloud factors, the results are 
varied for some relationship factors there were negative responses in relation to cloud and sub 
cloud factors, for example, there was trust in the CSP regarding performance and offering and 
a lack of trust regarding governance. However, it was not always the case that a lack of trust 
resulted in a lack of trust in the sub cloud factors. Here there is a discussion about the 
connection between relationship and cloud and sub cloud factors.  
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All of the relationship factors were analysed against each sub cloud factor of each cloud 
factor. The reason this analysis was carried out was to answer the second research question 
which was ‘Are there certain cloud related factors that are affected by relationship factors that 
affect government confidence in the public cloud?’.  
To provide an example of what the analysis was aiming to achieve, where negotiation was 
considered it was tested against a cloud factor such as security to determine if the government 
felt if they could negotiate for security and privacy. Furthermore, negotiation is then analysed 
against the sub cloud factors of security and privacy, for example, Assurance regarding CSP 
employees. Therefore, the results of this analysis will show which areas of the cloud are 
affected by relationship factors, for example, government may be reluctant to adopt the 
public cloud because they feel they cannot negotiate for assurance about the CSP employees 
in relation to security and privacy. 
One of the main ideas that arose from the results was that there was a very significant 
difference in the results for the cloud factor and the results for the associated sub cloud 
factors, this was the case for most of the relationship factors and cloud factors. Responses to 
the cloud factors for most of the relationship factors were strong one way or the other, the 
respondents were sure how they felt about the link between the relationship factor and cloud 
factor. Where the respondents where then asked about the sub cloud factors within each cloud 
factor the results were either completely opposite to the results of the associated cloud factor 
or the results were polarised among the different sub cloud factors. 
7.2.1 Governance 
There was agreement with the idea that government trusted their CSP, however, this was in 
response to a general feeling of trust, where governance as a cloud factor was mentioned then 
the level of trust significantly decreased to the extent that the majority said that they did not 
trust the CSP, this was also found to be the case for compliance. 
The literature has shown that of particular concern for government is that they gain a certain 
level of governance over data and systems in order to have confidence in the public cloud 
(Mreea and Munasinghe, 2016; Haag et al., 2014; Craig et al., 2009). This has also been 
shown to be something that is necessary in order for a government to be compliant.  
Specifically, within governance the sub cloud factors where there was a lower level of 
agreement or more negative perception were Control and knowledge over CSP employees, 
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Dynamic SLA, Knowledge and control over third party issues and Assurance about other 
cloud tenants. This was found to be the case for trust whereby respondents did not trust their 
CSP in these areas, and a corresponding negative response was found for risk whereby 
respondents perceived a risk. Moreover, where respondents were asked about their ability to 
negotiate generally with their CSP they also felt that they could not for these sub cloud 
factors of governance, and the same was found to be true for the ability to collaborate 
generally.  
This idea is then further supported by the fact that for these sub cloud factors for governance 
there was a low perception of a positive reputation. The idea that there are sub cloud factors 
that would be considered a particular concern for government, even before the research was 
carried out, is further supported by the fact that for more general sub cloud factors that would 
be a concern for all organisations, there was less of a concern. In other words the government 
felt that they could trust, perceive less risk, negotiate, collaborate and perceive a positive 
reputation in more universal sub cloud factors such as Auditing and measuring the CSP and 
sufficient notice of disruption which are common provision in SLAs. A negative reputation 
for governance was found to be correlated with a negative perception of being understood for 
governance requirements, which may further explain the reluctance to adopt the public cloud. 
7.2.1.1 Clarity of roles and responsibilities 
This was a sub cloud factor of governance for which there was a high level of trust, a low 
perception of risk, a high perception of the ability to negotiate, a perception that requirements 
are understood, a perceived ability to collaborate and a perceived ability to communicate. 
However, there was a perception of a negative reputation of the CSP for this sub cloud factor. 
This has implications for CSPs that they have to address why they have a poor reputation in 
this area. These concerns agree with the concerns about governance found in the literature 
(Haag et al., 2014, Nycz and Polkowski, 2015, Diez and Silva, 2013). It is important to note, 
as part of a wider theme in the findings, clarity of roles and responsibilities, is often a 
standard provision in SLAs, and not considered a government-specific concern.   
Who is responsible for what both on the side of the government and the CSP is important for 
an overall effective relationship and functioning of government in the cloud. The positive 
findings for this sub cloud factor show that there is a possibility for an assurance framework 
to ensure a clear governance strategy where benefit can be achieved in the cloud (Rebollo et 
al., 2012).   
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7.2.1.2 Need for knowledge and control over data and processes  
This sub cloud factor was important because it is an essential part of governance. The 
literature review has shown that government need a certain level control and knowledge over 
data and processes in the cloud (Norr et al., 2016, Brender and Markov, 2013, Firdhous et al., 
2011, ENISA, 2011, Kanwal, 2014). There was almost equal trust and mistrust for this sub 
cloud factor but with a perception of risk. However, the government did strongly feel that 
they could negotiate for this area despite the fact that they felt that the CSP did not 
understand their requirements as part of the negotiation process. Moreover, despite the fact 
that they felt they could negotiate, they did not feel they could collaborate in this area. 
Unfortunately, collaboration has been cited in the literature as a remedy for the loss of 
governance over data (Rebollo et al., 2012). There was a high level of uncertainty regarding 
the CSP’s reputation in this area. 
The perception of risk is understandable given the fact that detailed monitoring of cloud 
systems by the cloud consumer is not something that is offered in most SLAs (Jansen and 
Grance, 2011).  
7.2.1.3 Assurance about other cloud tenants 
The government was concerned about other tenants that share the public cloud, however, 
despite these concerns, government felt they could negotiate this area despite the fact they 
felt the CSP does not understand their requirements or that they could collaborate. A poor 
reputation was also perceived for this sub cloud factor. It is reasonable that government are 
concerned while at the same time having the ability to negotiate. According to Almorsy 
(2011) because of multitenancy in the cloud, each party has their own Security Management 
Process (SMP) that they want to enforce in the cloud, this would explain the government 
perceived ability to negotiate. However, because no one single tenant has the full security 
picture there is significant loss of governance (Almorsy, 2011).   
7.2.1.4 Knowledge and control over third party issues 
Third parties include any party other than the CSP that are involved in providing the 
technology for the provision of the cloud. The most obvious example is the cloud provider 
(CP) which provides the physical infrastructure of the cloud. The results were mostly 
negative for this sub cloud factor, the government did not trust the CSP in terms of the idea 
that they will be given an acceptable level of knowledge and control over third parties, they 
perceived a high risk, they felt they could not negotiate and that the CSP would not 
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understand their requirements during that negotiation, there was a strong perception that they 
could not collaborate and they also perceived a poor reputation.  Brenda and Markov (2013) 
say that concerns about employees of the CSP should extend to the cloud provider as well. 
The lack of trust by the government is made understandable by the fact that between the CSP 
and the CP and the government as a customer, there are different ideas about what 
governance is (Firdhous et al., 2011) which would explain the concerns about negotiation, 
collaboration and reputation.  
7.2.1.5 Dynamic SLA 
A dynamic SLA was something that was identified in the literature as something that would 
be important to government when considering the cloud (DiModica, 2014, Kanwal, 2015, 
Filiali and Yagoubi, 2015) and is important especially in consideration of the fact that SLAs 
are often standard and would not be suitable to meet the complex and ever changing 
requirements of government. This issue was reflected in the responses by government where 
there was a perceived high level of mistrust and risk, the perceived inability to negotiate and 
have requirements understood, the perceived inability to collaborate and the perception of a 
poor reputation in this area. Much like other sub cloud factors that received negative 
responses, a dynamic SLA was a government-specific concern.  
7.2.1.6 Control and knowledge of CSP employees 
There were negative responses regarding this sub cloud factor, the government strongly 
mistrusted the CSP and perceived a high level of risk about this sub cloud factor. Moreover, 
the government felt strongly that they could not negotiate for this sub cloud factor. The 
findings of this study confirm the concerns that have been put forward by Brenda and 
Markov (2013) and the CSA (Cloud Security Alliance) who say that the employees of the 
cloud are a major consideration for government and governance. This idea is further 
supported by an idea that arose in the interviews that the government lacked knowledge about 
their CSP.   
7.2.1.7 Auditing and measuring of CSP 
The government trusted the CSP that they would be allowed to audit the CSP for governance, 
however, they perceived a level of risk. This is particularly relevant to the government as the 
public sector where governance requires internal and external auditing (Craig et al., 2009). 
Moreover, due to the nature of the public cloud where data is geographically dispersed, 
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enforcement becomes difficult (Craig et al., 2009). However, the government indicated that 
they were not concerned that there would be auditing and measuring the CSP for governance 
issues. Again this is a sub cloud factor that is included as a standard provision of SLAs. 
7.2.1.8 Governance during migration 
There was very little concern about governance during migration, evidence by a high 
perception of trust and risk. Migrating to the cloud is a process that is well-established and 
CSPs have experience of this, and is also well established in SLAs. This shows that the 
government feel they will have a certain level of control and involvement in the migration 
process.   
7.2.2 Compliance 
Continuing with the idea that there are certain sub cloud factors that are of a particular 
concern for government in comparison to other sub cloud factors, looking at the sub cloud 
factors of compliance there was a deviation from this idea as far as trust and risk are 
concerned. It is important to note that compliance and its sub cloud factors are obviously a 
concern for government generally, however, for Clarity and confidence about jurisdiction 
there was very little concern for trust and perception of risk and for negotiation there was a 
very high level of confidence. However, for risk, trust and negotiation there was a high level 
of concern about the location of data, whereas for collaboration there was a high level of 
confidence. In addition to these ideas, the government perceived a poor reputation for all the 
sub cloud factors of compliance except for Compliance when migrating. Overall this shows 
that as far as compliance is concerned there is no clear pattern that suggests that the 
government is specifically concerned about sub cloud factors that would be a particular 
concern to government, the real problem for compliance is, however, reputation which has 
implications for the CSP to consider. 
7.2.2.1 Continuous auditing and assessment 
Compliance is an essential requirement for government and they need compliance to be 
continuously audited and assessed. Although there was a negative perception in terms of risk 
and trust, there was some agreement. The government were confident that they could 
negotiate for this area but did feel that the CSP did not understand their requirements. 
Moreover, there was a strong agreement with the idea that they could collaborate for this sub 
cloud factor, and although they generally perceived a poor reputation, around a quarter did 
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perceive a positive reputation. The mixed opinions for this sub cloud are understandable in 
light of the fact that it has been claimed by Ahmad and Janczewski (2011) that the CSP may 
not be able to comply with auditing requirements because of the laws in their own 
jurisdiction. Moreover, Craig et al. (2009) said that the public sector faces legal challenges 
for auditing, which is made more difficult by geographic dispersion.   
7.2.2.2 Clarity and confidence about jurisdiction 
Government were very sure they could trust their CSP in this area and there was a low 
perception of risk. They felt positive they could negotiate and collaborate, but despite these 
positive findings they did perceive a negative reputation for this sub cloud factor. These 
findings are contrary to most of the literature that is about the issue of jurisdiction raises 
concerns. These concerns include issues related to citizen data being located in another 
country (Ahmad and Janczewski, 2011), uncertainty about the laws of which jurisdiction 
would apply and the government requirement to comply with national and international legal 
and regulatory frameworks (Han, 2013). Furthermore, the benefits of cloud computing for 
government can be undermined if geographic borders become fractured (Bhatt, 2012). Given 
these numerous difficulties identified in the literature, the government were not concerned 
about this sub cloud factor of compliance. 
7.2.2.3 Data management 
The results for this sub cloud factor reflected those for the previous sub cloud factor. In 
summary, there were positive perceptions related to trust, risk, negotiation and collaboration, 
while at the same time a negative perception of reputation. So for data management although 
there was a negative perception of the CSPs’ reputation, it did not affect their trust or 
perception of risk or the ability to negotiate and collaborate with the CSP. 
7.2.2.4 Roles and responsibilities for compliance 
In order to achieve compliance there needs to be clarity about who is responsible for what 
aspects of compliance. There was strong disagreement that the government could trust the 
CSP, and there was a high perception of risk in this area. This was reflected in the negative 
perceptions for the ability to negotiate and collaborate as well as a perception of a negative 
reputation. These negative perceptions by government reflect the issue raised by Hon et al. 
(2012) who said that the role of CSPs in compliance is not understood by CSPs and is ill 
defined, moreover, CSPs do not give much attention to regulatory or legal implication 
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because negotiated terms are often standardised. Here, therefore, there is another problem 
associated with standardised contracts which are clearly affecting the government’s 
willingness to adopt the public cloud. Other results for other sub cloud factors also suggest 
standarisation of agreements is a problem for government. 
7.2.2.5 Security and privacy 
Security and privacy towards being compliant has been shown to be important to 
government. Although government were generally positive about trust and risk, there was a 
level of uncertainty. There were mixed opinions about the ability to negotiate, but negative 
perceptions about the ability to collaborate and a negative perception of a reputation in this 
area.  
7.2.2.6 CSP ability to be compliant 
There was a high level of skepticism for this sub cloud factor, there was lack of trust, a 
concern about risk and a perception of a poor reputation, however, the government did feel 
that they could collaborate in this area. In relation to this, there is a recurring theme found in 
this study that despite negative perceptions about cloud and sub cloud factors, the 
government still felt that they could negotiate and collaborate. This is more reflective of the 
abilities of the government once a relationship with a CSP has been established, however, it 
is the lack of trust and the perception of risk and poor reputation in relation the CSP that is 
the impediment to adopting the cloud in the first place. 
7.2.2.7 Data location 
It is important for government to be aware of where their data is located as part of achieving 
compliance. The government are accountable to their public and therefore, should be aware 
of the data’s location at any time. Although they could not trust the CSP and did perceive a 
risk, there were some positive perception for risk and trust. Although the government felt 
they could not negotiate for data location, which is something that takes place before an 
agreement is made, they did feel they could collaborate, something that takes place during the 
relationship. As for the reputation, there were mixed opinions. Similarly, problems have been 
identified in the literature which include user concern about geographic location of data (Hon 




7.2.2.8 Compliance when migrating 
Compliance during migrating was not a concern for government, where all relationship 
factors were found to be positive, in particular the perception of the ability to negotiate for 
this sub cloud factor. The process of migrating to the cloud does not cause a concern for 
government. This is a surprising issue because it is during migration to the cloud where data 
is vulnerable and it has been shown in the literature to be an aspect of the adoption of the 
cloud that a government have to be ready for (Kurdi et al., 2011) and involves a number of 
steps (Singh, 2012). Therefore, an explanation is that government trust the CSP competence 
in this area. Moreover, as with other sub cloud factors where there is less concern, 
compliance during migration is found in SLAs as standard. 
7.2.3 Security and privacy 
The literature has shown that security and privacy is one of the main concerns of government 
not wanting to adopt the public cloud, however, this study has shown that there is a high level 
of trust generally for security and privacy. This requires a rethink of assumptions that are 
made in the literature, that may not be appropriate to the specific situation of government 
considering the public cloud. Where respondents were questioned in relation to the sub cloud 
factors of security and privacy there was a clear expression of the idea that there are specific 
sub cloud factors, which would be expected to be a particular concern for government, where 
there was a high level of concern, this concern for these sub cloud factors was found to be 
true for trust, risk, negotiation, collaboration and reputation. Particularly, there were strong 
opinions about Security related to third parties, Tailored security and privacy policy, 
Assurance regarding CSP employees and Clarity of roles and responsibilities whereby the 
respondents expressed strong negative perceptions in the areas of negotiation, collaboration 
and reputation in particular. This was in contrast to the other sub cloud factors that received a 
more positive response from the government. 
Therefore, in terms of trusting the CSP, having no perception of risk and having the ability to 
negotiate and collaborate, there were negative opinions for specific sub cloud factors of 
security and privacy considered a particular concern for government, a recurring theme of 
this study. This clearly shows that these sub cloud factors are major inhibitors for adopting 
the public cloud. This was also evident in the interviews where although there were generally 
positive attitudes about collaboration, there were real concerns about collaborating for the 
security and privacy of sensitive government and citizen data.  
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However, in reference to security and privacy generally there were positive responses for all 
relationship factors, this has been a recurring theme of this study, that the initial responses to 
cloud factors are often different to the responses for certain sub cloud factors, where there 
seems to be an initial confidence and positive response for the cloud factor, this is met with 
more skepticism and negative responses for some of the sub cloud factors.  
As part of their perceived ability to negotiate, the government felt very confident that they 
could specify their security and privacy requirements. Again, this is a standard expectation of 
information security management systems that the cloud customer should be able to specify 
their security requirements on the cloud hosted assets (Almorsy, 2011). Moreover, in addition 
to be allowed to specify security requirements as part of ISO27000 requirements for a 
security management system, customers should also be allowed to continuously monitor asset 
security and policy that should be based on security policy that the cloud customer already 
uses. Therefore, the nature of international standards for security management systems in the 
cloud acknowledges that the customer is very knowledgeable about their own security 
requirements. 
7.2.3.1 Security related to third parties  
For all of the relationship factors in association with this sub cloud factor there were negative 
responses. Concerns about third parties was also found to be an issue within governance. This 
was found to be one of the main concerns for government in consideration of moving to the 
cloud, the reasons for which have been presented in governance above in the previous 
section. This high level of negativity is understandable given that governments are 
particularly concerned about the deployment of sensitive data, it has been shown that in 
relation to third parties, such as the CP, storing sensitive data is a particular concern for 
government (Alshomrani and Qamar, 2013). This is the reason for governments often opting 
for private clouds in order to store data because of these security concerns (Bhatt, 2012, Khan 
et al., 2011).   
7.2.3.2 Monitoring of policy adherence  
The government were very positive about this sub cloud factor, there was a very strong level 
of trust and an associated low level of risk perception. Overall there were no concerns about 
the CSP monitoring their adherence to their security policy. Therefore, this was not a factor 
that negatively affected the government’s d ecision to adopt the cloud. It is in fact a standard 
expectation of information security management systems that a CSP should adhere to their 
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security management standards and continuously monitor, evaluate and improve information 
security on a regular basis as part of requirements for international standards (ISO 27000) 
(Almorsy, 2011). This is an assurance that is offered as standard as part of internationally 
recognised and required standards for the cloud, and it is thus understandable why 
government have no relationship concerns for this sub cloud factor.  
7.2.3.3 Sufficient involvement in security 
Although there was some trust here, there was also some perception of risk. The government 
felt they could both negotiate and collaborate to be involved in security. It is important in 
order for government to achieve both governance and compliance to be sufficiently involved 
in security, the literature has shown that they need to very involved and be able to fully liaise 
in this area. Again, sufficient involvement in security by the customers is something as 
standard in security management frameworks for the cloud (Almorsy, 2011). However, it is 
also understandable that a government would require a higher level of involvement in the 
cloud that is currently offered. 
7.2.3.4 Tailored security and privacy policy 
This was found to be a government specific concern. As with other sub cloud factors that are 
related to the idea of a tailored service, there is need for government to be afforded a tailored 
service in security and privacy. One of the main concerns for government is the well-known 
characteristic of public cloud services which is that they are standardised, which is necessary 
for their economies of scale and affordability. There were strong negative opinions about this 
sub cloud factor, there was a strong lack of trust and a perceived inability to negotiate and 
collaborate, and understandably a perception of a poor reputation as the public cloud is 
known for being standardised.  
7.2.3.5 Clarity of roles and responsibilities 
The government did not trust the CSP to be clear about who is responsible for which aspects 
of security and privacy. There was lack of trust and a high perception of risk, although there 
were mixed feelings about the ability to negotiate and collaborate and the reputation of the 
CSP for this sub cloud factor. Assuring clarity for roles and responsibilities between the 
government and the CSP is a requirement for managing security risks and ensuring that the 
government’s security requirements are met (Jansen and Grance, 2011), and the doubt that 
was shown in this study for this area is clearly a reason for reluctance to adopt the public 
 249 
 
cloud. Moreover, when the government move to the cloud roles and responsibilities are no 
longer the same as they were in the traditional computing environment (Jansen and Grace, 
2011). Therefore, this uncertainty understandably leads to the high perception of risk found in 
this study. Another cause of risk perception associated with a lack of clarity for roles and 
responsibilities for security is the separation of duties. This refers to dividing roles and 
responsibilities in order to ensure that no single individual has the power to subvert critical 
processes (Microsoft and Estonia Ministry of Economic Affairs and Communications, 2015).  
In reference to the relationship factors, the association here between risk and trust is 
understandable, however, there were a significant number of government respondents who 
felt they could negotiate and collaborate for clarity for roles and responsibilities. This can be 
due to the fact that they are already knowledgeable about roles and responsibilities for 
security and privacy and that clarity for these roles and responsibilities is required for success 
in the cloud (Jansen and Grace, 2011).   
Therefore, it is not their perceived ability to negotiate and collaborate that is an impediment 
to public cloud adoption, but instead their perception of mistrust and risk. To a large extent, 
the government have control over their perceived ability to negotiate and collaborate, so the 
more positive responses for these relationship factors can be explained by this level of 
control, whereas for trust, risk and reputation this is not in the control of government. 
7.2.3.6 Assurance regarding CSP employees 
A government is responsible to its citizens about the protection of data, therefore, they should 
be assured about the employees of the CSP that they do not have bad intentions towards the 
government. Naturally this was a significant concern for the government evidenced by strong 
negative responses for all relationship factors. Therefore, this is a clear reason for the 
reluctance by the government to adopt the public cloud. Malicious insiders has been cited as 
one of the main security risks for the public cloud (Venkatraman, 2014).  
Specifically, the results of this study show that there was a very strong negative perception of 
the ability to negotiate for this sub cloud factor. However, it has been shown that negotiation 
for security and privacy for government in the public cloud is necessary and includes 
negotiation for vetting employees as a main concern (Jansen and Grace, 2011). The strong 
inability to negotiate for this sub cloud factor would also explain the associated strong 
perception of risk.  
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7.2.4 Performance and offering 
In consideration of the sub cloud factors of performance and offering a similar idea was also 
found as for security and privacy. For the sub cloud factors which included Customisable 
cloud environment, Dynamic / flexible SLA, Meet government specific requirements and 
Additional specialised staff for government needs there were negative perceptions for all of 
the relationship factors. In other words, there was a lack of trust, a perception of risk, a 
perception of the inability to negotiate and collaborate and a negative perception of reputation 
for these cloud factors.    
Overall, the results have revealed that where there is negative opinion about the relationship 
factors it is mostly related to those sub cloud factors that are of particular concern for 
government. The reason that these sub cloud factors have been considered to be a particular 
concern or relevance to government is because it has been suggested by the literature. This 
study included these sub cloud factors not only to test to test if they are a concern for the 
Saudi government and adoption of the public cloud, but also to reveal the link between 
relationship factors and these sub cloud factors. It can be said therefore, that there is a lack of 
trust, a perception of risk, an inability to negotiate, an inability to collaborate and a negative 
perception of reputation for sub cloud factors, for most cloud factors, that are shown in the 
literature to be a particular concern for government. 
7.2.4.1 Customisable cloud environment 
In reference to the problem of standardisation of public cloud services and it being a cause of 
concern for government, there was a strong sense of mistrust, a high perception of risk and a 
perceived inability to negotiate for a customisable cloud environment. There are a number of 
sub cloud factors that are associated with the idea of moving away from a standardised 
service to a more tailor-made or customisable cloud service, these include a Dynamic SLA, 
Tailored security and privacy policy, Meet government specific requirements and Additional 
specialised staff for government needs, all of which received negative responses for most 
relationship factors. 
This study has shown that there was a very strong negative perception of the ability to 
negotiate to this sub cloud factor. Not being able to negotiate would be detrimental for 
achieving a customisable cloud environment, especially in large and regulated organisations 
such as governments whereby negotiation would have to be increased in order to make sure 
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that government requirements are met (Hon et al., 2012). This would therefore explain the 
overall negative responses for this sub cloud factor, especially, the perception of risk.  
It is important to note, however, that it is not just the inability of the government to negotiate 
for a customisable cloud environment that is the only impediment to cloud adoption, there 
was also a high level of mistrust of the CSP for this area. Therefore, the government, through 
their responses, suggest that it is both the fault of the CSP and the government that the issue 
of not being able to achieve a customisable cloud environment is the cause of reluctance for 
public cloud adoption.         
7.2.4.2 Dynamic SLA 
Another sub cloud factor relevant to the problem of standardisation is Dynamic SLA, 
whereby the government require an agreement that is flexible and dynamic according to the 
ever-changing requirements. The government also felt strongly about this issue where there 
were strong negative responses for all of the relationship factors. Again, it is the perceived 
inability by the government to negotiate that is a cause for concern here, because according to 
DiModica (2014) the inability to achieve a differentiated cloud service is the result of poor 
negotiation. This sub cloud factor is considered a particular concern for government because 
it is an absolute requirement of government that they have flexibility in their agreements 
which in turn maintains trust between the parties (Kanwal, 2014) and the results have shown 
that the government have no confidence in themselves or the CSP for this issue.  
7.2.4.3 Continuous monitoring of performance 
Although there was some uncertainty about trusting the CSP that they would continuously 
monitor their performance, they mostly trusted their CSP in this area. Despite there being 
little perception of risk, there were some who did perceive a risk. Moreover, what was 
noticeable about this sub cloud factor was the very strong perception of the ability to 
negotiate. This sub cloud factor is closely related to Auditing and measuring of CSP, 
Continuous auditing and assessment and Monitoring of policy adherence, as sub cloud 
factors from other cloud factors, where a very positive perception of the ability to negotiate 
was also found. Again, these are standard provisions in current SLAs which would explain 
the positive perception by the government of the ability to negotiate. 
These sub cloud factors are something that take place on a continuous basis and therefore, the 
ability to collaborate for these areas is relevant. For this sub cloud factor, there were mixed 
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opinions about the ability to collaborate, although there were marginally more who were 
confident to collaborate for this area. For all of the other similar sub cloud factors, mentioned 
in the previous paragraph, there was a strong positive perception of the ability to collaborate. 
Therefore, continuous monitoring of performance as a sub cloud factor of performance of 
offering, and the other closely related sub cloud factors from the other cloud factors, the 
associated ability to collaborate and negotiate for these sub cloud factors, and a positive 
perception of trust and low perception of risk, suggest that these are not reasons for 
reluctance of government to adopt the public cloud, especially as they can collaborate on an 
ongoing basis which is a requirement for achieving these sub cloud factors. 
7.2.4.4 Meet government specific requirements 
Again, this sub cloud factor is associated with the problem of standardisation. There was a 
very high level of skepticism for this sub cloud factor, the government did not trust the CSP 
and perceived a very high risk. Moreover, the government felt that they could not negotiate or 
collaborate for this sub cloud factor and they perceive a very negative reputation. Meeting 
government specific requirements is closely associated with other sub cloud factors where 
there is consideration of government specific needs, these include Tailored security and 
privacy policy, Customisable cloud environment and Additional specialised staff for 
government needs. These have been shown to be of particular concern for government. 
Therefore, the perception of government that they cannot achieve these requirements, either 
through their own perceived inability, or a perceived inability of the CSP, is a significant 
factor in reluctance to adopt the public cloud. This is part of an overall theme that has 
emerged in this study, that the main inhibitors to public cloud adoption are factors that would 
especially be a concern to government, this is in contrast to factors that are often standard for 
which the government has less concern. This issue is discussed in more detail in section 7.4 
below. 
7.2.4.5 Additional specialised staff for government needs 
Government performance requirements for the cloud would be more numerous and complex 
than it would for other types of organisation. There is a need for specialised and dedicated 
staff within the CSP to support these needs. In light of this, there was a very strong concern 
about this sub cloud factor, this was in terms of trust, risk, the ability to negotiate and 
collaborate and a very poor perception of reputation. This was a sub cloud factor that was 
considered a particular concern and relevance for government. It has been suggested that the 
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nature of the cloud, in terms of its scale, does actually allow cloud staff to become specialists 
in different areas of the cloud because the scale of the cloud allows staff to be free from other 
duties (Jansen and Grace, 2011). Given that there is a lack of trust and a poor reputation of 
the CSP, it would be beneficial for the CSP to inform the government about the potential for 
specialised staff.  
7.2.4.6 Back-up and recovery 
Back-up and recovery is an important issue for government, especially in the case of an 
attack both cyber and physical. This is a service that is offered as standard in agreements with 
public cloud providers. In reflection of this, the government were positive in terms of trust 
and risk, however, there were mix responses about negotiation for this sub cloud factor. 
7.2.4.7 Sufficient support lifecycle 
Despite the negative view that the CSP will meet government requirements or offer 
additional specialised staff, the government did feel that the CSP would offer a sufficient 
support lifecycle, this could be because this is a well-known offering that is found in current 
SLAs.    
7.2.4.8 Sufficient notice of disruption 
There was a mixture of perceptions of trust that there would be sufficient notice of disruption, 
but despite this there was a generally positive view of this sub cloud factor. Again, notice of 
disruption is something that is offered as standard and the government will be aware of this, 
this is reflected in the positive response for this sub cloud factor.  
7.2.4.9 End of relationship 
Overall, for all relationship factors there was a positive perception of this sub cloud factor. 
The closely related sub cloud factor of Sufficient notice of disruption also revealed a positive 
response. The termination of a service is something that is clearly stipulated in the SLA, and 
therefore, the government have little concern about these areas.  
7.3 Relationship factors with other relationship factors 
Relationship factors were analysed against other relationship factors in order to find out how 
they affect each other, a simple example is the interplay between trust and risk perception. 
These ideas were based on theory that suggest that there is interplay between relationship 
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factors (Burda and Teutberg, 2014, Ryan and Falvey, 2012, Alshomrani and Qamar, 2013, 
Abbadi and Alawneh, 2012). 
7.3.1 Trust with other relationship factors 
Trust was correlated with other relationship factors in order to determine if there is a 
correlation between them, this was done against the cloud and sub cloud factors, to see for 
example, if trust in governance corresponded to an ability to collaborate for governance, or if 
a perception of risk in compliance was correlated with trust for compliance.  
7.3.1.1 Negotiation 
The various relationship factors were analysed to see if there were correlations between them. 
This offers an explanation of how the interplay between relationship factors affect the 
decision to adopt the cloud. In reference to negotiation and trust, the analysis was carried out 
to identify a correlation between the two, in order to determine if trust, whether high or low, 
had an effect on the perception of the ability to negotiate. This correlation was determined for 
each cloud and associated sub cloud factor in order to provide further insight into how trust 
and the perceived ability to negotiate relate to specific areas of the cloud. For example, a 
higher level of trust may increase the perceived ability to negotiate for governance but not for 
security and privacy, or a low level of trust may only affect the perceived ability to negotiate 
for compliance.  
There was a positive correlation between negotiation and trust found for compliance, security 
and privacy and performance and offering which suggests that where there is trust, the 
government perceive that they can negotiation for these areas of the cloud. However, for the 
specific sub cloud factors the story was different.  
Although correlations were found between trust and the perceived ability to negotiate for five 
of the eight sub cloud factors of compliance, these correlations were generally weak, the 
strongest correlation was found for roles and responsibilities where there was a moderate 
correlation. Therefore, for compliance and sub cloud factors for compliance trust does not 
have a significant impact on the ability to negotiate compliance requirements.  
For trust in security and privacy and the ability to negotiate security and privacy, there were 
only two sub cloud factors where a significant correlation was found, namely; tailored 
security and privacy policy and clarity of roles and responsibilities. This means that for all of 
 255 
 
the other sub cloud factors there was no correlation between trust and negotiation. Therefore, 
there was very little relationship found between the perception of trust and the perceived 
ability to negotiate for security sub cloud factors. In fact the weakness in this correlation was 
more profound for security and privacy than for other cloud factors.  
In relation to performance and offering there was also a positive, however, weak correlation 
between the perception of trust and the perceived ability to negotiate. For four out of the nine 
sub cloud factors for performance and offering there was a correlation found.  
It is important to note that where there was a correlation between perception of trust and the 
perceived ability to negotiate it was in relation to areas of the cloud that are considered a 
particular concern for government. Specifically, correlations were found for customisable 
cloud environment and Dynamic SLA, both of which are requirements for government. 
7.3.1.2 Collaboration  
The correlation between trust and collaboration was designed to see if there was a 
relationship between the perception of trust and the ability to collaborate. Collaborate refers 
to the working relationship once an agreement has been made. The results show a moderate 
correlation between these two relationship factors for governance. This means that trust is 
moderately related to collaboration as far as governance is concerned.  
This correlation was also found for five out of the eight sub cloud factors of governance. It is 
important to note that these sub cloud factors are of a particular concern to government. The 
strongest correlation was for the need to have control over data and processes, followed by 
other government concerns including assurance about other cloud tenants, knowledge and 
control over third party issues, control and knowledge over CSP employees and auditing and 
measuring of CSP.  
The correlation between trust and collaboration was found to be stronger in relation to 
compliance where a strong positive correlation was found. However, upon further 
investigation into the sub cloud factors of compliance, the correlations were mostly weak and 
non-existent. This was also the case for security and privacy where only two sub cloud 
factors had positive correlations; tailored security and privacy policy and clarity of roles and 
responsibilities, albeit moderate correlations. Because the frequencies show that for both trust 
and collaboration there was a generally negative agreement in relation to clarity and 
confidence about jurisdiction, this means that where the government do not trust the CSP 
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they also feel that they cannot collaborate where clarity and confidence about jurisdiction is 
concerned. It is important to note that jurisdiction is an issue that government is concerned 
about, the literature has shown that concerns about jurisdiction are one of the reasons 
governments are reluctant to use the public cloud. 
For the performance and offering sub cloud factors there were moderate positive correlations 
found between trust and collaboration for Dynamic / SLA and Additional specialised staff for 
government needs, both of which are of specific concern for government. In reference to 
Dynamic SLA specifically, for both trust and collaboration there was a high level of 
disagreement, therefore, there is a link between where the government do not trust the CSP 
and where they feel they cannot collaborate with the CSP in the area of a Dynamic SLA. The 
literature has shown that one of the main problems with a public cloud is that the SLAs are 
often standardised (Hon et al., 2012, Baset, 2012, Burden, 2014, Di Modica and Tomarchio, 
2014). This study has shown that there is a lack of trust about dynamic SLAs and an 
associated lack of the perception of the ability to be able to collaborate about dynamic SLAs.  
In reference to the additional specialised staff for government needs, this is something that 
has been shown to be important to government and gives them more confidence, moreover, 
this would allow for more governance and increased compliance. The results show that the 
government did not trust the CSP in regards this sub cloud factor and they also disagreed with 
the idea that they could collaborate in this area, this was evidenced by the moderate 
correlation between the two. 
7.3.1.3 Reputation 
The link between trust and reputation has been established in the literature (Huntgeburth, 
2015, Almanea, 2014, Fan and Perros, 2014). There was a correlation between trusting the 
CSP and a positive perception of reputation for the governance cloud factor. The results 
showed that the government did not trust the CSP in relation to governance and the vast 
majority disagreed with the idea that they perceived a positive reputation in relation to 
governance, and the two were positively correlated.  
This was also found to be true for compliance where a strong correlation was found between 
trust and perception of a positive reputation. A majority of respondents said that they did not 
trust the CSP in relation to compliance with a corresponding majority of respondents not 
agreeing with the idea that they perceive a positive reputation.  
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Sub cloud factors where there were moderate correlations between trust and reputation are 
areas that would be of particular concern for government and they included Roles and 
responsibilities for compliance and CSP ability to be compliant. There was no correlation 
found for Clarity and confidence for jurisdiction which is an area that government would be 
expected to be concerned about.    
For both trust and perception of a positive reputation there was a very high level of agreement 
in relation to security and privacy. The fact that there was a high level of trust in security and 
privacy shows that this is not the reason that the government have for not adopting the 
government cloud, moreover, it shows an associated strong perception of reputation in this 
area would also not be a reason for reluctance. However, this is security and privacy 
generally, and where the sub cloud factors of security and privacy are considered then this 
reveals that there are concerns, this is the case for both trust and reputation. 
Upon examination of the sub cloud factors of security and privacy, and the associated 
correlation between trust and reputation, it was shown that only two of the sub cloud factors 
positively correlated, these included Clarity of roles and responsibilities and Assurance 
regarding CSP employees. It is interesting to note that for Clarity of roles and responsibilities 
there was a strong positive correlation, this means that where the government trust the CSP 
they also perceive a positive reputation in relation to Clarity of role and responsibilities and 
where they mistrust about CSP employees there is an associated poor reputation. This has 
implications for the CSP, if they want to increase or maintain trust in the relationship they 
have to improve or maintain their reputation in these areas. 
There was no correlation between trust and reputation in reference to performance and 
offering as a cloud factor, meaning that a general trust in performance and offering did not 
result in a positive perception of reputation as far as performance and offering is concerned. 
However, the results were different when looking at the sub cloud factors. It is interesting to 
note that of the sub cloud factors for performance and offering where a positive correlation 
was found, they were all areas that would be particularly important to government and the 
include a Customisable cloud environment, Dynamic / flexible SLA, Meet government specific 
requirements and Additional specialised staff for government needs. Therefore, it is important 




The frequencies for these sub cloud factors reveal the following: for Customisable cloud 
environment, Dynamic / flexible SLA and Meet government specific requirements there was a 
high level of disagreement for both trust and reputation and for Additional specialised staff 
for government needs, there was a strong level of disagreement for both trust and reputation. 
Therefore, these results confirm that governments do not trust their CSP in relation to these 
areas which are evidently particular concern for government, and there is a corresponding 
lack of a positive reputation for the same areas. 
Having sufficient information about the CSP is associated with reputation. The results show 
that there was little correlation between trust and having sufficient information about the 
CSP. This was the case for the four cloud factors. Specifically, there was little correlation for 
governance, no correlation for compliance, only a weak correlation for security and privacy 
and no correlation for performance and offering. In reference to the sub cloud factors for all 
cloud factors except performance and offering, there was very little correlation. For 
performance and offering most of the sub cloud factors did correlate. This means that the 
level of trust that the government has in their CSP is not associated with the amount of 
information that they have about the CSP for most of the sub cloud factors.  
Therefore, the finding here seems to be contrary to the literature, where not only is it 
suggested that information about the CSP is something that has an influence on the decision 
to adopt the public cloud, but also there are mechanisms in place which include organisations 
that are dedicated to collecting information about CSPs towards allocating them a level of 
trustworthiness which is used by potential customers of the public cloud. 
Where trust was examined for its influence on, or being influenced by, other relationship 
factors, it was found that this influence or connection was prevalent for sub cloud factors that 
were a particular relevance to government. So, trust, negotiation, collaboration and to a 
certain extent reputation, have influencing effects on each other where government-relevant 
factors are concerned. Given that the general results for these government-relevant sub cloud 
factors are often negative, a negative perception of trust will lead to a negative perceived 
ability to negotiate and collaborate and vice versa.   
This is one of the main findings of the study, that sub cloud factors that are particularly 
relevant to government are perceived negatively by government, not only as evidenced here 
where relationship factors are analysed against other relationship factors, but also when 
relationship factors are analysed against sub cloud factors. 
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7.3.2 Risk with other relationship factors 
It would be fair to say that where there is a correlation between perception of risk and 
collaboration, this tells us that where there is a perception of risk there may be the inability to 
collaborate, and vice versa.  But it is important to know if this is true for security and privacy 
and the sub cloud factors of security and privacy. In other words, if there is a perception of 
risk for security, is there a corresponding lack of confidence to collaborate on security? 
There was a high level of a perception of a risk generally. This high perception of risk was 
also found to be the case for governance as a cloud factor. Specifically, the findings show that 
although there is a perception of a risk in relation to cloud factors, where the sub cloud 
factors are presented then the respondents often have different ideas, this was the case for 
governance. 
7.3.2.1 Negotiation 
There was a correlation between risk and negotiation for governance, however, only three out 
of the sub cloud factors of governance showed a correlation, they included - the need to have 
knowledge and control over data and processes, Assurance about other cloud tenants and 
Knowledge and control over third party issues. This means that for these areas the perception 
of risk related to the ability to negotiate. For example, where there was a risk perceived for 
the need to have knowledge and control over processes and data, there is also an associated 
perceived lack of ability to negotiate. This perceived lack of ability to negotiate was also 
evident in the interviews. 
For compliance and all of the sub cloud factors of compliance, except one there was a 
correlation between risk and negotiation. Therefore, compliance is a cloud factor where a 
perception of risk is associated with a lack of ability to negotiate, this was also the case for all 
of the sub cloud factors of compliance except for compliance when migrating. 
Although there was no correlation between risk and negotiation for security and privacy 
generally, there were correlations for four of the seven sub cloud factors. This would support 
the idea that there is more insight from government where they are asked in detail about sub 




Overall there was a very weak link between risk and collaboration. Also, for the effective 
communication aspect of collaboration, no correlation was found with risk, and for the ability 
to collaborate effectively there was a weak correlation. This weak correlation was found in 
relation to governance and compliance.  
7.3.2.3 Reputation 
A weak correlation was found between risk and reputation generally. It would be expected 
that there would be a link between risk and reputation, but in this study little correlation was 
found. Again, as with risk and collaboration the only time that there was a correlation, in this 
case moderate, was where risk was analysed against reputation in relation to governance and 
compliance. 
Overall, therefore, risk was not a significant factor in terms of its impact on other cloud 
factors, however, risk cannot be discounted as a factor for reluctance to adopt the public 
cloud because as a factor in isolation there were perceptions of risk.  
7.3.3 Negotiation and Collaboration 
There were mixed results in relation to the correlation between negotiation and collaboration 
as relationship factors. It may be expected that the two are closely correlated because they 
both involve an active relationship with the CSP. It is important to note that negotiation is 
pre-signing of the SLA, and collaboration is the ongoing relationship after agreements have 
been signed. For governance, there was a strong correlation, which means that the 
government’s perceived ability to negotiate has a strong bearing on the perceived ability to 
collaborate for governance. For compliance and security and privacy there were moderate 
correlations. This means that the CSP has to improve the negotiation process in order to have 
a better working relationship on an ongoing basis. 
7.3.4 Negotiation and reputation 
There was a moderate correlation between the ability to negotiate and the reputation that the 
government had about the CSP. A moderate correlation was found for all of the cloud factors 
except performance and offering. Having sufficient information about the cloud provider as 
an aspect of reputation was even less correlated with the ability to negotiate. Therefore, the 
government did not feel that their ability to negotiate depended on the information that they 
had about their CSP.  
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7.3.5 Collaboration and reputation 
Generally, there was very little correlation between the perceived ability to collaborate and 
the perceived reputation of the CSP. However, if reference to the cloud factors, there was a 
strong correlation between the perception of a positive reputation and the perceived ability to 
collaborate for compliance.  
7.3.6 Summary 
Revealing how relationship factors affect other relationship factors offered a deeper insight 
into the relationship between government and the CSP. Moreover, the study not only 
considered the correlations between relationship factors, but also highlights the areas of the 
cloud where these correlations are significant. The relationship between relationship factors 
was moderated by the cloud and sub cloud factors, this was evidenced by the fact that a 
negative perception of one relationship factor for a sub cloud factor was correlated with a 
negative perception in another relationship factor, and vice versa.  
An interesting finding of this study is that where respondents are asked to consider how they 
feel, as relationship factors, about certain cloud factors, they have more certainty in their 
opinions. This was found to be true, for example, where respondents were asked if they 
trusted their CSP generally, they said that they did, but where they were asked about trust in 
regard to cloud factors they gave either strongly negative or strongly positive answers. This 
idea was also found to be true in the correlations between the relationship factors, because 
more significant correlations were found between relationship factors where cloud factors 
and sub cloud factors were considered.  
Trust was found to have not much of an effect on other relationship factors, this was found to 
be the case for governance, for security and privacy, for performance and offering and most 
of the relationship factors for compliance. This means that no matter what area of the cloud is 
being considered by the government, their trust or lack of trust had no bearing on other 
relationship factors. 
One of the problems of collaboration is that the administrative structures are decentralised 
and there is a need for a central function for organising and distributing information, 
communication and reminding each partner about the rules that govern the partnership 
(Thomson et al. 2009).  Again, collaboration in this case would be necessary for governments 
to achieve the cloud critical success factors on an ongoing basis. 
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7.4 Particular Concern for Government  
A study that seeks to determine relationship and cloud factors that may influence the adoption 
of the public cloud, needs to consider the particular concerns of government. These 
government-specific concerns were identified in the literature (Ahmad and Janczewski 2011, 
ENISA, 2011, Diez and Silva, 2013) and are well-known concerns. The results of this study 
have confirmed these concerns as cloud factors and how they are related to the relationship 
factors.  
Some of the sub cloud factors that are a particular concern of government can be grouped 
within the same categories, even though they are sub cloud factors of different cloud factors. 
For example, the results showed that there was a high level of concern for parties other than 
the CSP themselves, this was evident by the fact that there were high levels of concern about 
other tenants in the cloud and third parties in addition to the CSP employees themselves. 
These sub cloud factors were found to be a concern in security and privacy and governance.  
Concerns about these sub cloud factors that were confirmed to be a particular concern for 
government featured in the relationship between relationship factors. Although, for example, 
insignificant correlations were found between trust and collaboration, there were significant 
correlation between these relationship factors for sub cloud factors that are of particular 
concern and relevance to government. For example, there were significant correlations 
between trust and collaboration for a dynamic SLA and additional specialised staff for 
government needs. A lack of trust was associated with a lack of confidence to collaborate but 
mostly in areas that were of particular concern to government, this means that these sub cloud 
factors had a mediating effect between these relationship factors. Therefore, the sub cloud 
factors that are government-specific concerns have an impact on the relationship resulting in 
reluctance to adopt the public cloud. 
There was also a high level of concern that the government feel that they cannot get 
government-specific services, these included dynamic SLAs, tailored security and privacy 
policy, customisable cloud environment and additional specialised staff for government 
needs. These are sub cloud factors that are found within the cloud factors.  
In order for government to achieve what they need in terms of governance, compliance, 
security and privacy and performance and offering, they need their specific needs met in each 
of these areas. The findings in this study, therefore, confirm the idea that was put forward by 
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DiModica (2014) who said that standardised service can be a problem because it does not 
allow for differentiated services, something that government require.  
These concerns were also echoed in the interviews where it showed that although there was 
some level of confidence in terms of the relationship factors generally, concerns were 
expressed about the CSP’s ability to meet government specific needs. In fact, the CSP’s 
ability to service the specific needs of government was a condition on the relationship factors, 
whereby, for example, trust was on condition of security and privacy requirements being met. 
The cloud factors that can negatively impact the decision to adopt the cloud, are often 
categorised within, security and privacy, governance over data and systems, compliance with 
laws and regulations both domestic and foreign, and the performance of the service as well as 
contractual conditions. It is accepted by this study that all of these are universal concerns. 
However, within each of these factors, which are termed as cloud factors in this study, there 
are sub cloud factors, and some of these, while being a concern for all types of organisation, 
can also be considered a particular concern for government. There are two reason for this, 
firstly, the literature has shown that governments have more reasons than other organisations 
to be concerned about certain issues in the cloud, for example they may require a more 
flexible SLA or more stringent compliance requirements (Alhamad et al., 2010, Alruwaili 
and Gulliver, 2014) and secondly, this has been shown in the results of the present study. 
This also means that the present study had affirmed the concerns that are reflected in the 
literature.  
However, the present study contributes further because not only does it confirm that there are 
concerns in these cloud areas and that these are impediments to adoption of the public cloud 
by government, but it goes further to understanding the role of the relationship factors. Where 
other studies may suggest there is a lack of trust or perception of risk, this study firstly shows 
specifically, which aspects of the cloud these trust and risk perceptions are, and secondly, 
extends from merely trust and risk by identifying and incorporating other relationship factors 
that may have an impact, for example the perceived ability to negotiate or a negative 
perception of reputation. 
A significant finding of this study is that for relationship factors, there was a high level of 
doubt and lack of confidence in many of the sub cloud factors that are particular to 
government. Towards the development of the research design of this study, it was important 
to identify not only the sub cloud factors that would be a concern for any organisation, but 
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also sub cloud factors that would be a particular concern for government when considering 
the public cloud. 
This idea of the government having negative opinions about sub cloud factors that are a 
particular concern for government is also supported by the results from the interview. One of 
the main ideas that arose was that government were very much dependent on the SLA and the 
SLA contains provisions that directly reflect those sub cloud factors for which there was 
more confidence, examples include sufficient notice of disruption, migration to the cloud and 
factors associated with monitoring and auditing activities.  
7.5 Recommendations for Cloud Service Provider (CSP) 
It would be important for CSPs to take note of the fact that there were some cloud and sub 
cloud factors where there were significant correlations between different relationship factors. 
For example, trust in compliance was strongly correlated with the ability to effectively 
collaborate for compliance and perception of a strong reputation for compliance. Therefore, it 
is within these particular aspects of the cloud that CSPs should understand these correlations, 
this, for example, will inform them that they have to improve their collaboration on 
compliance in order to increase trust of the government, or they have to achieve a positive 
reputation in compliance in order to achieve trust in compliance. Specifically, this has been 
found to be true for numerous cloud and sub cloud factors for correlation between 
relationship factors. 
One of the main issues that was identified in the relationship was that there were often 
concerns about a standardised offering from the CSP. The issue of standardised contracts 
needs serious reconsideration by the CSP because it is related to many of the concerns that 
the government have about the cloud which include not being confident about a dynamic 
SLA, tailored security and privacy policy, a customisable cloud environment, government 
specific requirements being met and specialised staff for government needs. 
Due to the standardised nature of negotiated agreements in the public cloud, roles and 
responsibilities are often not clear. It is therefore recommended that the CSP address the 
issue, not only of standardised service agreements, but also create more clarity for roles and 
responsibilities, which has been perceived negatively by the government.  
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The results showed that there was an almost complete lack of trust, a perception of risk and a 
perceived inability to work with the CSP over the security and privacy sub cloud factor of 
Assurance regarding CSP employees. This concern has also been identified in the literature 
(Venkatraman, 2014, Jansen and Grance, 2011) where proposed solutions include employee 
background checks and controlled and limited access to servers. Not only does this have to be 
ensured by the CSP, but the CSP must liaise with the government to find out what standards 
and level of checks need to be carried and the acceptable level of access to systems. 
Overall, although standardisation of the cloud is for economic reasons on the part of the CSP, 
they have to consider a more tailored solution to attract business from government. The 
government as a customer will bring large revenues and therefore, there is justification in 
offering public cloud solution that are not standard.  
Trust about governance was found to be a particular issue for government. It is important for 
the CSP to understand that in order to achieve trust the CSP should not interfere with the 
clients’ applications in the cloud (Abbadi and Alawneh, 2012). 
The results of this study showed that the CSPs really need to acknowledge the concerns that 
government have about governance. Not only were the government concerned about 
governance generally, but also about the sub cloud factors of governance, especially, there 
are trust and risk issues related to other tenants, third parties, a dynamic SLA and CSP 
employees. Therefore, there is a need for the CSP to address these areas. Although the first 
issue that may come to mind when considering governance is control over data, this was 
much less of a concern for government than the other areas of governance.  
Towards improving collaboration and ensuring trust, the CSP should open their operations to 
government personnel. A proposed solution is to have cross-organisational teams whereby 
government employees work with the CSP within their organisation. This would not only 
allow the CSP to better understand the needs of government, but will also allow government 
the opportunity for greater governance.  
Although overall there was not much significant concern about compliance, it is important for 
the CSP to understand that they must examine the individual sub cloud factors of compliance 
towards improving the relationship. For example, the government were not concerned about 
jurisdiction for the data, however, they were concerned about the location of the data. 
Therefore, this shows the CSP that they should not make assumptions, government not being 
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concerned about jurisdiction does not necessarily mean they are not concerned about the 
location of their data. This principle can be applied to all areas of the cloud.   
There was a noticeable perception revealed in the study that the government were very 
capable of specifying their cloud requirements as part of the ability to negotiate, however, at 
the same time government perceived that the CSP do not understand these requirements. 
Therefore, the CSP need to listen and show they are listening and engage a strategy of 
verification of understanding with the government. Specifically, this could include a 
mechanism where requests are verified with the CSP for clarity of understanding. This will 
have repercussions for other relationship factors, for example, it will also increase trust, 
decrease the perception of risk and improve negotiation and collaboration. 
In reference to reputation, the study has shown that a poor reputation is often perceived for 
the sub cloud factors that are a particular concern for government, for example, CSP 
employees, third parties and other cloud tenants, but also for compliance generally. It is 
recommended that the government implement all aforementioned recommendations, which 
will involve alleviating the government specific concerns, in order improve their reputation in 
these areas. A specific example that illustrates this idea is that there were positive correlations 
between trust and reputation for the following sub cloud factors of performance and offering:  
Customisable cloud environment, Dynamic / flexible SLA, Meet government specific 
requirements and Additional specialised staff for government needs, which would inform the 
CSP that they need to improve their reputation in these areas, possibly through offering them 
to government as they are not fully provisioned, in order to increase trust. 
Finally, the results of the interviews showed that the government had a lack of understanding 
of the public cloud and that they felt that the public cloud was not suitable for government 
use. For both of these concerns it is up to the CSP to ensure that the government understand 
the public cloud and its benefits. This point can also be extended to knowledge about the CSP 
themselves because the interviews also revealed that the government lacked knowledge about 
the CSP. By informing the government about the CSP and the public cloud this should 
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8.1 Summary of the Thesis 
Primarily this study was motivated by the fact that firstly, there is a real need to understand 
the reasons for the government of Saudi Arabia’s reluctance to adopt the public cloud, 
secondly, the real benefits that the public cloud can bring to the government, and thirdly, the 
fact that current studies offer a limited understanding through a narrow scope of the 
relationship between CSP and government as a customer, whereby relationship, 
organisational or technological factors are considered in isolation. Moreover, the study has 
shown in the review of the literature not only the benefits of the government adopting the 
public cloud, but also that it will become necessary in a world where there are increasing 
threats to countries from terrorism, cyber terrorism and conflict. Therefore, it is imperative 
that governments move towards a model whereby they can serve their citizens by e-
government which can be hosted in a public cloud. While this is the future direction for 
government in the cloud, it is understandable that governments will have concerns and that 
some of those concerns will be particular and relevant to government, and it was the aim of 
this study to understand those concerns through understanding what they are and how they 
are affected by the relationship between government and CSP.  
The study has taken consideration of the relationship between government and CSP to a new 
level, in that it offers a comprehensive and useful way of examining the relationship. The 
study has shown that other studies that try to determine the reasons for reluctance to adopt the 
cloud, especially the public cloud, have a narrow view in that they only consider cloud 
factors or relationship factors in isolation. Or where studies do consider both, the connection 
is weak and there is no explicit consideration of the connection and interplay between the 
two. In this sense, this study has built on these studies, emphasising the relationship while at 
the same time emphasising the need to consider the detailed aspects of cloud factors.  
For both parties, it is important that the concerns are addressed because it is inevitable that 
government in Saudi Arabia will eventually reside in the cloud. Moreover, concerns that the 
government in Saudi Arabia have, have to be addressed in a comprehensive way and 
overcome because of the threats that they face today. Saudi Arabia is a main target of 
terrorism and that includes cyber terrorism, and although the public cloud is seen by 
government as something that is vulnerable, the public cloud is also the means to further 
protect a government in the cloud which has been demonstrated in the case of Estonia. This 
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study should give more confidence to both parties to move to the public cloud through 
improving the relationship between them. 
In light of such issues, the study set out to further understand in more detail government 
concerns in Saudi Arabia about adopting the public cloud through understanding relationship 
and cloud concerns within the context of the relationship. In pursuit of this, the study 
established aims which were to reveal opinions about relationship and associated cloud 
factors in the government – Cloud Service Provider (CSP) relationship and to determine 
specific areas that includes relationship and associated cloud related factors that may have an 
effect on government confidence in the public cloud. Through the use of questionnaires and 
interviews this was achieved revealing a deep insight into the concerns that government have 
about the cloud and the associated relationship factors. Specifically, the association between 
relationship factors such as trust and cloud factors such as governance was identified in order 
to further understand the issues within the relationship context, for example, there is a lack of 
trust in the CSP for governance. This was also achieved through understanding the interplay 
between two relationship factors and their effect on a cloud factor, for example, a low 
perception of risk for governance was associated with a perceived ability to negotiate for 
governance requirements. Therefore, through these approaches the specific areas of concern 
within the government - CSP relationship were determined.   
In reference to the objectives of the study, specific relationship and cloud factors in the 
government - CSP relationship were thoroughly identified and analysed, through this analysis 
the second objective, which was to reveal the links between the relationship factors and cloud 
factors, was also achieved. Overall, the relationship and associated cloud factors as factors 
that affect the decision to adopt the public cloud were identified through the objective to 
develop and apply a research method that combines these relationship and cloud factors. 
Finally, the discussion chapter offered recommendations to CSPs on how the government-
CSP relationship can be improved towards increasing government confidence in the public 
cloud, which was the final objective of the study.   
8.2 Contributions 
The most apparent contribution of this study has been a new approach to understanding the 
reasons for reluctance of the Saudi government to use the public cloud for sensitive data and 
critical systems. This approach has acknowledged that the relationship between government 
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and the CSP is complex, in that it involves concerns about cloud related technical factors and 
the relationship factors which should not be considered in isolation, as is the case with other 
studies. Not only are these two types of factors considered, but the study has also recognised 
the interplay between the two and the importance of understanding this interplay in 
understanding the relationship both comprehensively and in detail. The results of the study 
have further shown that there has been a need to investigate the relationship in this way. 
Therefore, this study has answered the limitations of other studies (Bhatt, 2012, Aziz et al., 
2013, Ahmad and Janczewski, 2011, Lecklider 2014; Wang and Wu 2014, Filali and 
Yagoubi, 2015, Hana 2013, Alshomrani and Qamar 2013, Almorsy 2011, Fan et al. 2014, 
Ding et al. 2014) which look at cloud factors in isolation or fail to understand in detail the 
relationship factors and their association with cloud factors. Issues of trust and risk are well 
known in the cloud, but specifically, which aspects of the cloud and the context of the 
relationship are not fully considered or understood. 
The study offers a more comprehensive understanding of the relationship between the cloud 
provider and the government, through understanding how both the relationship factors and 
the associated cloud factors play a role in that relationship. Moreover, using the research 
design of the study allowed the relationship factors and the cloud factors to be considered 
together in order to understand the connections between them, rather than to be considered in 
isolation. This research design is validated by the fact that the relationship and cloud factors 
are derived from numerous studies and literature that consider the different factors that may 
determine the decision to adopt the cloud, this was established in the research design in 
Chapter 3. 
The study has also shown that it is important for both CSPs and government to not just 
consider the general issues of, for example, security and privacy, or performance and 
offering, within the relationship but also the detailed aspects of these areas. The study has 
shown that where more detailed aspects about the cloud are considered it reveals a 
completely different opinion. This was evidenced by the fact that opinions were often 
opposed between the general cloud factor such as security and privacy and an associated sub 
cloud factor such as security related to CSP employees. Moreover, the importance of 
considering the more detailed aspects of cloud factors through the consideration of sub cloud 
factors is further proved by the additional levels of concern or negativity where sub cloud 
factors were considered. This was evident in relation to the relationship factors, whereby, for 
example, a positive perception of trust in security and privacy soon becomes a negative 
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perception of trust where sub cloud factors of security and privacy are considered. Therefore, 
the study informs CSPs of specifically how and where they need to be concerned and how 
these concerns can be resolved through consideration of both relationship and cloud and sub 
cloud factors. What has been revealed about the relationship factors is not only important for 
the CSP and how they deal with the government, but how the government deal with the CSP 
as well towards achieving increasing government confidence to adopt the public cloud.  
Therefore, it was another contribution of the study that recommendations were offered for 
CSPs on how they can have a better relationship with the government which would include 
how they could alleviate some of the concerns that government have. Because the research 
approach revealed a detailed picture of the concerns that government have, it was possible to 
offer informative and detailed recommendations to the CSP. Specifically, the CSP would, for 
example, know in which areas of the cloud they are not trusted, or are seen as not being able 
to understand requirements.  
These contributions can be summarised in the following: 
1. A new approach to considering the relationship between the government and CSP that 
includes all relevant relationship and cloud factors together. 
 
2. The development of research design that is designed to reveal relationship and cloud 
factors in the relationship context and the associations between them. 
3. The development of a questionnaire that can be applied to different government-CSP 
relationship contexts. 
 
4. A deeper insight and understanding of issues in the government-CSP relationship and 
the reluctance to adopt the public cloud. 
 
5. Recommendations on how to improve the government-CSP relationship towards 
increasing government confidence in the public cloud. 
8.3 Success Criteria Revisited 
The first success criterion was to identify the relationship and cloud related issues in the 
government-CSP relationship. This was achieved successfully through a careful analysis of 
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the literature including cloud models where the relevant relationship and cloud factors of the 
government-CSP relationship were identified. The second success criterion which was to 
identify the associations between relationship and cloud factors was achieved through the 
application of the questionnaire and the analysis of the results. The research design was 
successfully developed and applied through the use of the questionnaire, this was the third 
criterion. For the fourth criterion, the potential issues that may affect cloud adoption were 
identified in the questionnaire and the interview results and these issues were used in the 
successful development of recommendations for CSPs which was the fifth criterion of the 
study.  
8.4 Implications 
The study has implications for the various stakeholders that are involved in the government – 
CSP relationship. Importantly, the study has implications for CSPs who are seeking to have 
government use the public cloud, this is because the study highlights in detail the reasons that 
government may be reluctant to adopt the public cloud. These reasons may be associated with 
relationship factors in which case the cloud provider could adjust their behaviour or how they 
deal with the government as a customer, or could be associated with cloud factors in which 
case the government could change services to alleviate these concerns, or the reasons could 
be associated with the links between relationship and cloud factors. In reference to the latter 
point, this study would allow CSPs to go beyond simply enhancing their services as a 
solution to government reluctance, instead they could, for example, alleviate the perception 
of the inability to negotiate certain cloud factors, or improve their reputation for certain cloud 
factors. As it has been stated in the study, to understand the cloud factors where there are 
concerns is not enough, and to understand the relationship issues in isolation also has its 
limitations. It is not enough for a CSP to know that they are not trusted, they need to 
understand which aspect of the cloud are they not trusted in, likewise it is not enough to know 
that a potential customer has concerns about security, the CSP needs to know how to address 
that concern, for example do they have to alleviate perception of risk or to understand the 
customers’ needs better.  
The study also has implications for the government organisations in Saudi Arabia that are 
responsible for decision making for the adoption of the public cloud. Where the cloud is 
adopted it will not be used by one agency within the government, instead there will be 
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numerous agencies on numerous levels, involving numerous employees, so the government 
decision maker can understand the potential concerns of users, or at least understand the areas 
that need to be addressed.  
For the research and academic fields the study has implications for how the relationship 
between government and CSP plays a role in decision making to adopt the cloud. In addition 
to studies that offer consideration of organisational factors, this study offers a new research 
design based on relationship and cloud factors. Moreover, there is the possibility that the 
principles of this research design can be applied in other IT and IS procurement situations, for 
government or otherwise. 
8.5 Limitations 
There was an intensive investigation into the cloud factors to the extent that the study 
included sub cloud factors. However, although for some of the relationship factors, such as 
negotiation, more detailed aspects were considered, this was not applied to all the relationship 
factors. A future study could consider more of the aspects of the relationship factors, for 
example the different dimensions of trust could be considered.  
The study was set in Saudi Arabia and it is reasonable to expect that cultural beliefs may have 
an impact on the relationship with the CSP. The study focused on the relationship but there 
was no consideration of how cultural factors would influence this relationship. Some CSPs 
are local, and some, especially those that offer the public cloud, are international and issues 
of trust and risk could be affected by cultural differences. 
8.6 Future study 
One of the findings of the present study was that the government felt that they could not 
negotiate or collaborate with the CSP on sub cloud factors that were a particular concern or 
relevance to government. While the present study offered detail on the specific sub cloud 
factors where this lack of confidence to negotiate and collaborate was found, it did not 
address the reasons for the inability to negotiate and collaborate. Towards offering those who 
provide public cloud services to government a better understanding of their client, a future 
study could further investigate the reasons why there is a perceived inability in these areas. 
The inability could be a fault of the CSP which could mean that they lack the ability to 
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negotiate or collaborate, or it could be perception of the CSP’s inability to offer the service 
that the government require. 
This study offered a research design to further understand the relationship and the reluctance 
by government to adopt the public cloud. A future study can look at the possibility of taking 
the concept of the approach by this study and develop a model or framework that can be used 
by both cloud customer and cloud provider alike, to be applied to a specific situation to 
further guide how the relationship should be approached. The main objective of such a future 
study would consider how the features of the research design of this study can be translated to 
a model that can be applied practically. 
The present study was concerned with a specific context. A future study could look at the 
feasibility of using the research design work in other contexts. For example, the study, or 
indeed any derived applicable models, as mentioned in the above, could be applied in 
different contexts with different types of organisation. This could reveal the particular 
concerns of different types of organisation, as this study has revealed particular concerns of 
the government of Saudi Arabia.  
One of the findings of the study was that where respondents were questioned about cloud 
factors generally, there was less concern, and where questioned about more detailed aspects 
of these cloud factors, namely, the sub cloud factors, there was more concern in many cases. 
This showed an apparent contradiction in the responses, for example, on the issue of security 
and privacy generally, there was a high level of trust but for some of the sub cloud factors of 
security and privacy there was a low level of trust. Therefore, a future study could investigate 
further this phenomenon and look at why there are perceived differences between cloud 
factors and associated sub cloud factors. For example, are the responses to the sub cloud 
factors a result of having much or little knowledge for that particular factor? Moreover, a 
future study could investigate the implications that these results would have for decision 
making and understanding cloud-related concerns, as opposed to other studies that simply 
address the cloud factors. 
In reference to one of the limitations of the study, a future study could investigate the 
relationship using more detailed aspects of relationship factors. Although relevant aspects of 
the relationship factors in a government-CSP relationship were considered, a future study 
could identify and apply more aspects of these relationship factors towards understanding 
government reluctance to adopt the public cloud.    
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A more focused study could be conducted which investigates the link between relationship 
and associated cloud factors and the confidence to adopt the cloud, in other words what is the 
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Confidence of Government in the Public Cloud 
Participant Information Sheet (Questionnaire) 
Dear Senior, 
We would like you to take part in a study about conducted by a researcher at De Montfort University in the 
United Kingdom.  
Introduction to the study 
Increasingly governments are using cloud technology to host data and services. However, there is reluctance to 
place sensitive data in public clouds because of security and privacy concerns. These concerns are related to 
governance in the public cloud and compliance with laws. When sensitive data is stored in a public cloud, 
governments lose a certain amount of control. Although there is willingness by governments to use the public 
cloud for sensitive data, unless above issues are resolved, advancement in this area will be slow. Through 
critical analysis of existing standards, this study proposes a new approach to the governance of the government-
cloud provider relationship towards increasing confidence in placing sensitive data in the public cloud.  
 
Participation in this study is voluntary and will involve a questionnaire, which will take approximately 10 to 15 
minutes. 
Participation is voluntary and you have the right to withdraw at any point during the research. Upon withdrawal 
from the research all of the obtained identifiable data will be destroyed, however, once the data has been 
anonymised it cannot be destroyed because it will be impossible to identify the origin of the data. 
Excerpts from the questionnaires will be used in any publications derived from this study.  
Confidentiality, privacy and anonymity are assured. If the researcher wants to use any quotations it will be 
anonymous. The distribution of the questionnaire will be through an online survey system, which will mean 
there is no identifying information, you will simply click on a link, complete the questionnaire and submit it. 
The information that is gained in this research project will not be used for another project and will only be used 
strictly for purposes highlighted above. 
All data will be kept in a secure location and is only accessible to the researcher and you will be able to request 
data at any time. 
 إذا تفضل الحصول على نسخة باللغة العربیة الرجاء االتصال بالباحث 
If there are any questions regarding this research please contact: http://soo.gd/Questionnaire 
Waleed Al Ghanim (PhD Researcher) 
Faculty of Technology, De Montfort University, 49 Oxford Street, Innovation Centre, LE1 5XY, Leicester, UK 





Confidence of Government in the Public Cloud 




I have read the information provide in the information sheet about the study 
titled " Confidence of Government in the Public Cloud". 
 
I have been given the opportunity to ask questions about this study, the answers 
were satisfactory and I was provided with additional information that I 
requested.  
 
I understand that participation is voluntary and I have the right to withdraw from 
the study at any time and my data destroyed. 
 
I am aware of the fact that excerpts from the questionnaire may be used in 
publications derived from this study, and all data will be anonymised.   
 
I have been informed that the data will be kept secure and will be for research 
purposes only and at any time I can request a copy of the data or remove my 
data. I have also been made aware that the survey will be conducted online with 
no identifying information to further protect anonymity. 
 
I have been informed that the data will be destroyed upon completion of the 
study. 
 
I acknowledge that some of the data collected during this study may be looked at 
by some people at De Montfort University or from regulatory authorities 
concerned with education where it is related to my participation this study. 
Moreover, I give consent for such individuals to be allowed access to my 
responses. 
 
I have been given the opportunity to request both the information sheet and this 
consent form in Arabic. 
من الباحث طلب ذلك كالعربیة من جمیع المستندات یمكن إذ ترغب الحصول على نسخة باللغة  
 
With knowledge of the above-stated issues, I agree to participate in this study.  
I agree to future contact by the researchers if my responses reveal interesting findings or for cross 
reference purposes.   Yes  No 
If answered yes, the suitable method of being contacted is: 










Dear Senior,  
As you have been informed, this study aims to understand both the relationship and cloud factors 
within the relationship between the government and the cloud service provider that may have an 
impact on government adoption of the public cloud. As part of achieving this aim the researcher 
needs you to answer questions about the relationship you have with the provider and cloud 
concerns you have.  
Your anonymity is guaranteed and you have the right to withdraw from the study at any time. 
Please try to complete all of the questions. If you have any questions please feel free to contact the 
researcher. Contact details are provided below. 
I would like to thank you for your invaluable contribution to the study. 
Please tick the appropriate boxes  
Waleed Al Ghanim (PhD Researcher) 
Faculty of Technology 
De Montfort University 
49 Oxford Street, Innovation Centre, LE1 5XY, Leicester, UK 
 P10003240@myemail.dmu.ac.uk  
TEL: UK +44 7593042025 











1. Strongly Disagree  2. Disagree  3. Neutral  4. Agree 
5. Strongly Agree 
1 2 3 4 5 
TRUST DOMAIN 
Q1 You trust your CSP      
QUESTION 2A GOVERNANCE 
Q2A 
In the relationship with the CSP you trust them in relation 
to governance   
    
 
Q2A 1-8 You trust the CSP in relation to the following governance issues: 
Q2A 1 
Your need to have knowledge and control over data and 
processes 
    
 
Q2A 2 Assurance about other cloud tenants      
Q2A 3 Knowledge and control over third party issues      
Q2A 4 Clarity of roles and responsibilities      
Q2A 5 Dynamic SLA      
Q2A 6 Control and knowledge of CSP employees      
Q2A 7 Auditing and measuring of CSP      
Q2A 8 Governance during migration      
QUESTION 2B COMPLIANCE  
Q2B 
In the relationship with the CSP you trust them in relation 
to compliance 
    
 
Q2B 1-8 You trust the CSP in relation to the following compliance issues: 
Q2B 1 Continuous auditing and assessment      
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Q2B 2 Clarity and confidence about jurisdiction      
Q2B 3 Data management      
Q2B 4 Roles and responsibilities for compliance      
Q2B 5 Security and privacy      
Q2B 6 CSP ability to be compliant      
Q2B 7 Data location      
Q2B 8 Compliance when migrating      
QUESTION 2C SECURITY AND PRIVACY 
Q2C 
In the relationship with the CSP you trust them in relation 
to compliance   
    
 
Q2C 1-7 You trust the CSP in relation to the following security and privacy issues: 
Q2C 1 Security related to third parties      
Q2C 2 Monitoring of policy adherence      
Q2C 3 Sufficient involvement in security      
Q2C 4 Tailored security and privacy policy      
Q2C 5 General security / privacy provision      
Q2C 6 Clarity of roles and responsibilities      
Q2C 7 Assurance regarding CSP employees      
QUESTION 2D PERFORMANCE AND OFFERING 
Q2D 
In the relationship with the CSP you trust them in relation 
to performance and offering   
    
 
Q2D 1-9 




Q2D 1 Customisable cloud environment      
Q2D 2 Dynamic / flexible SLA      
Q2D 3 Continues monitoring of performance      
Q2D 4 Meet government specific requirements      
Q2D 5 Additional specialised staff for government needs      
Q2D 6 Back up and recovery      
Q2D 7 Sufficient support lifecycle      
Q2D 8 Sufficient notice of disruption      
Q2D 9 End of relationship      
RISK DOMAIN 
Q3 In your relationship with the CSP you do not perceive a risk      
QUESTION 4A GOVERNANCE 
Q4A  When engaging in the relationship with the CSP you do not 
perceive a risk in relation to governance 
     
Q4A 1-8 
In the relationship with the CSP you do not perceive a governance risk in relation 
to the following: 
Q4A 1 Your need to have knowledge and control over data and 
processes 
     
Q4A 2 Assurance about other cloud tenants      
Q4A 3 Knowledge and control over third party issues      
Q4A 4 Clarity of roles and responsibilities      
Q4A 5 Dynamic SLA      
Q4A 6 Control and knowledge of CSP employees      
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Q4A 7 Auditing and measuring of CSP      
Q4A 8 Governance during migration      
QUESTION 4B COMPLIANCE 
Q4B When engaging in the relationship with the CSP you do not 
perceive a risk in relation to compliance 
     
Q4B 1-8 
In the relationship with the CSP you do not perceive a compliance risk in relation 
to the following: 
Q4B 1 Continuous auditing  and assessment      
Q4B 2 Clarity and confidence about jurisdiction      
Q4B 3 Data management      
Q4B 4 Roles and responsibilities for compliance      
Q4B 5 Security and privacy      
Q4B 6 CSP ability to be compliant      
Q4B 7 Data location      
Q4B 8 Compliance when migrating      
QUESTION 4C SECURITY AND PRIVACY 
Q4C When engaging in the relationship with the CSP you do not 
perceive a risk in relation to security and privacy 
     
Q4C 1-7 
In the relationship with the CSP you do not perceive a security and privacy risk in 
relation to the following: 
Q4C 1 Security related to third parties      
Q4C 2 Monitoring of policy adherence      
Q4C 3 Sufficient involvement in security      
Q4C 4 Tailored security and privacy policy      
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Q4C 5 General security / privacy provision      
Q4C 6 Clarity of roles and responsibilities      
Q4C 7 Assurance regarding CSP employees      
QUESTION 4D PERFORMANCE AND OFFERING 
Q4D When engaging in the relationship with the CSP you do not 
perceive a risk in relation to performance and offering 
     
Q4D 1-9 
In the relationship with CSP you do not perceive a performance and 
offering risk in relation to the following: 
Q4D 1 Customisable cloud environment      
Q4D 2 Dynamic / flexible SLA      
Q4D 3 Continues monitoring of performance      
Q4D 4 Meet government specific requirements      
Q4D 5 Additional specialised staff for government needs      
Q4D 6 Back up and recovery      
Q4D 7 Sufficient support lifecycle      
Q4D 8 Sufficient notice of disruption      
Q4D 9 End of relationship      
Negotiation (Specify Requirements) 
Q5 You can effectively specify your requirements      
QUESTION 6A GOVERNANCE 
Q6A 1-8 
You feel can effectively specify your governance requirements in relation to the 
following: 
Q6A 1 Your need to have knowledge and control over data and 
processes 
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Q6A 2 Assurance about other cloud tenants      
Q6A 3 Knowledge and control over third party issues      
Q6A 4 Clarity of roles and responsibilities      
Q6A 5 Dynamic SLA      
Q6A 6 Control and knowledge of CSP employees      
Q6A 7 Auditing and measuring of CSP      
Q6A 8 Governance during migration      
 QUESTION 6B COMPLIANCE 
Q6B In the relationship with the CSP you are able to specify 
compliance requirements 
     
Q6B 
You can effectively specify your compliance requirements in relation to the 
following: 
Q6B 1 Continuous auditing  and assessment      
Q6B 2 Clarity and confidence about jurisdiction      
Q6B 3 Data management      
Q6B 4 Roles and responsibilities for compliance      
Q6B 5 Security and privacy      
Q6B 6 CSP ability to be compliant      
Q6B 7 Data location      
Q6B 8 Compliance when migrating      
QUESTION 6C SECURITY AND PRIVACY 
Q6C In the relationship with the CSP you are able to specify security 
and privacy requirements 
     
Q6C 1-7 You can effectively specify your security and privacy requirements in 
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relation to the following: 
Q6C 1 Security related to third parties      
Q6C 2 Monitoring of policy adherence      
Q6C 3 Sufficient involvement in security      
Q6C 4 Tailored security and privacy policy      
Q6C 5 General security / privacy provision      
Q6C 6 Clarity of roles and responsibilities      
Q6C 7 Assurance regarding CSP employees      
QUESTION 6D PERFORMANCE AND OFFERING 
Q6D In the relationship with the CSP you are able to specify 
performance and offering requirements 
     
Q6D 1-9 
You can effectively specify your performance and offering requirements in 
relation to the following: 
Q6D 1 Customisable cloud environment      
Q6D 2 Dynamic / flexible SLA      
Q6D 3 Continues monitoring of performance      
Q6D 4 Meet government specific requirements      
Q6D 5 Additional specialised staff for government needs      
Q6D 6 Back up and recovery      
Q6D 7 Sufficient support lifecycle      
Q6D 8 Sufficient notice of disruption      
Q6D 9 End of relationship      
Negotiation (Understand Requirements) 
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Q7 Your CSP understands your requirements      
QUESTION 8A GOVERNANCE 
Q8A In the relationship with your CSP, they understand your 
governance requirements 
     
Q8A 1-8 
Your CSP understands your governance requirements in relation to the 
following: 
Q8A 1 Your need to have knowledge and control over data and 
processes 
     
Q8A 2 Assurance about other cloud tenants      
Q8A 3 Knowledge and control over third party issues      
Q8A 4 Clarity of roles and responsibilities      
Q8A 5 Dynamic SLA      
Q8A 6 Control and knowledge of CSP employees      
Q8A 7 Auditing and measuring of CSP      
Q8A 8 Governance during migration      
QUESTION 8B COMPLIANCE 
Q8B In the relationship with your CSP, they understand your 
compliance requirements 
     
Q8B 1-8 
Your CSP understands your compliance requirements in relation to the 
following: 
Q8B Continuous auditing  and assessment      
Q8B Clarity and confidence about jurisdiction      
Q8B Data management      
Q8B Roles and responsibilities for compliance      
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Q8B Security and privacy      
Q8B CSP ability to be compliant      
Q8B Data location      
Q8B Compliance when migrating      
QUESTION 8C SECURITY AND PRIVACY 
Q8C In the relationship with your CSP, they understand your 
security and privacy requirements 
     
Q8C 1-7 
Your CSP understands your security and privacy requirements in relation 
to the following: 
Q8C 1 Security related to third parties      
Q8C 2 Monitoring of policy adherence      
Q8C 3 Sufficient involvement in security      
Q8C 4 Tailored security and privacy policy      
Q8C 5 General security / privacy provision      
Q8C 6 Clarity of roles and responsibilities      
Q8C 7 Assurance regarding CSP employees      
QUESTION 8D PERFORMANCE AND OFFERING 
Q8D In the relationship with your CSP, they understand your 
performance and offering requirements 
     
Q8D 1-9 
The CSP understands your performance and offering requirements in 
relation to the following: 
Q8D 1 Customisable cloud environment      
Q8D 2 Dynamic / flexible SLA      
Q8D 3 Continues monitoring of performance      
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Q8D 4 Meet government specific requirements      
Q8D 5 Additional specialised staff for government needs      
Q8D 6 Back up and recovery      
Q8D 7 Sufficient support lifecycle      
Q8D 8 Sufficient notice of disruption      
Q8D 9 End of relationship      
Negotiation (General) 
Q9 You can negotiate with your CSP      
QUESTION 10A GOVERNANCE 
Q10A 1-8 In the relationship with your CSP you can negotiate your 
governance requirements 
     
Q10A 
You can negotiate your governance requirements in relation to the 
following: 
Q10A 1 Your need to have knowledge and control over data and 
processes 
     
Q10A 2 Assurance about other cloud tenants      
Q10A 3 Knowledge and control over third party issues      
Q10A 4 Clarity of roles and responsibilities      
Q10A 5 Dynamic SLA      
Q10A 6 Control and knowledge of CSP employees      
Q10A 7 Auditing and measuring of CSP      
Q10A 8 Governance during migration      
QUESTION 10B COMPLIANCE 
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Q10B In the relationship with your CSP you can negotiate your 
compliance requirements 
     
Q10B 1-8 
You can negotiate your compliance requirements in relation to the 
following: 
Q10B 1 Continuous auditing  and assessment      
Q10B 2 Clarity and confidence about jurisdiction      
Q10B 3 Data management      
Q10B 4 Roles and responsibilities for compliance      
Q10B 5 Security and privacy      
Q10B 6 CSP ability to be compliant      
Q10B 7 Data location      
Q10B 8 Compliance when migrating      
       
QUESTION 10C SECURITY AND PRIVACY 
Q10C In the relationship with your CSP you can negotiate your 
security and privacy requirements 
     
Q10C 1-7 
You can negotiate your security and privacy requirements in relation to the 
following: 
Q10C 1 Security related to third parties      
Q10C 2 Monitoring of policy adherence      
Q10C 3 Sufficient involvement in security      
Q10C 4 Tailored security and privacy policy      
Q10C 5 General security / privacy provision      
Q10C 6 Clarity of roles and responsibilities      
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Q10C 7 Assurance regarding CSP employees      
QUESTION 10D PERFORMANCE AND OFFERING 
Q10D In the relationship with your CSP you can negotiate your 
performance and offering requirements 
     
Q10D 1-9 
You can negotiate your performance and offering requirements in relation 
to the following: 
Q10D 1 Customisable cloud environment      
Q10D 2 Dynamic / flexible SLA      
Q10D 3 Continues monitoring of performance      
Q10D 4 Meet government specific requirements      
Q10D 5 Additional specialised staff for government needs      
Q10D 6 Back up and recovery      
Q10D 7 Sufficient support lifecycle      
Q10D 8 Sufficient notice of disruption      
Q10D 9 End of relationship      
COLLABORATION DOMAIN 
Q 11 You can effectively collaborate with your CSP      
QUESTION 12A GOVERNANCE 
Q12A You can effectively collaborate with your CSP about 
governance 
     
Q12A 1-8 
You can effectively collaborate with your CSP about the following 
governance issues: 
Q12A 1 Your need to have knowledge and control over data and 
processes 
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Q12A 2 Assurance about other cloud tenants      
Q12A 3 Knowledge and control over third party issues      
Q12A 4 Clarity of roles and responsibilities      
Q12A 5 Dynamic SLA      
Q12A 6 Control and knowledge of CSP employees      
Q12A 7 Auditing and measuring of CSP      
Q12A 8 Governance during migration      
QUESTION 12B COMPLIANCE 
Q12B You can effectively collaborate with your CSP about 
compliance 
     
Q12B 1-8 
You can effectively collaborate with your CSP about the following 
compliance issues: 
Q12B 1 Continuous auditing  and assessment      
Q12B 2 Clarity and confidence about jurisdiction      
Q12B 3 Data management      
Q12B 4 Roles and responsibilities for compliance      
Q12B 5 Security and privacy      
Q12B 6 CSP ability to be compliant      
Q12B 7 Data location      
Q12B 8 Compliance when migrating      
       
QUESTION 12C SECURITY AND PRIVACY 
Q12C You can effectively collaborate with your CSP about security 
and privacy 




You can effectively collaborate with your CSP about the following security 
and privacy issues: 
Q12C 1 Security related to third parties      
Q12C 2 Monitoring of policy adherence      
Q12C 3 Sufficient involvement in security      
Q12C 4 Tailored security and privacy policy      
Q12C 5 General security / privacy provision      
Q12C 6 Clarity of roles and responsibilities      
Q12C 7 Assurance regarding CSP employees      
QUESTION 12D PERFORMANCE AND OFFERING 
Q12D You can effectively collaborate with your CSP about 
performance and offering 
     
Q12D 1-9 
You can effectively collaborate with your CSP about the following 
performance and offering issues: 
Q12D 1 Customisable cloud environment      
Q12D 2 Dynamic / flexible SLA      
Q12D 3 Continues monitoring of performance      
Q12D 4 Meet government specific requirements      
Q12D 5 Additional specialised staff for government needs      
Q12D 6 Back up and recovery      
Q12D 7 Sufficient support lifecycle      
Q12D 8  Sufficient notice of disruption      
Q12D 9 End of relationship      
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COLLABORATION  (effectively communicate) 
Q13 You can effectively communicate with your CSP      
QUESTION 14A GOVERNANCE 
Q14A You can effectively communicate with your CSP about 
governance 
     
Q14A 1-8 
You can effectively communicate with your CSP about the following 
governance issues: 
Q14A 1 Your need to have knowledge and control over data and 
processes 
     
Q14A 2 Assurance about other cloud tenants      
Q14A 3 Knowledge and control over third party issues      
Q14A 4 Clarity of roles and responsibilities      
Q14A 5 Dynamic SLA      
Q14A 6 Control and knowledge of CSP employees      
Q14A 7 Auditing and measuring of CSP      
Q14A 8 Governance during migration      
QUESTION 14B COMPLIANCE 
Q14B You can effectively communicate with your CSP about 
compliance 
     
Q14B 1-8 
You can effectively communicate with your CSP about the following 
compliance issues: 
Q14B 1 Continuous auditing  and assessment      
Q14B 2 Clarity and confidence about jurisdiction      
Q14B 3 Data management      
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Q14B 4 Roles and responsibilities for compliance      
Q14B 5 Security and privacy      
Q14B 6 CSP ability to be compliant      
Q14B 7 Data location      
Q14B 8 Compliance when migrating      
QUESTION 14C SECURITY AND PRIVACY 
Q14C You can effectively communicate with your CSP about security 
and privacy 
     
Q14C 1-7 
You can effectively communicate with your CSP about the following 
security and privacy issues: 
Q14C 1 Security related to third parties      
Q14C 2 Monitoring of policy adherence      
Q14C 3 Sufficient involvement in security      
Q14C 4 Tailored security and privacy policy      
Q14C 5  General security / privacy provision      
Q14C 6 Clarity of roles and responsibilities      
Q14C 7 Assurance regarding CSP employees      
QUESTION 14D PERFORMANCE AND OFFERING 
Q14D You can effectively communicate with your CSP about 
performance and offering 
     
Q14D 1-9 
You can effectively communicate with your CSP about the following 
performance and offering issues: 
Q14D 1 Customisable cloud environment      
Q14D 2 Dynamic / flexible SLA      
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Q14D 3 Continuos monitoring of performance      
Q14D 4 Meet government specific requirements      
Q14D 5 Additional specialised staff for government needs      
Q14D 6 Back up and recovery      
Q14D 7  Sufficient support lifecycle      
Q14D 8 Sufficient notice of disruption      
Q14D 9 End of relationship      
REPUTATION DOMAIN 
Q15 You have sufficient information about your CSP      
QUESTION 16A GOVERNANCE 
Q16A You have sufficient information about your CSP regarding 
governance 
     
Q16A 1-9 
You have sufficient information about your CSP regarding the following 
governance issues: 
Q16A 1 Your need to have knowledge and control over data and 
processes 
     
Q16A 2 Assurance about other cloud tenants      
Q16A 3 Knowledge and control over third party issues      
Q16A 4 Clarity of roles and responsibilities      
Q16A 5 Dynamic SLA      
Q16A 6 Control and knowledge of CSP employees      
Q16A 7 Auditing and measuring of CSP      
Q16A 8 Governance during migration      
QUESTION 16B COMPLIANCE 
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Q16B You have sufficient information about your CSP regarding 
compliance 
     
Q16B 1-8 
You have sufficient information about your CSP regarding the following 
compliance issues: 
Q16B 1 Continuous auditing and assessment      
Q16B 2 Clarity and confidence about jurisdiction      
Q16B 3 Data management      
Q16B 4 Roles and responsibilities for compliance      
Q16B 5  Security and privacy      
Q16B 6 CSP ability to be compliant      
Q16B 7 Data location      
Q16B 8 Compliance when migrating      
QUESTION 16C SECURITY AND PRIVACY 
Q16C You have sufficient information about your CSP regarding 
security and privacy 
     
Q16C 1-7 
You have sufficient information about your CSP regarding the following 
security and privacy issues: 
Q16C 1 Security related to third parties      
Q16C 2 Monitoring of policy adherence      
Q16C 3 Sufficient involvement in security      
Q16C 4 Tailored security and privacy policy      
Q16C 5 General security / privacy provision      
Q16C 6 Clarity of roles and responsibilities      
Q16C 7 Assurance regarding CSP employees      
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QUESTION 16D PERFORMANCE AND OFFERING 
Q16D You have sufficient information about your CSP regarding 
performance and offering: 
     
Q16D 1-9 
You have sufficient information about your CSP regarding the following 
performance and offering issues: 
Q16D 1 Customisable cloud environment      
Q16D 2 Dynamic / flexible SLA      
Q16D 3 Continues monitoring of performance      
Q16D 4  Meet government specific requirements      
Q16D 5 Additional specialised staff for government needs      
Q16D 6 Back up and recovery      
Q16D 7 Sufficient support lifecycle      
Q16D 8 Sufficient notice of disruption      
Q16D 9 End of relationship      
REPUTATION 
Q17 You perceive a positive reputation of your CSP      
QUESTION 18A GOVERNANCE 
Q18A You perceive a positive reputation in relation to governance      
Q18A 1-8 
You perceive a positive reputation in relation to the following governance 
areas: 
Q18A 1 Your need to have knowledge and control over data and 
processes 
     
Q18A 2 Assurance about other cloud tenants      
Q18A 3 Knowledge and control over third party issues      
 310 
 
Q18A 4 Clarity of roles and responsibilities      
Q18A 5 Dynamic SLA      
Q18A 6 Control and knowledge of CSP employees      
Q18A 7 Auditing and measuring of CSP      
Q18A 8 Governance during migration      
QUESTION 18B COMPLIANCE 
Q18B You perceive a positive reputation in relation to compliance      
Q18B 1-8 
You perceive a positive reputation in relation to the following compliance 
areas: 
Q18B 1 Continuous auditing and assessment      
Q18B 2 Clarity and confidence about jurisdiction      
Q18B 3 Data management      
Q18B 4 Roles and responsibilities for compliance      
Q18B 5 Security and privacy      
Q18B 6 CSP ability to be compliant      
Q18B 7 Data location      
Q18B 8 Compliance when migrating      
QUESTION 18C SECURITY AND PRIVACY 
Q18C You perceive a positive reputation in relation to security and 
privacy 
     
Q18C 1-7 
You perceive a positive reputation in relation to the following security and 
privacy areas: 
Q18C 1 Security related to third parties      
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Q18C 2 Monitoring of policy adherence      
Q18C 3 Sufficient involvement in security      
Q18C 4 Tailored security and privacy policy      
Q18C 5 General security / privacy provision      
Q18C 6 Clarity of roles and responsibilities      
Q18C 7 Assurance regarding CSP employees      
QUESTION 18D PERFORMANCE AND OFFERING 
Q18D You perceive a positive reputation in relation to performance 
and offering 
     
Q18D 1-9 
You perceive a positive reputation in relation to the following performance 
and offering areas: 
Q18D 1 Customisable cloud environment      
Q18D 2 Dynamic / flexible SLA      
Q18D 3 Continuos monitoring of performance      
Q18D 4 Meet government specific requirements      
Q18D 5  Additional specialised staff for government needs      
Q18D 6 Back up and recovery      
Q18D 7 Sufficient support lifecycle      
Q18D 8 Sufficient notice of disruption      







Relationship and Cloud Factors Affecting Government Confidence in the Public Cloud 
Participant Information Sheet (Interview) 
Dear participant, 
I would like you to take part in a study conducted by a researcher at De Montfort University in the United 
Kingdom. 
The study is investigating the relationship between the government as a customer and providers of the public 
cloud and how this relationship affects government confidence in deploying sensitive data and critical systems 
in the public cloud. 
As your position means that you are involved in this relationship, it is felt that you can provide data that is both 
relevant and useful to this study. 
Participation in this study is voluntary and will involve a semi-structured interview, which will take 
approximately 1 hour. 
Participation is voluntary and you have the right to withdraw from the study at any point. If you do chose to 
withdraw all of the gained identifiable data will be destroyed, however, if the data has been anonymised then it 
will not be destroyed because identification of the origin of the data will not be possible. 
Data from the interviews may be used in publications associated this study.  
Privacy, confidentiality and anonymity will be assured by the researcher.  
The information that is gained in this research will not be used for other research and will only be used for 
purposes informed here. 
Data will be kept in a secure location and can only be accessed by the researcher and the participant will be able 
to request their data at any time throughout the research. 
If there are any questions regarding this research please contact the researcher at: 
P10003240@myemail.dmu.ac.uk 
Waleed Al Ghanim (PhD Researcher) 
Faculty of Technology, De Montfort University, 49 Oxford Street, Innovation Centre, LE1 5XY, Leicester, UK 











Consent form for interview 




I have read the information provided in the participant information sheet  
I have been given the opportunity to ask questions about the study, answers 
were satisfactory and I was provided with additional information when 
requested.  
 
I understand that participation is voluntary and I have the right to withdraw 
from the study at any time and that my data will be destroyed. 
 
I am aware that data from the interview may be used in publications associated 
with this study, and that all of the data will be anonymised.   
 
I have been informed that the data will be kept in a secure location and only 
used for research purposes. I also know that at any time I can request a copy of 
the data. 
 
I have been informed that the data will be destroyed upon completion of the 
study. 
 
I acknowledge that data collected may be looked at by some people at De 
Montfort University. Moreover, I give consent for such individuals to be allowed 
access to my responses. 
 
 
I agree to future contact by the researchers if my responses reveal interesting findings or for cross 
reference purposes.   Yes  No 
If answered yes, the suitable method of being contacted is: 
 Telephone …………………………………… email …………………………………………… 














1. Do you currently have plans to use the public cloud for sensitive data and critical 
systems? 
2. What are the concerns that you have about the public cloud? 
3. How is your relationship with your CSP?  
4. Do you trust your CSP? 
5. In relation to your CSP, do you perceive any risks? 
6. Are you able to negotiate effectively with your CSP? 
7. Do you feel that concerns can be resolved through the relationship with the CSP?  
8. Does your CSP accommodate all your needs? 
9. Are you kept informed by your CSP? 
10. How do you collaborate with you CSP? 
11. How involved are you with the provision of the public cloud as a service? 
12. Do you perceive a positive reputation of your CSP? 
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